



T H E

KING of PRUSSIA's
CAMPAIGNS.



Frederick II. d.
K.

Friedericus II Real Bor. 7^{CCa}

T H E

KING of PRUSSIA's
C A M P A I G N S.

W I T H
REMARKS on the CAUSES of the
several EVENTS.

Translated from the Original F R E N C H,

P A R T the F I R S T.

*Ces faits, que publiera l'auguste vérité,
Seront l'exemple un jour de la postérité.*

Oeuv. du Philos. de S. S. T. i. Ep. ix.

L O N D O N,

Printed for T. BECKET and P. A. DE HONDT,
in the Strand.

M D C C L X I I I.

1



388

T H E
EDITOR *to the* READER.

IT is not worth the attention of the Public, how we obtained the *King's Campaigns*, written in the form of Letters, with *Remarks on the causes of the several events*: Nor indeed have we any thing interesting to say on the subject.

Little concerned about the manner in which these Memoirs got out of the closet, we were content to oblige the Publick with a work so long expected.

We

We have therefore thrown it out without any Anecdotes, and even without a Preface, of which the agreeable and enterprizing genius of the *Aristarchus of Generals* stands very little in need.

To satisfy those, who, perhaps, may be rigorous in their demands of vouchers, we need only refer them to the Author's Advertisements; and, particularly, if they want original papers, to the Letters and detached Remarks in the second part; entreating them to be careful in applying to the present case the maxim of the Philosopher of Sans-Souci; who says, " I am of opinion
 " that Memoirs of great atchieve-
 " ments in war, written with con-
 " ciseness

“ cisenefs and veracity, laying open
“ the reasons that determined the
“ conduct of a General, and dif-
“ covering, in a manner, the very
“ foul of his operations; I fay again,
“ I am of opinion, that fuch Me-
“ moirs must be very instructive to
“ all those who follow the profession
“ of arms.”

ADVER-

ADVERTISEMENT
to PART I.

THESE Letters were written by an Officer, whose employment at the Court of the King of Prussia, enabled him, either to see with his own eyes, or learn, by means not liable to suspicion, every thing that passed in the army: accordingly he hath suffered nothing material to escape him; and has not, on the other hand, inserted into his Memoirs, any of those uncertain accounts, that have no foundation but common report.



THE
KING of PRUSSIA's
CAMPAIGNS.

LETTER I.

IN the last interview I had with you, before the King set out for the Army, I promised to keep a Journal of that Monarch's progress, and of the whole Campaign, and to communicate it to you in the form of Letters. As I am tied down by that promise, I begin, with this present Letter, to fulfil my engagements, and I hope, my dear Friend, you will be as punctual with regard to yours: that is, to require no compliments from me, to excuse my faults in a friendly manner, and to employ for your own amusement only, what I may have the honour to communicate to you. If you cannot prevail with yourself to perform these three articles of our provisional treaty, send me back, immediately, this first Letter, that I may not trouble you with a second. I have but one word more to say, before I enter upon my subject: that is, that if I am not able to give you pleasure by my manner of writing, I may, at least, flatter myself, that the truths which I

B

shall

shall take care to lay before you, plain and naked as they are, will make amends for the want of rhetorical ornaments. But now to my purpose.

It will not be necessary, I imagine, to begin with a long introduction, relating to the particular situation and present State of Affairs. You will understand by the Gazettes and common report, that the King, being master of the two Silesias, hath sent a part of his troops to take up their Winter quarters in Bohemia; that the Marechal Count Swerin hath entered Moravia at the head of several battalions, and made himself master of the city of Olmutz, and, that the town of Glatz having submitted to Prince Leopold, the Austrians are left in possession of nothing but the Castle, which is also closely blockaded.

You will know, on the other hand, that the French and Bavarians, joined by the Saxons, have surprized Prague; that the Duke of Lorraine, having come too late to it's relief, has been obliged to march back again, and the Army, which was under his command, is now divided into two bodies; one of which, having Prince Charles of Lorraine at it's head, has taken post near Boudweiss in the Circle of Bechin, and the other, commanded by Prince Lobkowitz, in that of Iglau which is a part of Moravia.

But you have not, perhaps, yet heard, that the Elector of Bavaria and the French Generals, not having prosecuted their plan of marching directly to Vienna, which was much more decisive than that of the conquest of Prague, have now the mortification to see all the places of strength, which they had conquered in Austria, retaken by

Keven-

LETTER I.

3

Kevenhuller, and among the rest the City of Lintz, where Monsieur de Segur, with a little army, rather than a garrison, thought it more proper to capitulate, and promise not to serve against the Queen of Hungary, for a certain time limited, than to defend himself with the courage and resolution of the Ancient Gauls. These events opened the gates of Bavaria to the same General Kevenhuller, and put him in a condition to make suitable returns to the Elector, for what he had actually done in Bohemia. It was this distressing circumstance that actually hastened the march of our Royal Master, and for this reason it was that he set out from Berlin, on the 18th of January, and lay that night at Elsterwerda, a house belonging to the King of Poland, about six leagues from Dresden. Next morning his Majesty set out for that Capital of Saxony, where he arrived about noon. The King of Poland received him with great demonstrations of joy and friendship, and the whole day was employed in the pleasures of the Carnival, which were succeeded, next morning, by more serious conferences, the result whereof was the resolution of marching to drive Prince Lobkowitz from his post in the neighbourhood of Iglau, and making a diversion in Moravia and the Lower Austria.

This being, without doubt, concerted in the Cabinet, in the same manner in which it was to be afterwards executed, the King proceeded on his march on the 20th, and on the 21st reached Prague, where, having had an interview with the Count of Bavaria, and the French Generals, he proceeded from thence to Old-Bolesla, from that to Koenigsgraetz, and arrived at Glatz on the

24th. Prince Henry, the King's Brother, with such of his Majesty's retinue as had not attended him in his march to Prague, travelled by Zittau, Little Bolisla, and Jaromirs, to the same place, and arrived on the 25th.

Glatz, a little town, but the first we met with in the King's new acquired dominions, is situated in a low ground; and the whole county of that name is a valley furrounded with high mountains, and interspersed with little eminences. The Fortrefs of that place has something very singular about it: It stands on a very steep rock, and commands the town so effectually, that whoever dares to appear in the great square, or the principal streets, which do not exceed the number of two, may be easily shot by musket-balls from the Fort. To see the Citadel from the other side toward the country, it appears to be one large house, built on the top of a hill, without any other fortification than that of the rock on which it stands, and very thick walls.

In the capitulation which the Commandant agreed to, when he evacuated the place, it was stipulated that no hostilities should be committed on that side, which was a very good thought of the General that made the conquest of it; because those that are in the town can by no means hurt the castle, but by throwing some bombs into it; whereas those of the fort might very soon ruin the whole town of Glatz, by only throwing into it some burning torches.

On the side next the country the case is very different; there you see advanced works, a covered way, ravelins, and bastions, all very high and

and surrounded with ditches, which, in appearance, are very deep, and cut out of the rock. There is no rising ground in the neighbourhood that commands these works; on the contrary, the attack seems to be confined to a very small front, which may be easily defended; if there be no other circumstance, such as want of ammunition or provisions, to distress the Garrison.

One Monsieur Fontenelle, a Lieutenant Colonel, was Commandant of the place. He affected to shew much resolution, and a deal of good humour: For, a little before our arrival, he had given his Garrison a Ball, on account of the advantages which Count Kevenhuller's Army had gained over the Bavarians. But after all, he began, even then, to be in want of good water, and could furnish his men with nothing to drink, but melted snow.

There is an anecdote concerning the King, while at Glatz, which I cannot pass over in silence. Having certain information, that the Countess of Grunn, who was married to a Lieutenant Colonel of the Garrison, had vowed a fine suit of cloaths to the Madona of the Jesuits, in case the blockade of the town were soon raised, he bought as many yards, of the finest stuff that could be found, as were necessary to make a large robe for the Virgin, and sent a message to the Gentlemen of the Society, acquainting them, that being informed of the fruitless vow the Countess had made, and knowing his men better than she, he did not intend that our Lady should be a loser, and therefore offered her in reality what Madam de Grunn had promised her in vain. The Jesuits were charmed, and came, in great formality, to

return his Majesty thanks; flattering themselves, perhaps, that this was a step towards his becoming their Profelyte.

All the King's retinue having now joined him, his Majesty set out, on the 26th, for Landscron, through the ice and snow which covered that dreadful chain of mountains between Moravia and Bavaria. Landscron is only eight leagues distant from Glatz, but they are Bohemian leagues, six of which are equal to ten of Germany; and they became much longer, and infinitely more fatiguing, by the narrowness and badness of a great part of the road. Accordingly it was very late before we arrived at Landscron, having had a great many of our carriages broken down, and others more than once overturned. The 27th was devoted to rest, which was highly proper after so long a march. The King was the more easily reconciled to this, as he found there the Chevalier de Saxe, who, at that time, commanded the Saxon troops, and the Count de Polastron, a Lieutenant General of the French army, who had come thither in consequence of the King's order, both of whom were to serve in the expedition to Iglau.

The 28th we travelled from Landscron to Olmutz, by a road, one half whereof lay over mountains, and the other through a plain: and this last part of our way to us seemed charming, by the rule of contraries; though, perhaps, others, who had not felt the inconvenience of the defiles we had passed through before, would have found reason to complain of it. After all, the entrance into Moravia, on this side, bears a great resemblance to our country of Magdebourg; and
if

LETTER I.

7

if it does not appear so agreeable at present, there are several ways of accounting for that, from the calamities of war, and the rigours of winter, which, when united together, make a very great change on the face of the earth.

Olmütz, Jan. 29,
1742.

I am, &c. &c.

LETTER II.

YOU found me in my last at the gates of Olmütz. Every one, that is not influenced by prejudice, thinks this place pretty tolerable. The houses, built after the Italian fashion, with very high frontispieces, which conceal the real roofs, have the appearance of platforms, and afford the eye a very agreeable prospect. The two great Squares are beautiful, and ornamented with fountains, and statues of Saints; and in the streets, tho' a little narrow, there are abundance of handsome houses.

The Bishop's Seat may pass for a castle: There are in it a number of beautiful apartments, very well furnished, and you breathe there the air of a Court: Tho' the Count de Lichtenstein, who is the present Bishop, with a revenue of near three hundred thousand florins, chuses rather to appear a good Ecclesiastic, than a great Lord. One cannot say too much good of this worthy and illustrious Prelate: He acts the part of a faithful shepherd towards his flock; yet his exhortations have not so great force as his example: His charity prevents the wants of his neighbours; and he never refuses his personal

B 4

assistance

assistance to the sick, even in those dangerous distempers, whereby his own health is exposed to hazard. He never thinks of meddling in those affairs, which come not within the sphere of his office, and tho' he is not ignorant, with regard to the affairs of this world, he make no use of his knowledge therein, but to amuse himself, or furnish matter of conversation. He is a little gouty man, about fifty-two years of age, with a countenance open and full of candour. He received the King with great declarations of sincere affection, and lodged him, with a good part of his retinue, in his own house, as well as he possibly could. The Chapter, whereof he is the head, consists of men of the highest birth. There are among the Canons, Princes, Counts, and Barons, all men of good estates, and that live like Noblemen.

Besides these, a great part of the Moravian Nobility had come to reside in this City, and the Carnival, there, is well supplied with comedies, balls, masquerades, and assemblies. Strangers may partake of these balls, by giving a ducat each for admission. The genius of the ladies of this country is not altogether the same as that of our ladies of quality: Their way of living has a little of the libertine in it; they become too soon familiar in their conversation, and have something too rustic in their manner of expression. It is pretended that their private interviews are very consistent with the opinion, which one is apt to form of them, from their forwardness and coquetish airs. But this I can by no means affirm: On the contrary, it seems to me, that many of them are very reserved, when one attempts to make advances to them.

them. Those, perhaps, on whom I made my observations, may be exceptions from the general rule: The gentlemen, who are of a contrary opinion, have possibly met with such as were not the most honourable and accomplished of the sex. The case must remain undetermined, and we must come at last to this indisputable maxim, that there is a mixture of good and bad to be met with every where.

Most of the inhabitants of Olmutz are Nuns and Monks: The College of the Jesuits is tolerably handsome, and contains above two hundred Friars and Scholars, besides a great number of servants. They value themselves on having a very fine library; and, indeed, the hall, in which it is kept, may be called grand, with respect to its architecture and decorations: But the library itself consists only of commentaries on the Fathers, treatises of scholastic theology, books of physic, and a great many histories of the church. There are in it but a small number of profane authors, except geographers and astronomers, and nothing else that can excite the attention of the curious. The convent of the order of the Premonstrants at Hradisch, near the city, is more beautiful, with regard to the building; but the library is still less than the Society's.

On the 1st of February arrived the second and third battalion of the King's guards, which had been quartered at Schweidnitz; and his Majesty, fatigued with little ceremonies at the Bishop's palace, which could not be dispensed with, left the castle, and, that same day, took up his lodging in the city.

On the 4th arrived Baron de Pflzner, Privy Counsellor and favourite to the Great Duke of Tuscany. Nothing of the proposals he made hath yet transpired; but we may imagine they were not agreeable, because the King persisted in his designs on Iglau.

On the 5th, his Majesty set out for Olmutz, and came to the little town of Wischaw, which was the place of rendezvous for that expedition.

On the 6th, we set out at the head of four hundred hussars, two battalions of grenadiers, and the Glasenapp battalion of infantry: about a league from thence, we were joined by the second battalion of the regiment of Swerin, and this first day's march ended at the small village of Jedowitz, which was so closely surrounded with rugged mountains, that it is scarce possible to get in or out of it. The smallness of this place obliged the King to lodge his hussars at a neighbouring castle, and cause his grenadiers to march a league further. The battalion of Glasenapp was obliged also to take other quarters, so that his Majesty remained alone with the regiment of Swerin, exposed to the incursions of the garrison of Brunn, which was only two short leagues distant from him: The rest of our regiments, both of horse and foot, marched upon our right and left, and cantoned as near as possible in the same line, to be ready to join when circumstances should require.

After a very bad night in this pitiful hole, we marched out of it on the 7th, and having passed the Zwittawa at Blanco, came to Gourein, a place

place as bad as the former, except that there was in it a kind of a castle to lodge the King in. This day's march from Jedowitz to Gourein is very fatiguing; for two long leagues the road is but one continued defile, between two frightful precipices, through which a broad waggon can scarcely pass. Three men in front may march through it without inconvenience, but four would be too many; moreover the ice made the roads so slippery, that the foot at each step went backward rather than forward. The cannon especially were with great difficulty drawn thro' this pass, and the many accidents that happened retarded our march so very much, that it lasted from eight of the clock in the morning till six at night: that is to say, ten long hours. The King, being in an exceeding good humour, marched the greatest part of the way on foot, which gave great spirits to the soldiers, who always regulate their conduct by the example of their General, and still more by that of their Sovereign. Gourein is a league and a half distant from Brunn; therefore the Austrian hussars, or, at least, some of their parties, came and viewed us very narrowly, but ours were too watchful to give them an opportunity of making any attempt upon us.

We continued at Gourein the 18th. There was so thick a fog that day, that you could not see six paces from you. This obliged us to keep constantly upon our guard, and likewise prevented the incursions of the enemy, who were as much afraid of the fog as we.

On the 19th we set out for Great-Bitiska, through a fog as thick as that of the day be-

fore. Accordingly it cost us an officer, a subaltern, and a dragoon, whom the enemy carried off from the regiment of Rotembourg, that marched in a column parallel to ours, at the distance of a thousand paces. At Bitiska, we passed the little river of Schwarza, and at Great Bitiska found Count Routowsky, Lieutenant General Renard, and Count Maurice of Saxe. These gentlemen had come to that place from their general quarters at Meseritz, to which they had marched with the Saxon troops, and a detachment of French from Teutschbrod by Polan, the convent of Saar, &c.

The latter of these, viz. the Count of Saxe, seemed to be one too many at that place: but as it is not my intention to take notice of the secrets of the cabinet, I shall not enlarge upon this anecdote, which will not fail to become publick by some other means, if I am right in my conjecture: However, the connection of this journal makes it necessary to observe, that neither the French nor the Saxons appear to be now so eager for the expedition against Iglau. They are afraid some attempt may be made by Prince Charles of Lorraine, the former imagining he will fall upon Monsieur de Broglie, the latter on the town of Prague, and even on their own country: but these are vain apprehensions, which the event will soon shew to be quite groundless.

On the 10th and 11th we continued at Grand Bitiska, on account of some regiments of our own, and of the Saxon troops, who were retarded

tarded on our march by the many defiles with which this country abounds.

On the 12th we marched towards Trebitsch, and passed the Oslawa on a high and magnificent bridge of cut stone, adorned with some beautiful statues of Saints. This was certainly the most fatiguing and tiresome day's march we had hitherto made. We were continually entangled with the baggage waggons of the Saxons, which were without number, and did not conclude our march till five o'clock in the evening.

Before we arrived in the neighbourhood of Trebitsch, we thought ourselves perfectly secure; but we soon found that we were in the very middle of the enemy's cavalry; fourscore of these, and some of their hussars, had got into the town a quarter of an hour before us, and carried off the French gentlemen belonging to the Court, and two officers of foot, who had gone before to provide quarters.

The same accident had like to have happened to Colonel Schmettaw and me. The King had sent us to the passage of the Oslawa, to draw up in order a file of baggage waggons, which disturbed our march, and when we had got to the head of this long file, we found we were but a little way from Trebitsch, which suggested to us the thought of going directly thither. By good luck we met, at Boudischau, a Captain of the Saxon regiment of Schoemberg, who was a native of Poland, and of the family of Pirch, with whom we talked till the King came up; had it not been for this, we must, without doubt, have fallen into the hands of those same hussars,

hussars, and nobody would have been sorry to see us punished for a step so rash and inconsiderate.

Colonel Ziethen set out immediately in pursuit of the enemy, with two hundred horse, but, instead of coming up with them, he fell upon two squadrons of Cuirassiers of the regiment of Seer, killed some of them, and took eighteen prisoners, who all told us with one voice, that they had not the least expectation to see us on the road to Iglau.

About a short league from Trebitsch, we had a transient view of the castle of Boudischau, where the Saxons had their general quarters. It belongs to the Count de Baar, Post-Master General of the Hereditary country. I question whether there is a more singular kind of building to be seen any where, whether at a distant or a near view of it. It is like some ornament of a theatre, and the print on the frontispiece of the enchanted island, is the most lively representation one can give of this castle of Boudischau. We shall stay here to-morrow and next day.

From Trebitsch, Feb. 12,
1742.

I am, &c.

LET-

ON
servic
four
horse
conn
mast
port
the
Fre
quo
hav
the
hin

L E T T E R III.

ON the 14th Prince Thierri of Anhalt-Deffau, Lieutenant General of foot in the King's service, was detached with eighteen battalions, fourteen squadrons, and two thousand light-horse, that is to say, Uhlans and hussars, to reconnoitre the gate of Iglau, and make himself master of it, if he should find a favourable opportunity. This detachment was taken from the troops of Prussia and Saxony, the body of French not being strong enough to furnish its quota; and the rest of the army, whereof I have sent you the order of battle, and subjoined the sum total, followed on the 15th to support him.

Sum total of the army :

Prussian foot	19 battalions.
Saxon	19
French	5
Prussian horse	30 squadrons.
Saxon	26
French	4
Prussian hussars and Uhlans	16
Saxon	6
French	2

In all, forty three battalions, sixty squadrons, twenty three squadrons of light horse, and an independent company of French.

On the same 15th day the King cantoned his troops at the little town of Oppatow, which is something worse than the village of Cassoubia, and in the evening Prince Thierri sent an officer

ficer with an account, that he had caused the Saxon troops to take possession of the town of Iglau, after some skirmishes between the light horse of the contending parties; that of the enemy attempting nothing but to cover his retreat, which was directly to Pilgram and Neuhaus.

Iglau being taken and occupied by the Saxons, the small detachment of the French, which was with us, marched back to Bohemia, in order to return to Monsieur de Broglio, and we moved about a league back to another little town called Schlettau, where we staid the 17th and 18th. Here the King had great reason to be dissatisfied with the Saxons. Those gentlemen, who never acted but by the advice of Count Maurice de Saxe, imagined they saw in their master's instructions, that they were to leave our army as soon as the expedition to Iglau should be over. In consequence of this wrong supposition, they had neglected not only to shift their quarters, on the 15th, as they had been ordered, and to draw nearer to us and the detachment commanded by Prince Thierri; but they even got Lieutenant General Count Renard to declare plainly, in their name, that they would return to Bohemia, in order to resume their first quarters, and cover the city of Prague, for which they affected to be under dreadful apprehensions. In vain the King endeavoured to persuade them, that even that expedition was not yet concluded; that the business was not merely to take Iglau, but to secure themselves so effectually in Moravia, and the frontiers of Lower Austria, as to force the enemy to evacuate Bavaria, and move thither in order to protect his own country; that

that hitherto every thing had succeeded, and several advices gave ground to hope for the intire accomplishment of the design, which would amply reward them for a few days patience. In vain, I say, did the King represent all this; they were not to be convinced of their error; we were upon the point of being abandoned by them, and obliged to bear the whole burden of this diversion alone. His Majesty had, however, sent Colonel Count de Wartensleben to inform the King of Poland of the reduction of Iglau, and of the obstinacy of his Generals, which drew upon them a severe message from that Prince, and very express orders to obey the King of Prussia without reserve.

This difference being quite removed, or varnished over, the King set out for Znoym, under a small escort of Uhlans, and arrived there on the 19th. Znoym, or Znaym, a frontier town of Moravia towards Lower Austria, is situated on the banks of the Taya, and of a moderate size. There are in it two grand squares, and several beautiful houses, built in the same taste with those at Olmutz; it is not fortified; but by the help of two walls, and as many deep ditches round it, we were enabled to put it out of danger of every insult, unless the enemy should bring cannon to batter it in breach.

The environs at Znoym are, in my opinion, very beautiful. It is true, that on the side next Austria, the prospect is not very extensive; but it is agreeably confined by mountains, and hills covered with vineyards, and fertile fields. On the side next Moravia it is more plain, the
country

country gradually declining to the frontiers of Hungary, which, excepting that part that turns towards Scalitz, are marked by a high chain of mountains.

I am not acquainted with the people of distinction at Znoym; there are in it, however, some Counts and Countesses; but they have little communication with one another.

The two battalions of the regiment of Trouches had taken possession of it, an hour after it had been abandoned by six hundred Austrian hussars. We found there some provisions, a few old cannon, a great quantity of ball, but very little powder.

On the 20th, 21st, 22d, and 23d we had various accounts of the enemy, all contradicting each other. Sometimes they were marching towards Boudweifs, to join Prince Charles, and fall upon the corps, commanded by Monsieur de Broglio; sometimes they were coming, with their whole force, to run the hazard of a decisive battle; sometimes, they were seen filing off towards the Danube, in order to pass it at Crems; and sometimes they kept quiet in their quarters, and were waiting for a reinforcement of foot, which was to be conveyed to them by the Danube, from the army of Count Kevenhuller. All these contradictory advices were at last reduced to this: That the army of Prince Lobkowitz had approached very near to that of Prince Charles; that these two corps extended from Boudweifs to Neuhaus, and still lower towards Austria; that they had lately collected a large magazine at Crems, to which
place

place they had also sent their hospital and heavy baggage; that their troops were considerably diminished by desertion and contagious distempers; and that they began to be absolutely in want of forage for their cavalry.

Mean while the King had detached Major General de Posadowsky, and Colonel de Schmettau, with three battalions, and two thousand horse, to scour the country towards Vienna, and raise contributions. His Majesty himself passed the Taya, to choose a camp towards the castle of Roitz in Austria. The detachment returned on the 28th of February, having pushed forward till they were within four leagues of Vienna, without meeting with an enemy, except a small number of hussars, and four squadrons of Cuirassiers, who had escaped to the other side of the Danube, before our men had time to reconnoitre them.

During these few days the Saxon Uhlans have distinguished themselves; they surprized at Teuch four hundred Austrians hussars, put several of them to the sword, took one hundred and fifty prisoners, and made themselves masters of a small magazine of corn. The Count de Routowsky is set out on his way to Dresden; every one is fully persuaded that his Excellency will not return soon, and that the command of the Saxon troops will fall into the hands of his brother the Chevalier de Saxe.

The garrison of Brunn, in which there are, at least, twelve or fifteen hundred hussars, has put us a little out of humour for some days past. Our communication with Olmutz, by being too extensive,

extensive, was not quite secure; accordingly the gentlemen of Brunn sallied out on every occasion, and carried off our couriers, postillions, and convoys. Hitherto the evil we have suffered is not very great; excepting some papers of consequence which we believe are lost. It might, however, have become considerable, if a remedy had not been applied; but this the King has done, and our affairs are carried on with greater security.

Znoym, Feb. 28,
1742.

I am, &c.

LETTER IV.

THE same evening, in which I dated my last, arrived a Saxon officer, who had been dispatched, the night before, from the general quarters at Iglau. He said, that when he set out, which was at three of the clock in the morning, they were greatly alarmed there; that they were packing up the papers in the Chancery; loading all the waggons; and the Generals with the garrison were retiring to Schlettau, leaving none at the gates of Iglau but the first battalion of guards. All this was found to be exactly true, but the alarm was groundless, and the terror a mere panic. For the day after, that is, the 1st of March, the King received advice from these same gentlemen, that every thing was quiet in the enemy's quarters; and, the next day, this news was not only confirmed, but it was also added, that there was no appearance of the Austrians being disposed to attempt any thing.

On

On the 6th we were informed, that a large body of hussars, consisting of between six and eight hundred horse, had come to Boulcka, a little town and river of the same name, a large league from Roitz, where the second battalion of Glasenapp was cantoned. Our patrols of hussars, who were coming along the Boulcka, had been surprized by them, and young Sydow, a Lieutenant in the battalion abovementioned, who was but indifferently mounted, made prisoner. Observe here, that the King, to train the young officers to this sort of war, had ordered that some of them, according to the order of the rolls, should accompany all the detachments of hussars, and acquaint themselves with their operations and stratagems.

On the 7th came over to us six deserters, viz. four hussars of the very same detachment, and two dragoons of the regiment of Lichtenstein and Philibert, by whom we were informed, that Prince Lobkowitz had detached General St. Ignon, with about twenty thousand horse, towards Horn; that he expected a reinforcement of foot from the corps commanded by Count de Kevenhuller, and that, in a few days, his whole army would possess themselves of that post.

The same day we intercepted a courier, coming from Vienna, with his dispatches. They contained, in substance, that the enemy would exert all his efforts against us, and that while Prince Lobkowitz was to march up to attack us, a large body of Hungarian troops, posted at Scaltitz, was to enter Moravia at Gœding, to cut off our retreat; we learned, moreover, that a great part of the militia of Hungary was posted
in

in the lower circle of Hradish, and that immediately after all these different corps should arrive at their places of rendezvous, they would advance on all sides to attack us, both in front and rear.

At this time the troops, which the King had ordered from the neighbourhood of Olmutz, and from Silesia, were on their march: But we were too far advanced, for them to join us soon enough, and they might be intercepted. Therefore his Majesty thought proper to detach Prince Thierri, with eight battalions, and twenty squadrons, of our own troops only, to march toward the Hungarians at Scalitz, and bring off our battalions that were on the other side of the Taya, and to move backwards with the troops in the neighbourhood of Znoym, in order to go and meet our reinforcement. The Saxons were also ordered, to draw near to us, and to the town of Brunn, not only to wait for the enemy there, but also to hem in the garrison of that place, and prevent their continuing their incursions.

While we were preparing for this march, we had advice, that the Hainacks or Vallachians, the Moravians, and the peasants of Teschen, had assembled about four miles beyond that place; that they had with them ten iron cannons, and threatened an irruption into the higher Silesia. A party of them had also the insolence to attack the van guard of Colonel de la Motte Fouquet, who was marching with six companies of grenadiers from Foulneck to Cremnitz; but were repulsed with the loss of fourteen of their best men.

The

The Hainacks, or Vallachians, are peasants, who inhabit the mountainous border, between Hungary and Moravia; they are very resolute and live by plunder, even in time of the profoundest peace. They come down, at times, to ravage the flat country; where they take a particular pleasure in ransoming the country Clergymen, and, after having extorted from them sums in proportion to their abilities, they make them say mass gratis, and then recommend to these poor Priests good œconomy, that they may be in a condition to pay the same contribution next year. In their rejoicings, and dances, which are very much of the grotesque kind, they sing a ballad, the burthen of which imports, that if they knew their children would not be as great robbers as their fathers, they would wring their necks about as soon as they were born.

On the 9th the King set out from Znoym, at the head of three battalions, one from the regiment of Swerin, and two from that of Troufches, and marched to Iritz, a large and beautiful village, where we stayed the 10th. This village is none of the smallest in Moravia; it lodged the King with his numerous attendants, and one of the battalions of Swerin. We left there abundance of forage to maintain a body of between six and eight thousand men, for two or three days, and, besides this, the place had paid a contribution of fourteen hundred florins.

On the 11th we marched to the borough of Pohrlitz about a quarter of a league from the former. Captain Blanckensee came post from Prince Thierri, to give the King notice of the reduction of the town and castle of Gœding,

ding, which are situated on the frontier of Hungary, about a short league from Scalitz. The garrison, which surrendered at discretion, consisted of three hundred and fifty men, of the new raised militia, commanded by a Major, a Captain, a Lieutenant, and two Ensigns. Blanckenfee added to his report, that the little towns of the country were full of such troops, and that the Prince would endeavour to carry them one after another. In the evening we intercepted more than six hundred letters coming from Vienna; they were haughty, and expressed great confidence in the new levies from Hungary.

The same night arrived Captain Oelsnitz, with a circumstantial relation of the reduction of Gœding; but there was nothing extraordinary in it, except the bad defence made by the besieged, who, after having stood two discharges of the cannon, hoisted a white flag and surrendered. This officer said, further, that there were behind Scalitz some thousands of Hungarian foot and horse; and it was reported there, that the old Count Palatine de Palfy was upon his march, with sixty thousand men; but that the Prince, notwithstanding this advice, would go directly to Scalitz, with a view to fight whatever he should find there.

From Lower Austria we learned, that the enemy having burnt all the bridges above and below Laab, the second battalion of Prince Maurice of Anhalt, that was cantoned there, run the hazard of being intirely cut off from the rest of the army: On which his Majesty ordered the two
battalions

battalions of Sydow, and about thirty Hussars, to go thither, and disengage them.

As we are to stay to-day at Pohrlitz, I have time to insert in my letter a very diverting adventure, which, I do not doubt, will give you some amusement. Colonel Fouquet, having entered Cremnitz with six companies of grenadiers, had placed a sentry on the wall, near the house of a Priest, or Curate. The good man, finding himself much disturbed by the frequent repetition of *Qui va la?* which the sentry pronounced, with a loud voice, every quarter of an hour, resolved to make the soldiers weary of this post, and with this view contrived to mask himself like a devil; accordingly horns, claws, the serpent's tail, cloven feet, and the fork were got ready, and our Priest, having equipped himself to his own satisfaction, and like a real devil, began to act his part, by advancing towards the sentinel, and, at every step, scratching the wall with the fork. The grenadier began to feel some tremors, but did not leave his post. He stopt short, till the devil coming too near, and presenting the three points of his fork, cried out with a hoarse voice, Thou shalt die by my hand; then the soldier got the better of his fears, and boldly cocked his musket. The spectre heard the click of this fatal instrument, and of a sudden losing all confidence in his fork and the whole of his apparatus, recoiled, and wanted to save his honour by a slow retreat. The grenadier, on the contrary, having once made free with this imaginary devil, followed him close, and saw him enter the house of the Curate, by a little back door. Upon this he called to his assistance some of his companions,

C

who

who were not a great way off; and they coming readily to his relief, the door was quickly forced open, and Belzebub seized with all his infernal habiliments, before he had time to put them off. As soon as he was taken, he was conducted to the nearest post, whence he was next day transported to the main-guard, and flogged like a poor devil, in the sight of the whole town. The Clergy made a great noise about this affair; but the Colonel giving them to understand, that the worthless Levite had, by this impudent masquerade, insulted the garrison, and consequently all the King's troops, matters were made up in such a manner, that the poor Curate was shut up in a Convent to do penance, and the Clergy paid a fine of ninety ducats, of which each company had fifteen, to purchase them black spatterdashes. Every body thought this adventure very diverting, and the soldiers said to one another, that the devil had taken pains to provide them with spatterdashes.

Pohrlitz, March 12,
1742.

I am, &c.

L E T T E R V.

ON the 13th we marched to Selowitz, a large and beautiful village belonging to the family of the Great Chancellor Sinzendorff, who died not long ago. The castle, where the King lodged with his retinue, and the detachment of his guards, is not as yet finished; it still wants half the front of the main building, which is opposite to the bridge, and one whole wing; but the entire front facing the gardens is already finished,

finished, and the other wing is very grand, and in a fine taste. The castle is surrounded with four bastions, and a wet ditch of considerable depth, whereby it is secured against any sudden attack. The garden is very large, with very beautiful alleys, alcoves, groves, basons, bowling greens, plantations of orange trees, &c. in short, it is a charming place, and fit to receive a great Prince; and it is really a pity, that the ravages of war should not spare such beautiful habitations.

The first news we heard at Selowitz was, that a detachment of Hussars, of the garrison of Brunn, had plundered the suburbs of Olmutz, and carried off some horses and mules belonging to the King's stables.

On the 14th in the afternoon, we heard, on our right wing, towards Brunn, some cannon shot, followed by a very brisk fire of muskets. We learned the same night, and more distinctly next day, that the Commandant of Brunn had detached almost three thousand men, foot and horse, to carry off General Count de Troughses, who had, but two hours before, taken up his quarters at Leseck, with the first battalion of his regiment. Leseck is but about half a league from Brunn, so that the enemy had a very good opportunity to be informed of his march, and the number of his troops, and to fall upon him with a superior force. Accordingly they did attack the battalion with great spirit, and, pursuing their laudable custom, set fire to the four corners of the village. Nevertheless the General, with the few men he had, supported their attack for six hours together; but the enemy, returning every now and then to the charge,

with fresh troops and even cannon, he sallied out of the village, cut his way thro' them, and took post upon an eminence, where they did not think proper to follow him; but amused themselves with plundering the officers baggage, and taking possession of a field-piece, which he had been obliged to abandon, because the carriage was broken down; but the cannonier had had the prudence to nail it up. When night came, the General marched back without difficulty to Glapenitz, where the second battalion of his regiment was quartered. The Austrians left two hundred dead on the field, and carried with them a vast number of wounded; on our side, the General was wounded in the left arm and in the thigh, the Lieutenant Colonel Marquis of Varenne, in the right foot; Major Rose, and ten officers more, had the same fate, and Captain Kalckreut, one of the number, died of his wounds. We had, in all, thirteen soldiers killed and twenty six wounded.

On the same 14th, Colonel Blanckensee, of the regiment of Sydow, reported, that he had succeeded in disengaging the battalion of Prince Maurice's regiment, which was shut up in Laab. He had met, on his march, with twelve hundred Hussars and a great number of armed peasants; but having killed about fifty of them, and dispersed the rest, he got to Laab, rescued the battalion, and returned without interruption. In this little skirmish we had an officer and twelve soldiers wounded, but none killed.

On the 15th in the morning, Prince Thierri sent notice to the King, that he had dislodged the enemy at Scalitz, and made himself master of

of a small magazine there. There were in Scallitz only about two thousand Hungarians, who would not engage, so that he made but one prisoner, and killed about a dozen of fugitives; he added, that not being in condition to venture further, he was returning to Moravia, and intended to march through Ungarisch-Brod to Meseritz, to disperse and destroy the peasants of the mountains, and the Hungarians, who were assembled there.

On the 16th and 17th we were pretty quiet, only the patrols of the enemy's hussars came very near our general quarters at Selowitz. We knew these patrols came from Nicolsbourg, whereof a large detachment of theirs had taken possession, immediately after our departure from Znóym.

In the evening of the 17th, Captain Oelsnitz arrived from Prince Thierrî. He reported, that that Prince arrived the 16th, towards evening, at Ungarisch-Brod; that the garrison had demanded a capitulation, and, while the articles of it were drawing up, they had pulled up the pallisades, on the other side of the town, in order to make their escape; that the Prince, having notice thereof, had detached a party of horse, and pursued them himself so briskly, that he had come up with them, and made more than two hundred of their foot and about thirty hussars prisoners; that the greatest part of them had their purses well lined; that he had taken the baggage of the Count d'Erdœdi, who was to have commanded in these parts; and that, finally, the Prince was marching towards Meseritz, and along the frontiers of Hungary, to disperse

or put to the sword all that should fall into his hands.

On the 18th, 19th, and 20th no great matter happened; but we found, very soon after, that General Rothe, at that time Commandant of Brunn, endeavoured to prevent, as long as he could, the blockade of that town: for he had begun to burn the villages that were nearest to it, and was proceeding further as the Saxons approached; which they did from the 24th to the 29th, and consequently more slowly than the King had commanded. We saw every evening some habitations in flames, and, from that time to this, have reckoned fifteen country towns and villages, which the enemy had themselves reduced to ashes.

They intended to play the same game in the King's quarters: for we found, in several barns and houses, matches that had been dipped in brimstone, and other implements for communicating fire. On the 27th also we intercepted a letter from Brunn to one of the inhabitants of Selowitz, wherein the latter was exhorted to be of good courage, because in four or five days the Austrians would come and drive us away.

In consequence of these discoveries, all necessary precautions were taken to give them a very good reception. And the gentlemen being, without doubt, informed of this, have not as yet had the courage to try the experiment; mean time our parties, and among the rest the Saxon Uhlans, have exercised themselves very well upon the Austrian Hussars, beat them in several

veral engagements, and taken prisoner Captain Bebouché, the best of their partisans.

On the other hand, Lieutenant Colonel Pfoung, of the Saxon regiment of Rachenberg, marching with two squadrons, suffered himself to be surprized in a defile, where he lost his standards, almost all his men, and was also made prisoner himself.

You will probably wish, Sir, that I would give an exact description of Brunn; but that is not in my power, as I have only seen the place through a good telescope. I shall, however, tell you, that the town stands at the foot of an eminence, and is tolerably well fortified. The castle of Spielberg, which is built on the top of this eminence, stands there, as it were, on the top of a mole-hill, and absolutely commands the town and the neighbouring places. It communicates with the town by a passage covered with a stone wall, which descends along the side of the hill, and is defended by a square fort in the middle. The castle is very strong, both by its works and its situation. The former were sometime ago enfiladed by an eminence in the neighbourhood, called Mont-rouge; but the Commandant, with immense labour, caused the top of it to be levelled, and that great work was compleated but a little before our arrival. Be not surprized to hear me constantly quoting the Commandant, for it is he that in reality does every thing, and the Governor, Baron de Sehr, who is near fourscore years old, is only there, if I may say so, to shew it.

During

During our abode at Selowitz, the King caused to be distributed to the infantry, cavalry, and Hussars, general instructions in case of a battle. I shall take care to communicate them to you in a particular letter, at the end of this Journal, if I have health and time enough to finish it.

Selowitz, *March 29,*
1742.

I am, &c.

LETTER VI.

PRINCE Thierri returned from his expedition on the 30th. In his march along the frontiers of Hungary he had entirely dispersed the Hungarians and Vallachians, killed a great many of them, and taken ten officers, five hundred and ninety six subaltern and private soldiers, and twenty four pieces of cannon.

That same day, the Chevalier de Saxe, and the Generals Renard and Birckholtz, arrived at the King's quarters. They complained, as they had often done since a certain time, that they were in want of subsistence, and that on this account, and because of the distempers that weakened their army, they were not in condition to act in case of a battle, or any other operation of importance.

The King supplied them with money, and assigned them quarters in the upper circle of Olmutz, that they might draw provisions from thence. But this remedy proved only a palliative, and it was very evident, that for want of large artillery, and perhaps for want of good will, the

the regular siege of Brunn, which was doubtful before, became now altogether impossible.

These circumstances appearing more and more evident, and, on the other hand, advices from Bohemia importing, that Monsieur de Broglio was in danger of being oppressed by the Austrians, as the body under the command of Prince Charles, together with that of Prince Lobkowitz, seemed determined to march against him; his Majesty resolved to march to the relief of Bohemia. And he was the more fully determined to this measure, as the French army was much weakened by the large detachment that had been sent to besiege Egra. Besides this, it was said, that General Bærenclau, with a considerable body from Count Kevenhuller's army, was to force his way into the Palatinate, and put the Marshal de Broglio between two fires; which would oblige that General, with the detachment at Egra, to fall back to Prague, or suffer themselves to be beat one after the other.

The King having seriously considered all these reasons, and having formed his resolution, moved his quarters from Selowitz, on the fifth of April, and, with an escort of ten hunters and fifty Hussars, marched directly to Wischau, in spite of the enemy's armies which were scouring the country.

The Saxons marched at the same time towards Bohemia, by the nearest passages over the mountains, and our battalions and squadrons, that were furthest advanced towards Austria, had orders to fall back towards the neigh-

bourhood of Wischau, and wait for further orders.

I must acquaint you, Sir, by way of parenthesis, that, on marching out of Moravia, the regiments were to lay the country entirely waste, in order to deprive the enemy of subsistence, in case he should think of establishing himself there; and that his Majesty left in that country Prince Thierrî, with a body of troops, with a view, first, to cover our march; secondly, to secure a passage from Olmutz, Wischau, and Cremnitz, for the magazines intended for a body of observation at Troppau; and thirdly, to guard for the future the frontiers of the two Silecias.

In the mean time the King marched on the 7th to Proßnitz, where he was joined by his brother, Prince William, the Margrave Charles, and Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick. His Majesty staid there on the 8th, and on the 9th came to Littau, where he found two battalions of his guards, who had been in winter quarters at Olmutz. We had advice this day, that the battalion of Kleist's grenadiers was, in a manner, blockaded by the Hungarians at Gœding. A few hours after we were informed, that the said battalion had evacuated the place, and boldly set out upon their march; and that the Hungarians, very well pleased to find them gone, had not given themselves the trouble to disturb them.

On the 10th we continued our march towards Bohemia by Mougltitz, forming, with the two battalions of the guards, the head of the first column,

column, which was very soon to be followed by the second.

An officer from Prince Thierry came to Mougltitz, to acquaint the King, that General Selchow, with four battalions, was besieged in Austerlitz, by four thousand Austrians, consisting of eight hundred horse, twelve hundred Hussars, and two thousand Hungarian foot; and that the Prince was assembling all the troops he could get together, to go to his assistance. His Majesty sent thither Captain Blanckensee, to gain more certain accounts of the matter, and on the 11th continued his march to Mærisch-Tribau. At that place a courier came, in the evening, with an account, that the regiment of Mœllendorff dragoons, marching over the hills of Austerlitz, had discovered two thousand of the enemy's horse on the plain; that Major General Mœllendorff immediately formed his regiment on the side of a hill, ordered two hundred of his dragoons to dismount, and post themselves in the hollow ways, to secure his flanks, and in that disposition waited for the enemy; that the Austrians, having formed at the same time, had come up on the gallop and attacked them with frightful shouts; but having received the fire of the dragoons concealed in the hollow ways, their squadrons fell into confusion; and that our's, taking advantage of their disorder, had attacked them in their turn, put them to flight, and pursued them close sword in hand; that they had killed about forty, and made upwards of twenty prisoners. That the Austrians had given themselves the air of rallying again, and returning to the charge; but upon General Selchow's marching with speed from Austerlitz,

C 6

and

and discharging some cannon upon them, they had intirely abandoned that design, and made off without looking behind them, or disturbing our baggage, which was moving forward with a very indifferent guard.

Captain Blanckenfee arrived on the 12th with a confirmation of this news; and, among other circumstances, related, that the enemy, after the evacuation of Austerlitz, was returned, to the number of six thousand men, and that Prince Thierri was preparing to put a stop to their progress.

Upon this information, which was very soon confirmed, his Majesty resolved to leave our second column in Moravia, to enable the Prince to make a vigorous effort, in case the enemy should come to attack him with any considerable force.

On the 13th we marched to Zwittaw, over the hill of Schœnhengst. The passage over this mountain is very steep, but not so impracticable as it has been represented; because the cannon can be drawn round the sides of it, with all the carriages belonging to an army.

On the 14th we marched from Zwittaw to Leitsmirl, a very pretty little village, belonging to the Count de Trautmannsdorf. There we rested on the 15th. On the 16th we proceeded to Hoen-Mauth; where the King had advice, that the rear-guard of the Saxons had been attacked by a detachment from the garrison of Brunn, and that four companies of the Count de Kosell's regiment, commanded by Colonel Sedenz,

Sedenz, had been entirely cut to pieces, except the Colonel and nine private men, who, after a gallant resistance, surrendered prisoners of war. They also lost four pieces of cannon. General Jasmound, who was marching to their relief, came too late. But because the peasants had fired upon him, and he understood that they had assisted in the massacre of the Saxons, together with their wives and children, he made reprisals on them, and extirpated all the inhabitants, without distinction of age or sex.

On the 17th we arrived at Chroudim, after a very expeditious march of three long leagues. Prince Leopold was already arrived at that place from Koenigsgratz, and immediately upon his arrival had given the King an account of the state of the troops in Bohemia. A little after dinner a Jew came, and gave notice, that a large body of the enemy's troops had been seen filing off towards Czaflau : but proper persons having been sent to observe them, it was found to be only a party of three or four hundred horse, that had carried off some flower, which the Saxons had amassed in the winter time, and some thousands of florins in cash, belonging to the land tax. This detachment had immediately marched back to Teutschbrod, the place it came from.

Chroudim, the Capital of the Circle of the same name, is a village of moderate size, ill built, and not well situated, tho' it stands on a spot of ground very beautiful and fruitful. The little river of Chroudimka washes the foot of its walls; and there is nothing else remarkable about it, but a very handsome church, where
they

they worship a miraculous image of our Lord. This image is a head admirably well painted by Lucas Kranach. It's miracles began in the time of the Thirty years war. Some Swedish soldiers having carried it away from Chroudim, and not agreeing among themselves who should have it, resolved to play at dice for it; fortune was so irresolute, that after playing several hours none of them could win it; therefore, in great rage, they resolved to cut it in pieces; but at the first cut given it with a knife, the picture bled. This inspired them with such terror, that they ran away and left it, and it was afterwards restored to its own church, where it is to be seen with its bloody wounds in the face, and a multitude of offerings, which those who have been benefited by its miracles have brought from all quarters.

Chroudim, April
18, 1742.

I am, &c.

LETTER VII.

THE Saxons have, at last, entirely separated from us, and are going into quarters of refreshment, in the Circle of Leutmeritz. It is not known when, or if at all, they will appear on the stage again.

On the 19th Captain Sydow, who had been sent to Prince Thierri, returned from his excursion, which was an exceeding dangerous one, on account of the many parties of peasants and Croats, that infested the road by which we had entered Bohemia. He reported, that Major Bredow, of the Gens d'armes, being cantoned in a village

village with three squadrons, had been attacked by six hundred Austrians, consisting of cuirassiers, dragoons, and Hussars; that the Major, at first, kept them at a distance by the fire of his carabineers and foot picquets; and that having by this means gained time enough for two of his squadrons to mount their horses, he sallied out upon them suddenly, killed some of their men, and dispersed the rest. He reported further, that the Austrians were increasing daily in the neighbourhood of Wischau, and it was said, that Prince Charles's whole army was there.

On the 20th in the morning an officer arrived from Prince Thierry, with accounts, that the Prince, being informed by a spy, that a large body of horse and foot were posted on this side of Probstnitz, had assembled all the troops he could, and marched against him; that the Prince had gone before with two squadrons of Hussars, and five hundred Saxon Uhlans, very lately arrived from Poland; that his escort had at first been repulsed by the enemy's Hussars; but that he having repulsed them in his turn, and skirmished with them for some time, the rest of his troops had come up to his assistance. Upon this, having drawn up his men in two lines, he had marched up to the enemy with drums beating and colours flying; the latter, being between eight and ten thousand strong, seemed for some time determined to stand his ground, but wheeled about towards Probstnitz when ours were within two hundred paces of him, and the Prince, having halted a little on the ground which the enemy had abandoned, ordered his regiments to return to their quarters near

near Olmutz, so as to be in readiness to reassemble on the first signal.

On the 21st towards evening, a courier came to the Marquis de Valory, Envoy from the Court of France, with the news of the reddition of Egra. The garrison, consisting of two battalions of regular foot, had capitulated thirteen days after the first opening of the trenches. The besiegers, consisting of four battalions of foot, and the regiment of Armenonville dragoons, lost in that expedition an hundred and eighty private men, and an officer of the artillery, who was very much regretted. About this time we learned by deserters from the Citadel of Glatz, that that fortress would very soon be obliged to surrender: that the Commandant had given the garrison hopes of relief about the 20th of April; but no such relief appearing, and their misery increasing every day, they would probably force him to capitulate; and this was the more likely to happen, as there were great misunderstandings among the officers, especially between Mr. de Fontenelle and the Lieutenant Colonel, Count de Grun.

On the 22d the King had advice, that the inhabitants of the mountains of Glatz, between Silesia and Bohemia, began to be suspected, and the road on that side to be very unsafe. For this reason his Majesty sent thither Major General Grefchow, and Colonel Winterfeld, his Aid de Camp General, to take proper measures for repressing these robbers.

On the 23d the same General Grefchow wrote the King, that he was solicited to treat with the
Commandant

Commandant of the citadel of Glatz; and thereupon had immediately sent the Colonel Count de Haack, to draw up the capitulation. On the 24th arrived Captain Brounikowsky of the Hussars belonging to our army in Moravia. He had been obliged to fetch a large compass, in coming from Olmutz, by Jägerndorff, Neus and Glatz; whereas, it would have been but a very short journey, if he could have travelled by Zwittaw, Lestomir, &c. but all these passes were guarded by the militia of Hungary, consisting both of foot and horse, and by the peasants of these cantons, who were constantly in arms, and very much inclined to that sort of pilfering war. Accordingly they had carried off some of our people, who travelled alone on this road, believing it to be safe, and, among others, Lieutenant Signoret, an Engineer, who had been sent to the mountain of Schöenhengst to make it more practicable. Captain Brounikowsky reported, that Prince Thierrî was endeavouring to carry off the little magazines of Olmutz and Sternberg; that he was actually conveying them to Troppau; and after sending thither the sick of our army, and those of the Saxons also, he would, according to his Majesty's orders, fall back to that place: That it was true, the Prince was still in condition to make head against the enemy; but, subsistence beginning to fail, in consequence of transporting the magazines, and the forces of the Austrians encreasing, he had it very little in his power to execute what was contained in his instructions; and therefore was making the necessary preparations for a good and honourable retreat: And that Colonel de la Motte Fouquet, notwithstanding the enemy's parties spread quite round
his

his quarters, greatly distinguished himself by the retreat he had made from Kremnitz, with his six companies of grenadiers. I shall give you the particulars of this little expedition ; for it is worth your while to be thoroughly acquainted with it.

The Colonel with his garrison was so closely hemmed in by the Austrians, that out of six orders the Prince had sent him, he received but one ; and the Prince, having no accounts from the Colonel, had already made the necessary dispositions to go and disengage him, when he saved himself and his men by his own ingenuity, and a scheme as prudently concerted as successfully executed. He moved his quarters early in the morning, caused his baggage to file off between his van-guard and his main body, and marched himself in the rear, that he might not be out of the way in case of a pursuit. He had moreover the precaution to fetch a little compass on this side the Morava, and having broken down the bridges, he flattered himself, the enemy would not be able to pass it, at least, for some time, because it was at that time very high. But the Hussars swam over it, and kept constantly about him, throughout the whole march, attacking him sometimes in the front, and sometimes in the rear. It was therefore with great difficulty he could get past the villages and defiles that were in his way ; but at last, when he came near to Kokar, through which he was necessitated to march, he had notice sent him from his van-guard, that the enemy's whole army seemed to be about that borough.

Upon

Upon this, he ordered his van to halt on the eminences of Kokar, and, having quickly joined it, saw, with his own eyes, twelve hundred Hussars, some horse, and a vast number of peasants, guarding both sides of the way, through which he could not avoid passing. He did not lose a moment, but immediately formed his resolution. He encouraged his little army, which scarce amounted to four hundred and fifty men; drew them up in a kind of a long square, ranged his baggage-waggons on the two flanks, and, wheeling about, marched directly to the enemy. This resolute air, and good disposition, quite disconcerted the Austrians; yet they stood their ground, till his cannon had saluted them twice; then indeed they retired without the reach of his guns, and took post behind his little square; but still, as has been observed, without the reach of his cannon. It is reported that General Nadasty, who commanded this detachment, seeing the bravery of our men, swore a great oath, and protested, that he would never suffer himself to be detached against the Prussians, without infantry and cannon. The Colonel, however, without amusing himself further with them, ordered some platoons to take possession of two eminences, at the two avenues of Kokar, to keep the enemy from setting fire to it; he then marched his van-guard through the borough, made his baggage-waggons follow, two a-breast, as fast as possible; and, having observed the same method with the platoons of his main body, he followed, at a slow pace, with the rear-guard, while the platoons detached to the right and left marched round the place, through the gardens and hollow ways.

General

General Nadaſty obſerved this diſpoſition from the eminences on which he was poſted ; but ſeing no means of hurting them, he contented himſelf with admiring the Colonel's conduct, and left him to proſecute his march quietly. Accordingly he arrived, without loſs, and contrary to every one's expectation, at Wilſternitz, in the way to Sternberg, for which place he ſet out the next day.

Chroudim, April

25, 1742.

I am, &c.

LETTER VIII.

I Concluded my laſt letter with the beautiful retreat of an officer of infantry ; and ſhall begin this with a ſimilar, or rather more critical ſituation, out of which Baron Cannenberg, Colonel of a regiment of dragoons, extricated himſelf, greatly to his honour and glory.

Four ſquadrons of that regiment were at Foulneck, the fifth at Graatz, and the Colonel, having had leave to paſs the winter at his own eſtate, ſet out to join his regiment on the 18th of April. When he came to Graatz, he found there an eſcort of forty dragoons, which Lieutenant Colonel Schack had ſent in country waggons to meet him ; and he further learned, that the three leagues, which he had further to march, lay through a mountainous country, covered with very thick woods, which obliged him to ſet out on foot, and leave the waggons to follow him. Having got through this dangerous paſs, without any accident, he diſcovered the town of Foulneck, attacked on all ſides by
a regi-

a regiment of Hussars, a thousand Hungarian horse, and more than a thousand foot: So that he had no choice but to march up directly, and attack them, not doubting but Lieutenant Colonel Schack, seeing him pressed, would come immediately to his relief. As soon as the enemy's horse perceived him, they marched against him, and he, on his side, made haste to get possession of an eminence, on which he drew up his little troop, and made a rampart of the waggons which had been used by his escort. As all this passed in the sight of the town, he was not long exposed to the different attacks of all that cavalry; for Lieutenant Colonel Schack immediately sallied out and disengaged him. But scarce had they marched into the town, when the place was attacked a-new, and that attack continued the remaining part of the day, and the whole night following. In this extremity, the Colonel, considering that the enemy was master of the country, the garrison in want of provisions and forage, and that he had no order to preserve the place, resolved to cut his way through the besiegers, and accordingly fell upon them next morning at the head of his squadrons. The enemy, surprized at this vigorous attack, abandoned a small eminence, on which he drew up his men, sent for his baggage, and called in all his posts. When his whole regiment was assembled, he began his march; but the road by which he came being impracticable, and the enemy having gone before to dispute the defiles with him, he was obliged to chuse another way, which was indeed further about, but less encumbered; excepting one defile, which was extremely bad, near a place called Wigfeldel or Wirsfeldal, through which he must necessarily

cessarily pass. By this means the enemy was in some measure deceived, and he had time to cause his baggage to file off by the side of his vanguard, and follow himself at the head of his squadrons. But scarce had he put the whole in motion after this manner, when the Hungarian foot attacked his flanks from a wood, and at the same time their cavalry fell upon his vanguard: So that he could see no other expedient, but to take advantage of the first proper spot of ground that should offer, to form his men into a square. He had also the precaution to cause twenty four of his dragoons to dismount, who, as often as the enemy came up to attack him, advanced within musket shot, and as soon as they had given their fire, to good purpose, the Colonel came up with two squadrons to support them, which never failed to put the enemy into disorder. By this means he stood their continual attacks all the rest of that day; and when night came on, he covered his flanks and rear with his baggage-waggons, and having made one more of his squadrons dismount, kept only two on horseback to defend his front, and to be ready in any other case of need. He moreover ordered the largest waggons to advance towards the corners of his square, at the distance of fifty or sixty paces, and posted behind each of them seven or eight men, who stopped the fury of the enemy's attacks, and prevented surprizes. Meanwhile his men, as well as the horses, had had no subsistence for forty hours past; his gunpowder was already quite spent; they had still two leagues to march, and a village to pass through, which was possessed by Hungarian foot. The only resource he had, was to make the state of his affairs known to Major General de Moulin, who commanded

commanded at Troppau; and Lieutenant Blanckensee very generously offered to undertake this dangerous commission. The Colonel, for this purpose, gave him the best horse he had; and tho' the enemy soon obliged him to turn back, he was not discouraged, but ventured a second time, and got safe to the place of his destination. However, the Colonel could not know whether he had succeeded, or been taken by the way; and the return of day-light discovered to him his distressed situation, which, it may be said, was growing worse and worse every moment. For this reason, he chose rather to resume his march, than to suffer himself to be consumed, as it were, by a slow fire. He ordered his vanguard, consisting of fourscore foot, to march with their bayonets fixed. These were followed by the baggage with two squadrons of horse; and the whole procession closed by a rear-guard of sixty horse and thirty foot. When they got near the village, the vanguard was divided into two bodies, each consisting of forty men, who were to march down the hills on the two sides of the village, to drive away the foot who had taken post behind and within the houses, and thereby to procure a safe passage for the main body. The rear-guard, on the contrary, as they filed through the large street in the middle of the village, were to post thirty foot in the houses on the right and left, to stop the enemy's horse, and prevent their setting fire to the place. All this was punctually executed, but not without blows: After which these thirty foot and the sixty horsemen retreated with great address to the main body, gradually as it advanced, and immediately after it got clear of this dangerous place. When the Colonel

Colonel had assembled all his men at the other end of the village, the enemy left him, with design, no doubt, to get before him, and harass him at other such dangerous passes; but he had scarcely marched an hour longer, when he heard the report of two cannon, which was the signal of the succours coming from Troppau. Upon this he halted till they should arrive, and the enemy, having lost all hope, and being quite fatigued, disappeared in a moment, and never ventured to come in fight again.

It must here be observed, that Prince Thierri, having information of the enemy's design, had sent three officers to Foulneck, with orders for the garrison to retire to Troppau; but they were all taken by the way, and the last of them on the very day that the four squadrons left that place; so that having been present at all the attacks, he saw with his own eyes that the enemy lost in that expedition eighty two of their infantry, and sixty of their horse. Our's lost only, in the whole, twenty-one men, and fifty-nine horses. The Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, and all the officers in general, distinguished themselves greatly on this occasion; and the regiment most effectually wiped away the stain it had contracted at the battle of Mollwitz.

On the 26th arrived the Field Marshal Reigning Prince of Anhalt-Dessau. He is to command the troops in Silesia, who, when together, will make a beautiful army, as you may see by the order of battle here following:

Infantry	16 battalions.
Cavalry	30 squadrons.
Hussars and Uhlans	30 squadrons.

It

It must be observed, that this Prince was im-
powered to augment his army, in case of neces-
sity, to twenty thousand men, with the battali-
ons dispersed in the several garrisons.

The day before the Field Marshal set out, an
officer arrived from Silesia, with the agreeable
news, that Prince Thierri had most happily car-
ried his project into execution : that his march,
indeed, was very fatiguing, but he had reached
Troppau with his army, notwithstanding the ob-
structions and difficulties, which the season of
the year, the badness of the roads, and the ene-
my had thrown in his way. Here follow the
particulars of this retreat, which you may depend
upon, as I had them from the mouth of Lieute-
nant Colonel Boudenbrouck, the King's Aid de
Camp, who was there in person.

The corps, which appeared on the 19th be-
tween Proßnitz and Olmutz, was the vanguard
of Prince Charles's army, which was said to be
thirty thousand strong, and actually presented it-
self the 21st on the eminences of the last mentioned
town, near the road to Olischau, but in the
evening retired, and resumed its post beyond the
little river of Hanna. Prince Thierri, on his
side, imagining it would return the next day,
made the necessary dispositions for giving it a
good reception ; but the enemy having given no
signs of life or motion all that day, he caused his
heavy baggage, and the sick of his army, to file
off, in the night of the 22d, towards Sternberg,
where they all arrived without loss. The body
of the army, consisting of sixteen battalions and
thirty squadrons, followed by break of day, after
they had broken down the bridges, and shut up
D the

the gates on the side next the enemy. The cavalry marched before, and the infantry having passed the last bridge, on this side of the town, demolished it likewise, and marched in two columns on the two sides of the great causeway, commonly called the Imperial Way. They had scarce broken down this last bridge, when the roofs of the houses of the town seemed, as it were, to blow up, the citizens having thought proper to express their wishes of a good journey to the army, by firing a prodigious number of shot at them. The fire was smart; but their hurry, and the distance they were at, rendered it altogether ineffectual. Our men continued their march with a slow pace, and without noise, the cavalry making the rear-guard in the plains, under the conduct of Major General de Nassau, and the infantry, in their turn, when defiles, or other obstructions, made that measure necessary. By this means they arrived in good health at Sternberg on the 23d.

On the 24th they marched to Berend, or Buhrn, over clayey ground, and with very bad weather: they met with no disturbance from the enemy all that day; but the next, that is the 25th, the baggage, that had been sent before, was attacked, as it passed the bridge on the Morava, near the village called Heidepliz, by two thousand Hussars, who, under cover of the woods and mountains, had got, unperceived, into the neighbourhood of Lesna, or Leschna; and here happened the little affair, which the Austrians would have to be considered as a great advantage on their side. Our whole loss, after all, consisted only of thirty odd baggage waggons, and an hundred men, most part of them sick, who, though

though far from being able to make any resistance, were put to the sword without mercy, or carried away prisoners. As soon as the van of our army appeared, the Hussars took to their heels, and left us to take quarters peaceably in the neighbourhood of Lesna, whence the army continued its march on the 26th to Troppau, and established its quarters there.

I leave you to judge, and submit to your decision, whether the Austrians have any reason to boast of their achievements on this occasion, or, if we have not rather a right to value ourselves upon such a noble retreat, made in the presence of an enemy, who, besides the superiority of his numbers, had the advantage of knowing the inhabitants of the country to be in its interest. Moreover, it is by no means true, that we abandoned our magazines at Olmutz; the whole of them was either eat up, or transported, and we left not so much as provision for the horses of one single carriage. You will therefore do justice both to them and us, if you rank what the Gazettes say on this subject among the vast number of fables, which our enemies employ to abuse the publick, and draw a veil over their own bad fortune.

Gbroudim, April
29, 1742.

I am, &c.

L E T T E R IX.

IN the evening of the 29th we had accounts, that the citadel of Glatz had been evacuated on the 25th. The garrison, which; at the beginning of the blockade, was from fifteen to sixteen hundred strong, when it marched out, consisted only of two hundred and sixty men bearing arms, and three hundred sick, all the rest were dead or had deserted. The King found there six and thirty brass cannon, and some mortars, with a reasonable provision of warlike stores. There was flour left in the place sufficient for several weeks; but their beer, brandy, salt, and fresh provisions, oil, vinegar, and salt, had entirely failed them a long time before; which, together with the bad water they had to drink, had given these poor men the look of persons just raised from the dead, or at least beginning to recover from a long and deadly distemper. I know not to what place they were conducted; only they marched out with all the honours of war, and the King seemed satisfied with the conduct of Monsieur de Fontenelle.

On the 1st of May Colonel Mortaigne, Quarter Master General of the French troops in Bohemia, arrived from Franckfort on the Main. It is said that he brought the King a plan for the future operations of the campaign, drawn by Monsieur de Belleisle; but it is justly suspected that the King will not adopt another man's plan. Monsieur de Mortaigne is reputed to be a very good officer, and, in fact, his conversation and behaviour shew him to be a man of great good sense,

sense, and uncommon experience. You will laugh, my friend, because, in speaking of a Frenchman, I do not say, according to the usual mode of speaking, that he is a man of wit; but such are my prejudices, that I believe a man of good sense to be infinitely preferable to a wit.

On the 2d a deserter, from the regiment of Old Palsy, was brought to the King during dinner. He came from the army in Moravia, and said, that the great Duke of Tuscany was there in person, and that the whole body consisted only of five regiments of horse, ten of foot, and two thousand Hussars, besides four thousand Croats. It was easy to discover that this man was ill informed himself, or wanted to impose upon us. We were fully convinced of this by another circumstance; he assured us, that their army had found at Olmutz plenty of forage and provisions, tho' we knew, by infallible means, and by other deserters from that very army, that they could not act at all on that side for want of subsistence. I give you these different accounts, that you may form a just idea of the advices of deserters, and what dependence can be had upon them.

The same day Colonel Winterfeld, whom the King had sent, on the 23d of last month, to punish the inhabitants of the mountains of Glatz for their insolence, returned also. He had, with one battalion of Margrave Charles's regiment, marched through all the mountains between Reinerts, Habelsword, and Mittelwalde, with a deal of trouble and fatigue; the snow, in many places, being from three to four foot deep. The Chiefs of these robbers had disappeared on his approach; so that he found only some miserable

wretches whom he pardoned. However, he burnt several of the cabins of those who had made their escape, and gave a general order to all the inhabitants of that canton, not to suffer these fugitives to return; but to seize them, and bring them to Glatz; assuring them, that they should be liberally rewarded for their obedience; and, on the contrary, suffer the same punishment, and have their hamlets demolished, if the least disorder should happen among them, or it should be discovered that these mutineers were entertained in their country.

About this time the regiments of infantry and cavalry, which came to us from our own country, passed the Elbe at Pardoubitz and Przelausch, and had their respective cantonments assigned them; so that our right extends towards Kouttenberg, and our left towards the frontiers of Moravia; our center being in the neighbourhood of Chroudim, where we have our general quarters.

On the 3d of May we were informed, that a large detachment of the enemy had taken post at Poliska, a little town on our left. The King detached thither Colonel Winterfeld, with three hundred Hussars, and six companies of grenadiers. Winterfeld marched to the place, and found nothing there, but a large body of Hussars, consisting of near sixteen hundred horse, who, after a moderate resistance, thought proper to retreat: he made only two prisoners, who very soon after died of their wounds; but he staid in the town all that night, and a part of next day, and was informed of the enemy's motions, which were as follow: The army that was sent to Moravia,
to

to ruin ours in their retreat, was become quite useless ; and the more so, that they could find no subsistence there ; so that after leaving a garrison at Olmutz, they filed off in two columns by the ways of Brunn and Czernahora, towards Saar and Teutsch-Brod. This army was said to be thirty thousand strong ; and the common report was, that it would direct its march towards Salsawa, and perhaps towards Prague. Those, who refine upon the business of war, say, that this is an artifice too gross ; that it is impossible the enemy should have the impudence to steal in betwixt our army and that of France, which they pretend is on the point of being reinforced with fifteen battalions and eight thousand recruits ; and for this reason their real intention must be, to resume their first post at Neuhaus, and then join Prince Lobkowitz, to carry on their operations jointly with him. Time will decide the question.

Chroudim, May 5,

1742.

And I am, &c.

L E T T E R X.

WE had accounts on the 6th, that the Austrian parties appeared frequently at Haber ; a little town upon the Salsawa, about three leagues from Chroudim. They had also surprized one of our patrols, consisting of an officer and twelve Hussars. For this reason his Majesty ordered a detachment of foot, under the command of the Prince of Bevern, to take possession of the environs of that town. Those who take things to be as they appear, cry out, that this is a proof of the enemy's design to establish himself upon the Salsawa ; but those who pretend to more penetration, still main-

tain, that all this is only to conceal their design of marching to Neuhaus, and to draw some provisions from that part of Bohemia, which, I know not by what chance, has been hitherto spared more than the rest of that kingdom. There even seems to be some probability in the reasoning of the latter, because we have lately heard, that they are carrying every thing they can out of that country. We shall see, perhaps, soon, which of the two are in the right.

On the 8th Captain Sydow returned from Silesia. He had left the Field Marshal, the reigning Prince of Anhalt Dessau, at Jägerndorf, and by his report, every thing was quiet since the enemy had resumed the rout to Bohemia. Mean time it is certain, that our army, in its retreat from Moravia, has lost more of its baggage than I told you of; not by the industry of the enemy, but on account of the bad roads through which it was obliged to pass. The horses and carriages sunk so deep in the mud, that we were obliged to put our most valuable effects into the carriages drawn by the best horses, and abandon the rest; so that the greatest part of it was seized by our own Hussars and Uhlans, who are very good at that trade.

The King had sent the Captain of Koerbener's Hussars, with forty of his troops, to scour the country: he returned on the 8th, and reported, that the enemy was on his march to Neuhaus, and that the Hussars were forming a chain along the mountains, which separate Bohemia from Moravia. This report was true, with regard to the disposition of the Hussars; but it was not so, with regard to the march of the army to Neuhaus.

haus. For we had information on the 10th, that a large body of troops was marching towards us, and therefore the King thought proper to re-assemble his army sooner than he had intended, to deprive the enemy of an opportunity of falling upon our separate quarters, and beating them one after another. His Majesty, therefore, fixed the 13th day of May, the first day of Whitsuntide, for this purpose, and laid out a camp himself near Chroudim, to be the point where all his troops were to meet.

Before I describe to you the position of it, I must drop a few words with regard to the first day of our encampment. The King set out for Chroudim at eight o'clock in the morning, at the head of the two battalions of his Guards, and marched to the eminence designed for the General Quarters. The weather was exceeding fine: the prospect of the plains and mountains, which are seen from the top of this eminence, as agreeable as you can possibly conceive. This was very charming in itself; but what rendered the sight still more brilliant, was, that you could perceive columns of infantry and cavalry, coming from all quarters, like lines drawn from different points to reunite in a center. You know the beauty of our men, and the implements of war: yet I may venture to tell you, that you can scarce form an adequate idea thereof; as I am persuaded, that the most fertile imagination cannot draw to the life a picture so exquisitely complete. I have told you, that the columns were marching from all parts over the plain, and one might see them distinctly from the General Quarters; but as they had some passes and defiles to come through, before they could arrive, one would have thought

D 5

they

they came out of the heart of the mountains, and the very bowels of the earth. *Parturiunt montes*, &c. says Horace, "the mountains are in labour," &c. But here, instead of the Poet's mouse, you might see strong stout men, and excellent foldiers. Even the King seemed to be affected with such a glorious spectacle; and I cannot conceal from you, that I was quite lost in it, though with some uneasiness of mind, occasioned by the reflections that occurred concerning the instability of human affairs; and that in fifty years time, nothing, perhaps, of all these brave men would remain, but dust and vermin. I did not, however, weep, as Xerxes did on the like occasion; but I could not in my heart but commend him, for that generous instance of weakness. But now to return to our camp.

The center is upon an eminence, as I have already observed; having behind it the town of Chroudin, at the distance of fifteen hundred paces. The right wing of the infantry extends from behind the chapel of St. Mark, and the village of Marckowitz, in a curve line, to a large pond; and the cavalry of the wing is formed *en potence*, from that pond to the eminences of the castle and village of Medleschitz. The left wing of the infantry extends towards the village of Podiebrad, and a little nameless rivulet, which empties itself into the Chroudinka, a little above the town; and the cavalry of this wing is placed *en crochet*, all along this rivulet, to the rivulet above mentioned, having before its front the large village of Statinam.

I admired that day, the manner in which the King, though fatigued, yet not satisfied with seeing

seeing every regiment take its proper place in the camp, made the tour of the whole, and took the trouble himself to post the picquets and guards on the left wing, leaving the disposition of those on the right to the General Prince Leopold.

We expect to continue some time in this amiable place, not only to establish and secure our magazines, at Koenigsgrætz, Nimbourg, Pardoubitz, and Podiebrad, but also to wait for some troops, which the Generals Derschow, Troughses, and Nassau are bringing us out of Silesia.

*From the camp at Chroudim,
May 14, 1742.*

I am, &c.

L E T T E R X I.

I Was mistaken in my calculation : We have already quitted our beautiful mountain, and many interesting matters have happened since my last.

On the 14th, in the evening, the King had advice, by his parties and spies, and more particularly by a deserter from the regiment of Bathiani, that the enemy was at Cholisbortz, about three leagues from our camp ; that he would march towards Kouttenberg, and endeavour to gain Prague. His Majesty immediately formed a resolution to prevent him, and marched, on the 15th, with ten battalions and thirty squadrons, by Hermannietz towards Choltiz and Czaflau, leaving the rest of the army under the command of Prince Leopold, with orders to follow next morning, if the ammunition-bread, which was

wanting, should arrive in time, and to cause the heavy baggage, without exception, to file off by Pardobitz, on the other side of the Elbe, towards New Kollin, where it was to rejoin us.

A little before the King set out, we had information, that a troop of Hussars had passed the Elbe near New Kollin, making incursions into the circle of Kœnigsgræts. Some hours after arrived a deserter from the army of Prince Charles, who reported, that the Enemy's army, commanded by that Prince, and consisting of thirty regiments, thirteen of horse, ten of foot, and the rest of Hussars and Croats, would be that same evening at Nassaura, about two short leagues from Chroudim; that the regiments of Max-Stahrenberg, Molck, Waldeck, and Leopold-Daun, were compleat; but the others very weak; there being among them companies which had only from forty to fifty men. Prince Leopold immediately dispatched his Aid-de-camp, Captain de Katte, with this deserter, to the King, that he might examine him himself, and give his orders accordingly.

About ten o'clock at night Colonel Winterfeld arrived from his Majesty, with advice, that being encamped upon the eminences of Podharzan, he discovered upon an opposite eminence, at the distance of two short leagues, a body of the enemy's troops, consisting of between six and eight thousand men; that his Majesty waited for the army there, and that upon our junction we were to march together towards Czaflau, or its neighbourhood, to cut off the enemy's passage to Prague.

In

In obedience to these instructions, the Prince decamped by break of day, and the army marched in two columns, each line making one. The first column marched by the villages of Podiebrad, Morašitz, &c. to Podharzan; and the second by Marckowitz and Newhof, near Hermanieftetz, to the same place, where they gradually rejoined. We had hardly begun our march, when the King sent notice to the Prince, that he intended to push his vanguard as far as Kouttenberg, while the army continued its rout towards Czaflau; and this the rather, that the enemy, who had been seen the night before, was no longer in that place, having decamped before day-light.

About noon, we made a short halt upon the eminence of Podharzan, where the King had encamped the night before, and the Prince, with his retinue, having gone a little to the left, to reconnoitre the ground, we observed, with surprise, that on the same side, where a small body of the enemy had been seen the evening before, that is, on the hills of Rannow, there was a camp pitched, and disposed into three lines, containing from twenty eight to thirty thousand men. We had no other measures to take but to continue our march; accordingly the Prince ordered the two columns to file off through two several openings of that mountain, and take the road to Czaflau. We were, at first, attended by small parties of the enemy, which came to reconnoitre our march, and when the head of our column was got down into the plain, the Hussars shewed themselves at a distance, but gave us no disturbance. Matters went on in this manner till we arrived in the neighbourhood of Czaflau; but then, they came upon us from all quarters, sometimes falling upon our baggage, and sometimes upon

upon the regiments that were filing off by the little bridge, and indeed the only one, on the Dobrava, near Sbislow; they even put us in pain for our artillery, which could not pass that bridge in the day time, because the two columns embarrassed each other; so that our fatiguing march did not end till eleven o'clock at night. Nay, it was midnight before our camp was well settled. The Prince wanted to encamp near Czaflau, and to have his right covered by that city, and a large space of marshy ground in front; but the town being already in the hands of the Austrians, the approach of the night, and some other circumstances, did not allow us to think any more of that: We therefore encamped about half a league from Czaflau, between the villages of Sehousitz and Czirkowitz, having that of Chotousitz before our center. We had not been encamped an hour, before the enemy's Hussars came to skirmish with our piquets and advanced-guards. We did not much regard that; but a little after day-break the alarm was spread, that their whole army was in motion to come and attack us. In fact, they had left their camp, at seven o'clock the night before, had marched all night, and would have been with us sooner than we could have wished, had not the many defiles in their way retarded the progress of their right wing. The Prince had sent, in the night, to acquaint the King with our situation, and the promising appearance of an approaching battle; and his Majesty had sent him word in return, that he would be with us, and that very early.

On the 17th, then, at six o'clock in the morning, we saw the enemy's army drawing up on the
rising

rising grounds near Czaflau. This was only their left wing; the right was still marching in columns towards Wlaschutz and Bergenau, on account of the defiles, through which they were obliged to pass. However, it came in sight by degrees; and the whole body, which amounted to thirty thousand men, seemed to promise us by its appearance a most glorious day. We had, in all, but between twenty three and twenty four thousand men, including the troops which the King was to bring with him from Kouttenberg.

The Prince, by the King's orders, drew out the troops, leaving most of the tents standing, and put them in order of battle, in such manner, that our right was covered by the pond of Czirkwitz, and the left extended beyond Chotoufitz, to a kind of park inclosed with walls, that reached to Schoufitz. By this disposition the cavalry of our right wing extended beyond that of the enemy's left by six or seven squadrons, which took theirs in flank; and that of our left occupied the ground between the said park and a rivulet with pretty high banks, which, dividing into two streams near Chotoufitz, formed a little island, in which two battalions of infantry were ordered to take post in a streight line with the other battalions of the first line, which reached to the bank of this rivulet, and had the village in their rear. It must be observed here, that his Majesty had directed an empty space to be left in the second line, for the battalions and squadrons which he was bringing up, and that whatever was found necessary to compleat the first line, should be drawn from the second, without regard to rank or seniority. All this you will see evidently in the plan, which I herewith send you, and a great
part

part of what I have further to say, with respect to the order of battle of both armies.

At seven o'clock the two armies were in presence of one another. In less than an hour after the King arrived, and had just entered between the two lines, when, by his order, the battle began by the fire of our artillery. This first discharge threw the left wing of the enemy into a little disorder; which moreover observing that our line extended beyond theirs, had already begun to be in some trepidation. On this account his Majesty ordered all the cavalry of our right wing to advance in a moment, and they, putting their horses to the trot, and afterwards to the gallop, fell, with such impetuosity, on the opposite squadrons, that they overthrew them like houses made of cards. The enemy's second line, which replaced the first, was more lucky, and pushed several of our squadrons, which, by reason of their having advanced too fast, could not rally quick enough: but our second line also doing its duty, and the regiment of Rothembourg forcing its way quite through to the infantry, their first line shewed no great inclination to return to the charge, and both sides contented themselves with keeping one another in awe, except some particular squadrons, which fought separately, and with various success.

It is very true, that our cavalry seemed to have lost a little ground, and that some squadrons were a little disordered by the fire of the enemy's Hussars, who had got in between the two lines, and from thence fired on our flanks and rear. But, if it be considered, that when the cavalry charged, the infantry of our right wing, having
no

no enemy in front, advanced very fast; and that, on the other hand, the cavalry found themselves often stopped and hindered from acting by very thick clouds of dust, it will appear very natural, that they should be left a little behind. However, if this wing of our cavalry has no right to boast of having decided the affair, it is at least indisputable, that its conduct had a great influence upon the sequel of the battle. For not only several Austrian squadrons went off, without ever returning to the charge, but also some of their infantry; particularly those whom the General Count de Rothembourg attacked so bravely with his dragoons, took flight, and greatly discouraged all the rest of that wing; and indeed our infantry, tho' it advanced very briskly during this operation, could never get up with the enemy's, who absolutely declined the battle, and disposed those that remained in their right, to repulse our left, and fall upon our rear. In consequence of this project, the cavalry of their right attacked our's near the village of Chotoufitz, and even surprized them; because they were, at that time, coming out of a defile, and there were but few of the squadrons formed. This was an unlucky accident, owing to the negligence of a certain General Officer, who not having executed the disposition relating to this wing that had been committed to his care, the cavalry was obliged, in order to get into a line with the infantry, to pass two fords, and as many gullies, in the enemy's face; a disadvantage which was very near proving irreparable, as I shall have the honour to tell you, when I come to speak of the consequences that followed from it. However, this handful of cavalry performed its duty so well, that it defeated all the enemy's attacks, and soon after the regiments

ments of Prince William and of Old Waldow fell upon a troop of Croats, and made a prodigious slaughter among them; yet this extraordinary ardour happened to be very unseasonable; for these brave fellows having by this means lost the ground they ought to have occupied, were never able to recover it again; and found themselves so far engaged, that they were under the necessity of cutting their way through two lines of the enemy, before they could get back to our right. This will seem a paradox, but it is nevertheless true, for we saw it with our own eyes. Our left flank, therefore, was almost quite defenceless, and the Austrians might then have attacked it with success, if that part of the cavalry, that was on this side of the defile, had not put a good face upon the matter, or if our infantry had commanded less respect.

You will give me leave here to make a little digression, and to acquaint you, that the Austrians at this time employed against us a new method of joining battle. Their squadrons advanced on a trot, and in close order, according to custom; but as soon as they came within a proper distance, they halted, opened to the right and left, and fired upon our flanks; a method of fighting which cost us a great many horses, and disconcerted our men, who did not expect to be shot flying in this manner. On this occasion, some of our officers took upon them to make our cavalry fire in the same manner, which partly succeeded, and in a great measure checked the enemy's vivacity. We asked the prisoners why they changed their ancient method of attack? They answered, that their Generals, being persuaded that the weight of our squadrons was superior to theirs, had
thought

thought this a proper method to make up for that disadvantage. And this account was confirmed by a disposition drawn up by Prince Charles for the conduct of this battle, found in the pocket of an officer that was killed in the field. But to return to the infantry, where the affair was decided.

I have told you, that the enemy carried their whole force to the right wing, on this and the other side of the village of Chotoufitz. There they attacked our left with all the vigour imaginable; they had posted almost all their cannon there, and made such a terrible fire, that if they had had to do with men of less resolution, they might, perhaps, have succeeded in their design. At least, by the negligence of the Officer I hinted at before, in speaking of the cavalry, they were very near it. Instead of placing the battalions of the left wing beyond the village, and between the two rivulets, as the order directed, and I have already mentioned, he left them on this side of it, which separated our infantry from our cavalry, occasioned the dangerous operation which the latter was necessitated to perform, as has been already observed, and moreover laid our flank quite open. Accordingly, the enemy's infantry did not suffer this fault to escape with impunity; for some companies of their grenadiers got round the village, possessed themselves of a hollow way, and kept a constant and regular fire upon the second line. To remedy this inconvenience, the two battalions of the Prince of Holstein's regiment were ordered to advance from the second line to reinforce the first, and two other battalions marched against these grenadiers, and dislodged them with a great deal of difficulty. At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Count Lievingstein had at-
tacked

tacked the village in front, and not being able to carry it immediately, he thought it would be his best way to set it on fire; and in this he succeeded, but instead of hurting us thereby, he did us a real piece of service. For our troops having abandoned the village, and a great number of Croats having entered it at another place, without the Lieutenant Colonel's knowledge, they were almost all burnt to death; besides that, by this conflagration, the enemy had deprived themselves of the advantage of being able to fall upon our flank. In the mean time, the regiments of Leopold, of Anhalt, Swerin, Holstein, and la Motte made a terrible fire, gained ground every moment, and at last, by their extreme resolution, pushed the enemy on that side likewise. However, they disputed the post near the village with the greatest obstinacy, and having pointed some cannon on a small eminence, enfiladed a part of our main battle. This determined the King to make his right wing fall back upon the left, not only that he might march directly to these cannon, but also that he might surround as many as he could of the enemy's troops that were there: As soon as they perceived his design, they began to give way in good earnest, and, being close pressed, took to their heels with such haste, that in a moment they were out of musket shot, and very soon out of the reach of our artillery.

I may boldly say, that this masterly measure very much shortened the battle, and absolutely decided the day: So that about eleven o'clock this grand affair was terminated, to his Majesty's immortal glory, who, during the whole engagement, maintained a composure and presence of mind that was truly admirable. We gained, be-

sides

sides the field of battle, seventeen brass cannon and an haubitzer, all quite new. The fields before Chotoufitz, and all round it, which had been the scene of the most bloody part of the battle, were quite covered with their grenadiers, and the best of their foot, who had fallen in the action; and the roads, through which they directed their flight, were, in like manner, strewed with their dead, dying, and wounded. Their cavalry, to the number of sixteen or eighteen squadrons, (for the rest were, by this time, a great way off,) appeared still at some distance upon our two wings: but the cannon playing upon them, and our cavalry advancing a-new, they took the same road the rest had done, that of their right, with precipitation, but their left with a little more order and regularity. We had but few colours, and not so much as a single standard. As for the latter, the Austrians had taken the precaution to send them to their baggage at the very beginning of the action; a sure, but not very honourable way to save them. The regiment of Brounickowsky Hussars, the only one we had with us, distinguished itself greatly. It attacked the infantry, and obliged two regiments to form the hollow square, in order to defend themselves. If our cavalry had been less harrassed, or we had had more Hussars, we must have made a vast number of prisoners. But indeed the whole army had been so fatigued the day before, that it was impossible for us to make such an advantage of our victory as might have been wished. His Majesty, however, sent thirty squadrons, and all the grenadiers of the army, to harass the enemy in their retreat; but their cavalry was so well mounted, and the infantry had so good legs, that it was impossible to come up with them. His Majesty made Prince Leopold
Field

Field Marshal on the field of battle, while the village still continued in flames : And he dispatched, that evening, Count Schmettow, Master of the Ordnance, to carry this important news to the Emperor ; Colonel Borcke, his Aid-de-camp, to the court of France ; and Colonel Count de War-
 tensleben to that of Dresden, and to Berlin, &c.

*From the Camp at Czaf-
 lau, May 18, 1742.*

I am, &c.

Sum Total of the PRUSSIAN Army.

Infantry	33 battalions.
Cavalry	60 squadrons.
Hussars	10 squadrons.

*Sum Total of the AUSTRIAN Army, at the Battle
 of CZASLAU.*

Infantry	37 battalions.
Cavalry	84 squadrons.
Hussars	20 squadrons.

L E T T E R XII.

YOU have here the list of our killed and wounded ; the third department is of those who were made prisoners, or lost themselves during the action ; so that all you see here are actually missing ; though we do not yet know their fate.

INFANTRY.

Killed. 12 officers, 26 subalterns, 10 drummers,
 660 private men.

Wounded.

Wounded. 46 officers, 62 subalterns, 13 drummers, 1137 private men.

Prisoners or missing. 3 officers, 16 subalterns, 15 drummers, 244 private men.

C A V A L R Y.

Killed. 30 officers, 75 subalterns, 13 trumpets, 1187 troopers.

Wounded. 48 officers, 42 subalterns, 6 trumpets, 107 troopers.

Prisoners or missing. 13 officers, 18 subalterns, 4 trumpets, 417 troopers.

The officers of note that we have lost in this battle, are Major General Werdeck; Colonels Bismarck, Maltzan, Kourtzfleisch, and Pritzen; Lieutenant Colonels Souckow and Wernsdorf; and Majors Schoëning and Bieren. Among the wounded are Lieutenant General Waldaw; Major General Wedel; Count Rothembourg; Lieutenant Colonel Rindorf; Majors Zastrow, Haus, Knobloch, and Bandemer.

You see by these lists, and particularly by that of the cavalry, that we did not fit cross legged in the time of the battle; and we may fairly aver, that our enemies left in the field at least twice as many as we: but it will be some time before we can come to the certain knowledge of this. Upon our entering Czaflau, about the end of the battle, we made prisoners, Major General Count de Poland, a Colonel, a Lieutenant Colonel, and several officers, who were getting their wounds dressed there.

The King encamped on the 17th, beyond the field of battle, as you see by the plan I sent you with

with my last. But on the 18th, the enemy having halted at Willimau, his Majesty thought proper to draw nearer to him, and therefore marched, that same day about noon, to Slep, where we had notice, that he was gone to Haber, which we were assured of by our parties, as well as by deserters, who came in, in great numbers.

On the 20th we had advice, that the enemy was still at Haber, that he had been reinforced with some regiments, and shewed some inclination to venture another battle. Accordingly, as we also were to be joined next day by some fresh troops, which the Generals Derschow, Troughses, and Nassau, were bringing up, the King gave orders to prepare for marching on the 21st, and General Lewald was to set out at day-break, with a vanguard, consisting of six battalions of grenadiers, five squadrons of dragoons, and twenty-eight of Hussars, including the eighteen squadrons, which were to arrive the next day.

During all these days a great number of deserters, both of horse and foot, arrived at our camp. They unanimously reported, that their army was greatly discouraged; that they did not expect to find so much resistance from our cavalry; that their dragoons had behaved very ill, and that whole squadrons of them had run away at full speed, without so much as looking behind them. That, in the mean time, their infantry had suffered most; that they reckoned upwards of six thousand missing; and that they would soon remove to a great distance. They added, that they would be in want of provision and forage; and that the reinforcement so much boasted, and so eagerly expected, consisted only of two regiments
of

of horse, to wit those of Lobkowitz and Cohari, and a battalion of Wolfenbuttel.

On the 21st, at eight o'clock in the morning, arrived the corps which we had been expecting : it consisted of two battalions of foot, five of grenadiers, and twenty eight squadrons of horse, including the eighteen squadrons of Hussars belonging to General Lewald's detachment.

At the very time these troops were filing off before the King, the van-guard, which was quite ready, set out. The army marched some hours after, and encamped nearer to the enemy, with its right covered by the mountains on the further side of the villages of Toupadla and Brzesc, and its left by some deep hollow ways, in sight of Czaflau.

Our vanguard rejoined us that same evening, but very late ; it had advanced within sight of the enemy's camp, and skirmished with his Hussars, and a part of his horse, upon which his whole army had drawn out before their camp, and continued in arms till after dark. We were informed next day, that it decamped soon after, and marched towards Teutschbrod.

The King had notice sent him, at that same time, by Monsieur de Belleisle, that Prince Lobkowitz having opened trenches before the castle of Frauenberg, he (the Marshal) would join Monsieur de Broglie's army, and fight the Austrians, without loss of time ; so that he hoped to bring them to a battle before the 26th ; if he keeps his word, and comes off with as much glory as the King has done, the war will soon be

E

at

at an end. In the mean time, his Majesty sent thither his Aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Colonel Willich, to see what passed.

You can hardly imagine into what a state of dejection our victory has thrown the enemy, and his partizans. The Commandant of his troops is quite disgusted, and the foot, which at the battle of Chotoufitz was above sixteen thousand strong, must now be reduced to about nine thousand, and continues to decrease every day. Not that the battle cost them so many; the number of their dead, wounded, and prisoners, not greatly exceeding four thousand men; but it is incredible how they ran away; and all the spies and deserters assure us, that there are companies which have not above twenty, or five and twenty men. In a word, they are in a very wretched case, and the poor creatures much to be pitied. Tho' they are our enemies, we cannot refuse them the justice to own, that they fought with great valour, and made us buy our victory very dear.

It is thought we shall continue some days in this neighbourhood, as we are posted to great advantage, and have an easy communication with our hospitals and magazines. My last letter was so long, that it is but reasonable to abridge this, and to conclude with telling you, that

From the camp at Brzesz, I am, &c.
May 23, 1742.

LETTER XIII.

THE news which I mentioned in my last, was confirmed to us on the 24th. Prince Charles is making dispositions for retreating still further. His army, we are told, looks like a wreck; nay, some pretend that it is reduced to the number of eighteen thousand men; but I can scarce believe this account, which seems to be out of all proportion.

On the same 24th, Major Retzow, of the regiment of Kalckstein, who commands a battalion that guards the magazine at Pardoubitz, sent word, that he had been attacked that very morning, at break of day, by a large body of Hussars and Pandours; that they had scaled the rampart, at a place where it is not quite impracticable; but the garrison, having been alarmed in time, had repulsed them, and killed about twenty of their number; that after all, they had got round the town, passed a branch of the Chroudimka, made prisoners an ensign and twenty men, who had defended themselves bravely in a redoubt, and, last of all, had set fire to a large magazine of straw; that the loss of this magazine was a matter of no great consequence, but the Pandours continued still in the neighbourhood, and that he was afraid he should be often alarmed by them.

The King sent thither Major General Lewald, with four battalions, and the ten squadrons of Ziethen. He marched that same night, and next evening came in sight of the enemy's party.

But it was impossible to come up with them, as they retired with precipitation into the mountains and forests, that are on the right hand of the road to Chroudim; it was a large party, and the country people said, it was between six and seven thousand strong. However, the Hussars of Ziethen had time to put to the sword a Captain and upwards of thirty Pandours, and General Lewald took post in the town of Chroudim.

On the 25th arrived Lieutenant Preeck, Aid-de camp to the reigning Prince of Anhalt, and reported, that between five and six thousand Hungarians had made lodgments in the mountains on the border between Silesia and Moravia, from whence they made frequent incursions, and thereby distressed extremely our troops, that were still in quarters of cantonment, and that but two days before, they had handled very roughly the Margrave Frederick's regiment of horse. Colonel Rochow; with that regiment, happened to be in the town of Kranowitz, and had so effectually secured it by the intrenchments he had made, that he resolved not to march out, but quietly to wait for the enemy; when his advanced-guard sent him notice that three hundred Hussars were in sight, and seemed determined to attack him, he only ordered that guard to fall back to Kranowitz, under the fire of the dismounted cavalry, and then made preparations for giving those Hussars a very warm reception, in case they attempted to come too near him. On the contrary, the General, who commanded in that district, having information of the affair, came thither himself, and thought proper to sally out with three squadrons, to drive away these Hussars, leaving two other squadrons for a body of reserve, with orders

ders, however, to mount their horses. He accordingly sallied out, but coming to a place not far from Kranowitz, where the squadrons were obliged to pass a very bad and narrow bridge, over a deep rivulet, a fourth part of them had scarce got over, when above three thousand Hungarians, who had concealed themselves before, appeared, all of a sudden, beyond the eminences, and attacked our people on both flanks, while they were marching upon a causeway, with a ditch on each side, where it was impossible for them to act. They were therefore reduced to the sad necessity of marching back, and, as ill luck would have it, the bridge breaking down, before they were all passed, those who remained on the other side of the rivulet were surrounded, and to a man killed or taken. This was not all; for, as an addition to their misfortune, they amused themselves with firing irregularly, and waiting for the two other squadrons, who were coming to their assistance in this unhappy catastrophe. This gave the Austrians time to pass the rivulet, in two other places, and to fall a-new and on each side upon these unhappy men, who seeing themselves attacked in front, flank, and rear, had no other resource, after a vigorous defence, but that of forcing their way sword in hand. This resolution they indeed executed, with the assistance of the regiment of Carabineers that appeared at a distance; but it was with great difficulty, and after leaving behind them forty killed and two hundred prisoners. This is the only substantial affront our troops have suffered from the Hussars, in the course of the campaign; and this regiment is the more to be pitied, that it received such a considerable check, at a time when the King's armies were every where else victorious.

We had information, from General Lewald, on the 27th, that the party against which he was detached, were actually retiring by Nassauwick, towards the body of their army, and that every thing was quiet in the neighbourhood of Chroudim and Pardoubitz.

On the same 27th one of the King's Hunters came with a message from Lieutenant Colonel Willich, and on the 28th Brigadier Chevalier de Court arrived from the French army, to notify to the King, that their van-guard, consisting of a regiment of Carabineers, and some squadrons of dragoons, had attacked, near the village of Sahay, that of Prince Lobkowitz, consisting of three regiments of horse, viz. those of Seer, Hohenzollern, and Lanthiery; that the former had overthrown the latter at the first attack, killed near two hundred troopers, and made prisoners General de Fin, a Major, and some subaltern officers; that in consequence of this, Prince Lobkowitz had raised the siege of Frauenberg, and retired to Boudweiss.

The French Gentlemen make a great noise about this little advantage, and would not be sorry to have it thought a decisive blow. Accordingly they pretend, after this exploit, to take their repose till the end of July, alledging, that they are incapable of acting sooner, for want of their reinforcements and recruits, which are not to arrive before that time. Between you and me, I am morally certain, that they heartily wish we may have a second battle, and laugh in their sleeves, at the eagerness with which the Germans cut one another's throats. But, perhaps, we may one day or other think of the
common

common proverb, *He that laughs last, laughs longest.*

General Poland and Lieutenant Colonel Lievingstein are dead of the wounds they received at Czaflau. The King ordered them to be interred with all the honours and ceremonies due to their military rank. Prince Charles has thanked his Majesty on that account, and all the Austrian officers, in general, are very sensible of this mark of his Majesty's attention.

On the 29th the infantry and cavalry of our right wing, excepting the Gens-d'Armes, left the camp to go into quarters in the villages and country towns of the circles of Czaflau, and Kauerzim: but about noon a deserter from the regiment of Lichtenstein having deposed, that the Austrians encamped at Teutschbrod, had lately made a great forage for four days, and got a reinforcement of three regiments of foot, the King thought proper to cause this wing to halt; and on the 30th, his Majesty, instead of cantoning, resolved to form a good camp in the neighbourhood of Kouttenberg and the Elbe, to observe the motions of the enemy, and lie quiet till a more proper season; and this the rather, that the enemy was in a state of inaction, that began to look suspicious.

On the same 30th we had notice, by one of our parties belonging to General Brounikowsky and Colonel Winterfeld, that Prince Charles's army had decamped from Teutschbrod, directing its march toward Hompeletz; but that one of his detachments, consisting of eight or ten thousand men, had pushed forward as far as Detsch

on the Saffawa, within three leagues of Kouttenberg. His Majesty, upon this, sent orders to all the regiments of the right wing to repair to the neighbourhood of Kouttenberg, to go into quarters of cantonment there, and wait for the left wing, that, on the 1st of June they might both together enter the camp which his Majesty himself had laid out for them, between Kouttenberg and the little country town of Malefchau.

*From the Camp at Brzesc,
May 31, 1742.*

I am, &c.

L E T T E R XIV.

I Must now acquaint you that, in conformity to my last, we have got into our new camp near Kouttenberg. Upon the accounts the King had of the detachment which the enemy had caused to advance towards Detsch, he sent thither General Brounikowsky and Colonel Winterfeld; they found there no more than about a thousand, or twelve hundred Hussars; who, for fear of a surprize, had broken down the bridges on the Saffawa, and were actually retiring towards their army. They were informed there also, that the Prince of Lorraine would decamp that very day from Hompeletz, and set out for Pilgram, which was confirmed by deserters and by our spies.

On the 1st of June our left wing decamped, and marched in two columns to join the right, which had entered the new camp that morning.

If

If you have that beautiful map of Bohemia, which the late Emperor caused to be drawn, you may, by joining it to the plan which I herewith send you, obtain a pretty accurate idea of our present position. The right wing is covered by the little town of Malešchau, and the left by the eminences near the village of Neschkaretitz ; so that the extent from wing to wing is three quarters of a German mile. Our front is every where inaccessible, having all along it morasses, hollow ways, and very narrow defiles. In the few places where an enemy might attempt to beat up our quarters, the King has caused strong redoubts to be built, and well provided with artillery, which render those places as little liable to insult as the rest. The right flank is covered also by morasses and hollow ways, and the left by small rivulets and marshes. In the rear of the camp there are numerous pits of prodigious depth ; and these pits, which are the remains of the silver mines formerly worked in this place, reach from the right wing to the town of Kouttenberg, which town, together with a vast number of hollow ways, covers the rear of our left wing. Before the middle of the front, and beyond the morasses, there is a wood of oaks, which begins at the top of an eminence, and reaches all the way down its sides to these morasses, the dikes and causeways whereof are occupied by posts of infantry. In the wood itself is encamped Count Hauditz's regiment of Hussars, which defends the entrance into it, and if pushed can fall back under the fire of the posts of infantry. You will understand by this description, tho' imperfect, that our camp is very strong, and that the King, by this position, has it in his power to accept, or to de-

cline a battle at his pleasure. All the connoisseurs admire it, and agree, that the choice is worthy of its author.

I must now say a word or two concerning Kouttenberg. This town was formerly considerable on account of its rich mines, and actually took its name from the manner in which they were discovered. We are told, that a Capuchin, having gone out a begging, walked through a particular spot on these little hills, and observed a vein of some mineral, which he took to be silver. That he might the more easily find it again, he left for a mark his hood, which in the German language is called *Kutte*, and this word joined to *berg*, which signifies a hill, produced the name of the town Kouttenberg. At present there are no such mines here; but Kouttenberg is nevertheless a very pretty town, both in itself, and with regard to the country about it; for it is not only better built than the towns of Bohemia usually are, but it stands in a soil so charming and fertile, that from these eminences one may see sixty cities, country towns, villages, castles, and convents, all in a little bit of plain, not above five or at most six miles in circumference.

The Convent of Sedeletz, belonging to the Cistercian Order, which stands a short quarter of a mile from Kouttenberg, is worth seeing. There is in it a chapel of moderate size, the inside and ornaments whereof are made wholly of the heads and bones of the dead; but with admirable order and dexterity. The Monks tell you, that all those, whose melancholy remains compose the inside of this chapel, were Saints; that

that the earth, on which the Convent stands, is holy ground, which never destroys intirely the bodies of the blessed, but only consumes the flesh, and whitens the bones; while the bodies of the profane and damned, rot, and are intirely reduced to dust, in less than twenty four hours. To this purpose they tell you, that a Preacher of a different Order, having, in a sermon he delivered there, expressed some doubts, though very modest, concerning the happiness of such a number of people, the whole chapel began to shake, and the bones to leave their places, apparently in order to knock the unbelieving Preacher on the head; who, seeing himself in imminent danger, quickly made a solemn-recantation of his irreligious opinions, and by that means prevented the outrage of those vindictive bones. I give you this story for a fable, as it is; the only truth in it is, that the work is very curious, and put together with great ingenuity.

On the 2d, the Duke de Belleisle, Marshal of France, arrived from Prague, attended by his brother the Lieutenant General, and Messrs. de Valory, de Court, de Mortaigne, and several other officers.

Deserters are still coming in continually from the corps commanded by Prince Lobkowitz, and also from that under the Prince of Lorraine.

The King has received advice, by ways not liable to suspicion, that the loss of Prince Charles, at the battle of Czaflau, amounts to seven thousand five hundred men, by the confession of the Austrians themselves. But as

these Gentlemen are accustomed to magnify their advantages and diminish their losses, it is very possible they may have suffered more, on this occasion, than they chuse to own.

On the 3d an officer from the army in Silesia reported, that that corps, which is still in quarters of cantonment, is very much disturbed by parties of Hungarians, who, among other exploits, had attacked a convoy of seventy two boats, that were coming by the Oder, but had done no other damage, besides carrying off, from the deck of one of these boats, a grenadier of the Margrave Henry's regiment.

On the same 3d we received more positive accounts of the Prince of Lorraine's army. It had marched on the 1st of June, from Hompeletz to Czernowitz, and having remained there the 2d, had directed its march to Sobieslau, with a view to march from thence either to Tabor or Boudweiss. But, after all, some deserters, and among them a Quarter Master of the regiment of Nadaſty, arrived on the 4th, and assured us, in very strong and positive terms, that their army was marching to Neuhaus, to which place that of Prince Lobkowitz would also repair, as it had been obliged to leave the neighbourhood of Boudweiss, after the check it had lately met with. Tho' in fact this news be very improbable, and the declarations of deserters ought moreover to be admitted with some caution, it is however certain, that Prince Lobkowitz's cavalry, after the affair of Sahay, fell back two long miles, and that his infantry, which was not very numerous, threw itself precipitately into Boudweiss; so that Monsieur de Broglie, had

had he pursued him briskly at first, might probably have totally routed him, and consequently have made himself master of that place, together with the magazine, which is said to be very considerable. The King communicated these remarks to the Duke de Belleisle, who could not help owning the justice of them.

You must have observed, in the publick papers, that the Prince of Lorraine took a tour to Vienna, when his army marched out of Moravia. We heard some days ago that the design of this journey was to assist at a Grand Council of War, in which it was resolved, that the army should march in quest of that of Prussia, and at all events give it battle. The Prince insisted on having that resolution in writing, signed by the Queen, and rejoined his troops, in order to execute these orders; which were said to be so positive, that he would have been obliged to follow us all the way into Silesia; but we saved him the trouble of so long a march; he did not go near so far to be beat.

It is however true, that this was not his fault. His dispositions for the battle were very good; and with regard to his personal behaviour, all the army bears him testimony, that he gave authentic proofs of uncommon valour.

Monsieur the Marshal de Belleisle set out on the 5th for Dresden. On taking leave, he said, he would make the Saxon troops march in fifteen days at farthest; and that about the end of the month, the army at Piseck would be above forty thousand strong. We were surprized, that neither the Marshal, nor any officer of his retinue, went to view the field of battle at Chotouitz,

toufitz, which is not above two hours easy riding from our camp. Could it be for want of curiosity, or for want of esteem for an action, in the glory of which the French nation had no share?

I conclude my letter with the departure of this great man, who, notwithstanding all the satire with which he is pelted at Paris, seems to me extremely deserving of the praises bestowed upon him by men of sense. He applies with great care and assiduity to the various functions of his office, with regard both to military and political affairs, and is by no means to be blamed, because his destiny hath placed him in such times, and in such perplexing circumstances, as did not admit of his being equally and entirely successful.

*From the Camp at Kouttenberg,
this 5th of June, 1742.*

I am, &c.

LETTER XV.

ON the 6th a trumpet arrived from the Prince of Lorraine, to demand some servants of his officers, who had deserted, after having robbed their masters. He reported, that he had left the army at Sobieslau, and that it might possibly march against the French. At the same time a deserter, who pretended to have left the army a day later than the former, reported, that it was marching back from Sobieslau towards Heiligencreutz, near Teutschbrod; but as he maintained that this march, of eight long Bohemian miles, was to be performed in one day, nobody would give credit to him. The King, however, that no-
thing

thing might be neglected, sent General Brounikowsky, with six hundred Hussars, towards Haber, and still lower towards Teutschbrod, to get the best information of the matter that was possible. He returned on the 7th, and reported, that, not being able to get into Haber, on account of a large detachment of the enemy, who had just taken possession of it, he had marched further, and been informed that, in fact, there was only a part of the army at Heiligencreutz, and the rest were said to be on their march towards Moravia. This account seemed by no means to be exact, especially as one of our trumpets, who, in his return from the Prince of Lorraine had passed through Haber, reported, that he did not see in that place one living soul of the enemy's army.

On the 7th arrived an officer from the army in Silesia, who brought advice, that the mountains, both of Silesia and Moravia, were still full of Hungarians and Croats; that they had made attempts upon Warta and Braunau, but had been repulsed with great loss; that Captain Malakowsky, having come up with a party of three hundred horse, had killed fifty-six of them, and made the rest prisoners: that Lieutenant Colonel De-Witz, of the regiment of Brounikowsky, had, in like manner, surprized eight hundred peasants and Wallachians in the county of Glatz; that he had put a great number to the sword, taken some prisoners, and dispersed the rest of this great gang of robbers. But after all, that clan is like the Hydra, the more of its heads you cut off, the more grow up in their stead.

On the 8th we learned, by our parties and spies, that the deserter lately mentioned designed
to

to impose upon us, and that at Teutschbrod, there were only a few hundreds of Hussars, employed in conveying some forage to their army at Sobieslau, which was preparing to turn towards Tayn upon the Moldau. In effect, upon the 9th Lieutenant Colonel Baron de Willich, who was still in the French army, sent the King advice, that the Austrians, having passed the Moldau at Tayn, and in the neighbourhood of Frauenberg, the French had been forced to abandon their camp at Protewin, and to take shelter behind Piseck. Marshal Broglio wrote his Majesty to the same purpose, and assured him, that he would resolutely wait there for the enemy.

The King sent orders to Prince Thierri in Silesia, to bring him from thence eight battalions and twenty squadrons, the sooner the better.

We have seen, some days ago, the Austrian account of the battle of Czaflau. It is not possible to carry the humour of falsifying facts to such a pitch; therefore I chuse rather to believe their account to be forgery, than to persuade myself that they are capable of spreading seriously such unaccountable stories.

On the 12th, Lieutenant Colonel Willich reported, that the French had evacuated Piseck, and taken post behind Beraun, about two miles from Prague. The loss they have lately sustained of their military chest and magazines, is said to amount to three millions of livres; that is, to seven hundred and fifty thousand German crowns.

The

The same evening arrived Monsieur de Mortaigne ; he told us, he had left the Marshal Duke de Belleisle at Dresden, very much dissatisfied with the Count de Broglio's conduct ; but that the Saxons would soon march, to reinforce his army ; that it was feared, the enemy might attempt, with the Imperial and auxiliary troops, to inclose Monsieur d'Harcourt, and on that account the Duke de Belleisle had sent notice to Monsieur d'Harcourt, to repair to the neighbourhood of Amberg, not only for his own safety, but also to facilitate the junction of his recruits, and the other reinforcements that are upon their march.

By several advices the French are still retreating, and are by this time at the gates of Prague. It is pretended, that they are pursued by Hussars and light troops only.

Lieutenant Colonel Willich set out upon his return in the night between the 14th and 15th. The French are under the cannon of Prague. It is believed in their army, that the Austrians have already passed the Beraun, and may be up with them in twenty-four hours. Yet we have learnt by the return of a trumpet, that had been dispatched to the Prince of Lorraine, about some difficulties with respect to the exchange of prisoners, that that Prince's army was still at Prizibram on the 15th, and was to march from thence to Pilsen, which is thirteen German miles from Prague ; so that, in fact, the rear of Marshal Broglio's army hath been harrassed by light troops only. Lieutenant Colonel de Willich, who was an eye-witness of the Marshal's retreat, owns, that it was rather too precipitate, and that the
loss

loss he had sustained in his troops, amounts at least, to two thousand men.

A few days ago Captain Sydow returned from Breslau. He had been sent with a letter from the King to his Minister Count Podewils. Upon this it has been whispered, that a certain negotiation, with respect to a separate peace, may have had a happy issue. It is, besides, imagined, from the frequent messages sent to the Austrian army, that some matters of importance are upon the carpet; but hitherto no particulars have transpired. However, Monsieur de Valory hath left us a little abruptly, and set out for Prague.

To day, the 17th, we begin to talk a little more positively. It is said, that our peace is made, under the mediation and guarantee of England, and that we are soon to leave Bohemia. The thing is not yet quite publick; but it is certain, that the Gens-d'Armes march to-morrow; that the two battalions of guards, those of Roeder and of Flantz, have received the same orders, and every thing is getting ready for our return homewards. This, to me, seems sufficient to inspire us with the hopes of enjoying some repose, after a severe campaign of between nineteen and twenty months, the greatest part of our regiments having been constantly in motion ever since the beginning of the war.

Monsieur de Valory is returned from Prague, as suddenly as he went. He seemed surprized to find us in readiness to depart; and when he came out from a private audience of the King, every body imagined they observed in his countenance something of an air of dissatisfaction.

*From the camp at Kouttenberg,
June 18, 1742.*

I am, &c.

L E T-

LETTER XVI.

I Told you in my last, that Monsieur de Valory, when he came out from the King, seemed to be a little dissatisfied ; he continued in this way two days, during which he never appeared at our Head-quarters. This morning, he appeared again, with a little of his usual good humour, and dined with his Majesty ; matters, however, seem to go on in the same track, without any tokens of change. Our regiments continue to file off towards Brandenbourg and Silesia. The army resembles a rosary of beads, gently slipping off one after another, and in a short time, nothing will remain in the beautiful camp of Kouttenberg, but the remembrance that we were once in it, which will not be extremely agreeable to the inhabitants. Let an enemy observe ever so good order, his neighbourhood is never pleasing.

A great many particulars are talked of with regard to our peace, and, among others, that certain advantages have been stipulated for the Emperor and the King of Poland ; if these are proportioned to the success of their arms, they will be of no great service to them. As for France, she will find, in proper time and place, and that justly, means to make herself amends for her trouble and expence.

To conclude, this day, the 22d of June, peace was proclaimed in the camp, with the sound of trumpets and kettle-drums. Monsieur de Rochow, the Saxon General, arrived when the solemnity was just going to begin. I saw him go
into

into a tent when the musick struck up in the King's quarters, and he did not appear again till the ceremony was over.

Some would persuade us, that the news of the peace occasioned the greatest joy at Vienna, and in the Queen's army. God knows whether it be sincere.

On the 24th, we had advice, by a man who had been upon the spot, that the Austrian army was marching with great expedition towards Prague; that it consisted of thirty thousand fighting men, and a train of forty eight pieces of artillery, including field pieces and battering cannon. If the French stand their ground with resolution, as I doubt not but they will, we may expect either a notable battle, or a long and bloody siege of a town, which, by the strength of its fortifications, consisting of eighteen bastions, and a garrison twenty thousand strong, is able to make a glorious resistance; especially as, by the confession of the French themselves, they are in no want of provisions or ammunition. But if, contrary to all probability, Monsieur de Broglie should think proper to capitulate, his story may almost pass for the second part of the Adventures of the Duke of Eisenach, who, being shut up in an island of the Rhine, near Strasbourgh, in the year 1677, was obliged to capitulate for his whole army, and could not get out himself but under the conduct of a trumpet and a bare passport, which Monsieur de Crequi thought proper to grant him, in order to his return to Germany.

On the 25th, we departed from the neighbourhood of Kouttenberg with the remainder of
our

our troops, leaving four companies of grenadiers to guard our hospitals. The cavalry took its rout over the eminences of Podharzan, towards Pardoubitz, with a view to pass the Elbe there; and the King, with seven battalions and ten squadrons, passed the river at New-Kollin, and encamped, for the last time, on the further side of it.

On the 26th, the regiments separated, to take their routs to their respective quarters; and his Majesty, attended by the Princes his brothers, the Margrave William, Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, and a part of his retinue, repaired to Kœnigsgrætz. Having passed a night there, he set out at three o'clock next morning, and arrived about the same hour after noon at Glatz. The journey was fatiguing on account of the badness of the roads, and the prospect from time to time very displeasing; for we saw between Lewin and Reinarts, which are but a short league from one another, eleven bodies hanging on gibbets, which, beside the disagreeableness of the sight, had also a most shocking smell. These had been robbers upon the highway, who, under colour of the war, had plundered and murdered a vast number of people on that road.

The King went after dinner to see the fortifications of the Castle. The good opinion I had conceived of it, when I passed that way in the month of January, was just with respect to its out-works, and the fortifications of the body of the place. But the place itself is by no means answerable to its out-works; it is too narrow, and too much crouded with houses, many of which
are

are not proof against fire; so that a garrison could not hold it, if the least fire should happen in it, or bombs be thrown into it. His Majesty has now applied a remedy to these inconveniencies, and ordered all the necessary alterations to be made therein, and especially good casemates to be built. At present, however, the new fortifications are barely begun, and the old much damaged. But one may see by the construction of the former, and the reparations of the latter, that the Commandant, notwithstanding his good inclination, was in want of necessaries for the execution of his plan. After all, to do him justice, he hath taken a great deal of pains; and if we had been forced to besiege it in form, it might possibly have cost us a great many men; we therefore chose the properest course, that is, to reduce it by famine, and this will always be the best method to get the better of such a place. In the weakest place the Commandant had made mines and chambers. But the ground, though stony, is so moist, that if they had been loaded the powder would soon have been entirely spoiled, and incapable of taking fire. There is nothing remarkable in the town, except the Jesuits church, where we saw the Madona, that the King had taken care to cloathe.

There are still in the county of Glatz, about Habelswerd and Mittelwald, some hundreds of Hungarians, who make some difficulty of evacuating the country, on pretence of some contributions being still unpaid. The King has sent notice of this to General Festetitz, Commander in Chief of the troops scattered in the mountains, and made intimation to him, that,
if

if any disorders should happen, or his Majesty, by that means should find himself necessitated to leave some troops in Bohemia, to make reprisals, the General must answer for it to the Queen his mistress. And indeed we are told, that some regiments have actually received orders to halt till further advice. But in all probability this little misunderstanding will not last long.

From Glatz, this 28th of July, 1742. I am, &c.

L E T T E R XVII.

GENERAL Fesletitz having returned answer, on the 28th at night, that he would conform himself to his Majesty's pleasure, the regiments were ordered to continue their march, and we set out on the 29th for Neisse, where we arrived that same day, having only seven short leagues to travel. Neisse is a town of moderate size, standing on the confluence of the rivers Neisse and Byla, the latter whereof passes through the city before it joins the former. There are several beautiful houses here; but the streets are irregularly laid out, and very dirty. The episcopal palace is a large building, and would perfectly resemble a castle, if it did not stand in a little, narrow, crooked, and very dark street. Among the churches, that of the Holy Sepulchre, or rather of the Canons of that Order, holds the first rank, with regard to beauty; it may be called a very neat piece of modern architecture. The painting of the cieling is not amiss; the pillars and pilasters, which are of a beautiful factitious marble, the pulpit, the great altar, its tabernacle, and the
several

several little oratories dispersed in the church, taken all together, make a whole elegantly disposed, that affords an agreeable view. The holy Sepulchre, an exact copy of the original in Palæstine, is in the corner next the great door of the church, and adorns it with the greatest lustre, in the opinion of good Roman Catholicks.

I had been told, that these Canons were a branch of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem; but upon inquiry, I found that they are of an Order quite different, which pretends to derive its institution from the Apostle St. James the younger. The Gentlemen Canons seem even to be offended with those, who would confound them with a secular and military order, and they are so prepossessed with a notion of the superiority of their own merit, that they disdain any relation to those honest folks, as an alliance that would dishonour them. They have printed a wretched pamphlet, on the origin and history of their Order; which is nothing but a string of false miracles, and childish traditions.

The new fortifications, which the King is adding to the old, are admirable. Among other works, according to the plan, there will be an advanced ditch, forty toises broad, from ten to twelve, and in some places fourteen foot deep.

It will be filled with water from the Byla; but as that river might be turned and thrown into the Neisse above the town, means have been found to make a dyke, with sluices, across the
the

the Neisse itself, whereby the water will be made to run back into the ditch. This dyke with its sluices will be enclosed within the fortifications, so that the besiegers cannot render them useless, unless they make themselves masters of the works that cover them, which will be a matter of no small difficulty.

I observed here a thing that was new to me, as I had never seen it before. The Byla, before it comes into the town, is conveyed over the ditches thereof; its bed is between seven and eight foot higher than the surface of the water in the ditch, and runs over it in a canal of wood, supported by piles. The ground also through which it runs, in the neighbourhood of this town, is from three to four foot lower than the bed of the river, and the banks of the latter are so thin, that they may be cut through in a moment, and a very considerable inundation made in less than half an hour's time.

On the 2d of July the King went to Brieg; this town seemed to me not so large as Neisse, but more pleasant, and the inhabitants have the appearance of greater frankness and contentment than the people we have just left. Over the gate of the castle are still to be seen the arms of the house of Brandenburg, and, if I do not mistake, the same arms are also on the front of the arsenal, which, by the bye, is a place of no great importance. The King has actually begun the fortifications of the place, and given orders for rebuilding the suburbs.

I went that same day to see the field of the famous battle of Mollwitz, and had the marches
F and

and the different positions and motions of the two armies explained to me. It is a beautiful plain, much fitter for cavalry to engage in, than that of Chotoufitz.

On the 3d we went to Breslau, where the King, with all his retinue, lodged in some gardens of the suburb St. Maurice, on the road to Ohlau. Breslau is, as you know, a large city, but I cannot give it the epithet of beautiful. If it has an air of greatness, it owes it entirely to the gentry, who often come to live there, and to the vast number of people whom trade invites. Not but that there are some beautiful spots in it, such as the great square called the Ring, and some other places; but, in general, the streets are so narrow, and the pavements, as well as the houses, in such bad repair, that the little good architecture you find in it cannot make amends for all its other disadvantages.

The country round it, on the other hand, is extremely beautiful and charming; and if the riches of the inhabitants of Breslau be taken into the account, we may affirm it to be one of the principal cities of Germany.

We found in it a great number of the principal people of fashion, who make a grand figure there. The ladies are handsome, lively, a little inclined to gallantry, and consequently quite sociable. Assemblies are kept there in the same manner as at Olmutz; that is, you may go to them, dance, lose your money at play, and be very poorly entertained, for a ducat a head.

On the 5th, there was a numerous assembly at the palace of his Eminence the Cardinal,
Bishop

Bishop of Breslau, Count Sinzendorff, which his Majesty honoured with his presence. The Cardinal is a man of about forty years of age, but extremely distressed by the gout, which has been in possession of his body since his eighteenth year, and hath deprived him of the use of his limbs in such a manner, that he must always be carried, or drawn, from one place to another. It is a great pity, for that Nobleman seems to be made for society; he has a great deal of wit, sweetness of temper, and politeness, with a wonderful ease of expression; he enlivens, with his happy turns, every subject he treats of; and though he be one of the greatest talkers I know, yet nobody is ever tired of hearing him. I do not know whether he be as profound a divine, as he is a well bred man; hitherto he hath made no efforts to shew his abilities in that way: But I may suppose, with moral certainty, that he could never have risen to such an eminent station, if he had not been possessed of all the qualities necessary for that dignity. In short, it must be allowed, that he is a most amiable Nobleman, and perfectly worthy of the esteem and respect which the generality of mankind shew him.

On the 7th, his Eminence gave the King's brothers a grand ball, accompanied with a magnificent entertainment. The King was present at the ball, but did not stay supper.

Next day, the 8th, his Eminence regaled us with a very different sort of entertainment; he preached before his Majesty, and took for the subject of his sermon the story of the Samaritan woman, who met our Saviour at Jacob's well,

and particularly the words which our Lord spoke to her in the 23d verse of the xivth chapter of St. Matthew. His discourse was very laconic, and in general turned upon that charity and obedience which ought to accompany all our actions; but my Lord Cardinal very artfully introduced this observation, that we were doubly happy, when, in the love of our neighbour and obedience to our superiors, we met with objects, who, by the superiority of their talents and their merits, naturally obliged us to love and revere them.

After sermon, the young Abbé Count Shaffgotſch, who, among other benefices, enjoys the prerogative of being a mitred Prelate, celebrated Mass in *Pontificalibus*; it was sung by fine voices, and very well performed.

There is at Breslau a large and beautiful College of Jesuits, and several fine churches, where the lovers of antiquity and painting may find a great deal of amusement. The Library of the Protestant church of St. Elizabeth contains a vast number of books, and some very rare manuscripts.

I say nothing to you concerning the form of government in this city: It submits in every respect to the laws of its conqueror.

As to the fortifications, they consist of a plain wall, flanked with bastions, with a ditch pretty broad, but not deep, and filled with standing water. It is said that his Majesty intends to have a large intrenchment drawn round it; but that matter is not yet quite settled.

Count

Count Schmettow, Great Master of the Ordinance, is come hither to make his report to the King, with regard to his journey to Francfort. The Emperor has gratified him with the dignity of a Count, and a gold case of mathematical instruments, made of the same metal. He assures us, that he saw an authentic list of Prince Charles of Lorraine's army, dated the 27th of May, by which his loss, at the battle of Chotoufitz, amounts to ten thousand men.

On the 9th we arrived at Great Glogau, a town of middle size, standing on the banks of the Oder, in a fat and fruitful soil. It did not seem to be very beautiful on the inside, and the castle is no great matter, tho' the furniture of it is tolerably good; but the avenues on the other side of the river present the most magnificent landscape you can well conceive. The fortifications there are of a particular form. The body of the place only has a ditch round it; the ravelines, lunettes, counter-guards, and other outworks, are all of a piece with the covered way, and, instead of ditches, have glacis within them, which, it is pretended, are more convenient for sallies than ditches. The ravelins have intrenchments within them in the form of tenaillons. I saw the three attacks, by which Prince Leopold of Anhalt surprized this place; though, at that time, the greatest part of the works were not faced with stone, and the slope of the bastion called Wolff's-graben was so great, that cavalry might have got over it. However, I am of opinion, that the Governor, with a little more vigilance, might have rendered that enterprize very doubtful, especially

pecially as the garrison at that time consisted of twelve hundred regular troops: but I will not enlarge upon this subject, as you are well acquainted with the circumstances of that affair.

On the 11th we went from Great Glogau to Franckfort on the Oder, and on the 12th about noon the King arrived at Berlin, to the great joy of the Royal Family, and with the acclamations of his faithful subjects.

From Berlin, July

18, 1742.

I am, &c.

L E T T E R XVIII.

YOU desire me to clear up some points with respect to our late victory:

1st. Whether this battle was an accidental blow, and, so to speak, a sort of chance-medley, without being thought of before hand by either side, as is said where you are?

2dly. Whether it be true, that the order of battle, with regard to the ground, was none of the best?

3dly. Whether it can be said, that the infantry alone beat the enemy, as your friend, the modern Polard, hath written you?

As to the first and third articles, I shall answer, without respect of persons, what I take to be true and reasonable; but with regard to the second, which concerns the order of battle, I shall communicate to you only the sentiments of some con-

connoisseurs, without adding my own, which would be of no great weight.

It was said in our army, as well as with you, that the Prince of Lorraine intended no more than to gain some marches upon us, in order to get to Prague; and the King having advanced towards Kouttenberg to interrupt his passage, this diversity of designs had occasioned the battle.

These, however, were only common reports, spread by some people, who imagine they can at once account for every thing; but which those who understand the art of war, discover at first glance to be idle and ill grounded surmises; as they cannot imagine that Prince Charles's march could possibly have any other design but that of giving us battle.

And, indeed, what could that Prince have gained by concealing from us his march towards the city of Prague? Was he sure he could take it by storm as soon as he arrived? I believe not; and he was still less capable of laying siege to it, being in want of artillery, and other parts of the apparatus necessary for such enterprizes.

But supposing he had had every thing that was necessary on such an occasion, can it be imagined that a General of good sense would have left us in his rear, with an army almost as numerous as his own; and, if I may say so, a better one? Nay, an army which, besides that advantage, might be increased at our pleasure, by reinforcements drawn from Silesia, as it actually was a few days after the battle?

It is, therefore, evident, that the Prince of Lorraine had no other design but that of giving us battle, and thereby putting it out of our power to interrupt the operations he had projected against the Marechal de Broglio. A design, which afterwards appeared very plain, when the Queen of Hungary, upon the loss of the battle, made haste to conclude a peace with the King, that she might unite her whole force against the French, and ruin them.

The King, on his side, being well apprised of Prince Charles's intentions, had a mind to save him part of his march, and to gain the plain of Czaflau, that he might fight him there, with the greater advantage. So that it was by no means a matter of chance, or an accident unforeseen, but a design well concerted on both sides.

It is true, the King, by pushing his van-guard beyond Czaflau, as far as Kouttenberg, seemed, by removing from the body of his army, not to expect a battle so soon: but, as Prince Leopold had positive orders to follow him next day, and as by one single march he could join the vanguard, and as the enemy, marching slowly through a broken country, had it not in his power to prevent us, his Majesty had all the time necessary for drawing his army together; especially as the town of Kouttenberg was no further distant from Prince Leopold's camp than two short hours march, through a plain country, without any defiles to pass; an advantage which also prevailed with the King not to fatigue his troops with a march by night to reinforce us, but to wait for broad day-light.

The

The Prince of Lorraine, in the mean time, began his march very early in the morning, in four columns, two of cavalry on the wings, and two of infantry in the center. A part of his Hussars preceded the whole, in order to skirmish; the rest of them, and the irregular foot, marched in the rear, by way of reserve. He set out from his camp at Renow the night before, with design, perhaps, to surprize us by break of day; but the hollow ways, the little morasses and gullies, of which this plain is full, protracted his march, especially that of his right wing, which wanted room to form, and more particularly the cavalry thereof, which was never drawn up in very good order.

In his approach to us, he had Czaflau on his left, and when he formed his line, he had it in his rear, so that this wing of cavalry, stretching a great way beyond the town, was quite useless, and left a considerable space of empty ground between it and the lake of Circkwitz. The right wing of his infantry had in front the village of Chotoufitz, and the cavalry was opposite to our left, but under great disadvantages for acting, or charging with vigour, on account of the ditches, gullies, and hollows that abounded all along the front, as far as the park of Schoufitz.

Prince Leopold drew up our army upon the same principle, the cavalry, equally divided, being on the two wings; with this difference, that our right was, in some measure, covered by the lake of Circkwitz, and our left by the park aforesaid; whereby they had this advantage over those of the enemy, that they could not be flanked.

However, in the opinion of some officers of great experience, neither of these orders of battle were quite agreeable to rules, or rather, were both quite improper on the present occasion; and if we consider the reasons they give for their opinion, we shall find it a difficult matter to avoid submitting to them.

Is it then absolutely and indispensibly necessary, say these criticks, to go always the common road? Does the rule, of dividing the cavalry between the two wings, admit of no exception, whatever circumstances may require. Certainly we should commit a gross blunder, if we applied this principle of Tactics on all occasions, and especially on those where it would do more hurt than good. Yet the two Generals, who commanded the Prussians and the Austrians, fell both into this mistake, and the former was still more in the wrong than the other. For the former, being master of the ground before the battle, ought to have examined it carefully, and have suited his disposition to it; whereas Prince Charles made his dispositions after he saw us in possession of the plain, and when he had not time to reconnoitre its situation. But this excuses him only in part. He ought to have had in his army a good many officers who were acquainted with those places: But what do I say? he actually had with him a General Officer, who was a proprietor of lands in that place, and consequently was sufficiently acquainted with the situation of it, if he had been pleased to think of him.

In this, then, consisted the fault which is common to both the Generals; viz. in having posted their cavalry so as to render it useless. It hath
already

already been observed, that the ground before our left was very much embarrassed, and by no means proper for the operations of cavalry; so that the right wing of the Austrians could not come at us, without breaking its order in passing the defiles, and we could not advance to it, without exposing ourselves to the same inconvenience.

The criticks make this circumstance the foundation of their reasonings, and pretend, that the Prussian General ought to have placed infantry in that post, and extended it to the park of Sehousitz, which, being inclosed with a wall, would have covered them, and kept the enemy's cavalry from attacking them any where but in front, which would not have been an easy matter, for the reasons above assigned. He might, moreover, have supported that infantry, drawn up in one single line, by ten or twelve squadrons of dragoons, which would have been more than sufficient for this purpose. This disposition would have allowed him to strengthen his right wing with fifteen or twenty squadrons, which would have made it superior to Prince Charles's left, at least by ten squadrons. It is so much the more probable, that, with this additional weight, the left wing of the enemy would have been beat and put to flight, as it is evident it was actually broken by the first assault of our first line, tho' not very strong, nor so close and compact as it ought to have been; for, to mention it only by the bye, our extreme attention to stretch our line beyond that of the enemy induced us to make the distances between our squadrons too great. Now this circumstance being a well known fact, have we not a right to suppose, that the enemy's

cavalry being once broke, it would have been an easy matter to drive them a great way off, by means of our first line, and to turn with the second upon the enemy's infantry, already embarrassed and disordered by the first shock, which must have immediately secured the victory? This reasoning becomes still more plausible, when we consider, that a great many of the Austrian squadrons, after having been once routed, never returned to the charge, neither together nor apart; that about the end of the battle, there were not in all that wing above fourteen or fifteen squadrons, which remained spectators of the rout of their infantry; and that a part of that infantry was put into such confusion as never to shew themselves again, which obliged the General absolutely to decline the attack there, and exert his utmost efforts against our left.

The natural consequence of all this is, that if the first attack had been supported, it could not have failed to produce a total defeat of that whole wing of the Austrians, both cavalry and infantry, which must have infallibly drawn after it all the rest. But our right wing being inferior in cavalry, and the spaces betwixt our squadrons too wide, and they, in consequence of this, in danger of being flanked, very soon lost the advantage gained by its first vigour, and could not complete what it had so happily begun.

As for our left wing, those criticks think the disposition thereof still more defective. Whoever has seen, continue they, the field of battle, must have observed, that from the rivulet, which runs on the left of Chotoufitz, and forms a little island

island near that village, to the park of Sehoufitz, the ground, as has been already observed, is very impracticable, and full of embarrassments for cavalry, but very advantageous for infantry, who could be posted in it, in order to keep in awe a wing of cavalry, and wholly prevent its operations.

This spot of ground not being very extensive, and there being occasion only for one single line of infantry, a few battalions would have filled the line, and fifteen squadrons in the second line would have been sufficient to support them. Nay, it is supposed that ten squadrons would have been enough, the difficulty which the Austrian cavalry must have found in approaching us on that side, being so great, that they could not march in one front above a hundred paces together, without filing off every moment, and therefore must have been exposed to a very terrible fire.

The event seems to justify this supposition. For on the one hand, our squadrons of the first line attempting to advance, either to get into a line with the infantry, or to attack the enemy, (a motion, which perhaps was made improperly,) they were obliged immediately to file off, and break, which had this bad effect, that, notwithstanding their brave attack, they were put into disorder, and not having room enough behind them, to form again into a line, they were reduced to the necessity of forcing their way, in the best manner they could, through the enemy's two lines, over the bellies of a troop of Croats, and through the fire of a good part of the infantry, whereby they lost more than the third part of their number. On the other hand, if the ground had not been such as I have described it, what could,
in

in that case, have kept the Austrian cavalry from pushing their point, of falling upon the remainder of ours, putting them intirely to the rout, and forming themselves upon our flank and rear? Yet none of these things were attempted; and the loss sustained afterwards by the regiment of Werdeck dragoons proceeded from their imprudently venturing to engage, some in the village, a corner of which was, at that time, possessed by Pandours, and some in the hollow-ways, where some companies of the enemy's grenadiers had taken post, as you must have seen in my account of the battle.

It will be answered, without doubt, and with some appearance of reason, that the Austrian cavalry had also suffered from the efforts of ours, and that several of their squadrons were put to flight; but still, what was left entire seems to have been sufficient to put ours entirely to the rout, and it is to be presumed that they would infallibly have attempted it, if they had not met with real obstacles, which they could not surmount.

With us, the misfortune that beset this wing of our cavalry is imputed to the negligence of a certain General Officer, who did not execute the order he had received, to post two battalions in the island formed by the little rivulet. But besides that this General Officer absolutely denies the fact, and that the pretended order was only verbal, and without witnesses, which makes the proof of it a matter of some difficulty, it is also certain, that these two battalions could be no support

port to the cavalry, after the latter found themselves obliged to march forward.

From all this the criticks conclude, that the disposition of the army was indeed conformable to the general custom, but improper in the present case ; and that therefore it ought to have been quite different. Their scheme is as follows : they place fifty squadrons of cavalry on the right wing, and the rest on the left, that is, ten squadrons to support the line of infantry, which they would extend to the park of Schoufritz, behind the broken ground. As this wing, consisting of one single line of infantry, supported by ten squadrons, and covered by the park wall, could not be attacked in flank or rear, it ought to have served as a center of motion to the whole army, which, beginning the battle by the right wing, in this case superior by ten squadrons to Prince Charles's, must have overpowered it; and, falling upon his whole line of infantry, would have still advanced, turning at the same time towards the left, while a sufficient number of squadrons would have pursued the enemy, and prevented his rallying. On this plan we should have had no occasion for cavalry on our left wing ; ten squadrons would have been sufficient to support it, and, even supposing the worst, the infantry alone would have been able to keep the enemy's cavalry from advancing over ground so unfavourable to their operations.

It is again objected, that if Prince Charles, following the same method, had posted the bulk of his cavalry on the left, the match would have been equal with regard to disposition, and his wing greatly superior to ours.

But

But our criticks answer, first, That Prince Charles did not do so, and that we might have observed this very plainly, if we had taken sufficient notice; his march, and his proceeding in drawing up his army, being neither rapid nor secret; and secondly, he could not do it with such security as we. His right wing, having nothing to cover it, would have been presently attacked in flank by our cavalry; and the Prince, supposing we had had a whole wing ready to attack him, would have been guilty of a great fault if he had weakened his. This is what these Gentlemen say; and if you maturely consider their arguments, and all that happened during the battle, and at the conclusion of it, you will be qualified to decide the question.

With respect to the glory, which is ascribed to the infantry, of having alone beat the enemy, I must tell you very plainly, that that is true in one sense, and very false in another. It is true, if you consider only the battle between the infantry on the one side and on the other; for in this the cavalry had no share, except that it lessened a little the number of the enemy's foot, when put into disorder, at the first charges. But since to beat one part, and to have nothing to do with the other, is not beating a whole army, I see not how it can be said, that the infantry alone performed all the exploits atchieved in this battle.

Take particular notice of what I am going to tell you, in as few words as I possibly can, and then decide the controversy yourself.

At the first charge of our right wing, the cavalry of the enemy's first line was overthrown, and
tho'

tho' the second re-established their affairs, and stopt the progress of ours, yet several squadrons, and particularly the regiment of Olonna dragoons, left the field of battle, and returned no more: some battalions, imagining themselves most exposed, after this rout, imitated the ill example set them, and the confusion among them came to be so great, that if our cavalry had supported their attack with the same vigour, the enemy, from that moment, must have been beat without resource: But having flagged, and been repulsed by the second line of the Austrians, the first advantage was quite lost, and they retreated in their turn; whence it happened, as is observed in the relation, that it was no longer a battle of wing against wing, but a sort of skirmish, so to speak, between some detached squadrons, with various success, and by no means decisive. However, as ours were not every where beat, but beat also in their turn, the number of the enemy's squadrons diminished so considerably, that out of forty that were on that wing, at the beginning of the battle, we saw only thirteen or fifteen, when they made their retreat. You may see, by this circumstance, that such a small number of squadrons were not able to push ours very far, and still less to fall back upon our infantry; because, besides the resistance they must have met with there, our cavalry might have recovered from their surprize, and returned to the charge. They did therefore as much as could be expected, by keeping them in awe, and one cannot easily comprehend, how they succeeded even in this, unless he supposes, that a panic had quite turned the heads of our whole wing. What you may depend upon is, that

that not a single Austrian squadron came within musket shot of our infantry. It is true, that four or five squadrons of horse appeared at some distance from our rear, and that we let fly some cannon shot at them without effect; but we soon discovered, that they were some of our own horse, who did not appear to great advantage in that post. Excepting these, we did not see, on our right wing, either friends or enemies, till the end of the action, when the latter retreated and ours returned, but at leisure, and with no great inclination to renew the battle.

As to the right wing of the Austrians, their cavalry attempted nothing with vigour; the ground, without doubt, prevented them: and as the heat of the battle, between the infantry of the two armies, was at the village of Chotoufitz; as the flank of our left wing was also sufficiently covered, and there were still some squadrons of dragoons unbroken, they had sufficient reason to proceed with caution; so that, on this wing, as well as the other, the Austrian cavalry did not at all meddle with our foot. On the contrary, on both wings they were too discreet to disturb the operations of the infantry, and we never saw either the one or the other, till the battle was at an end, and the victory secure.

It will, moreover, seem very extraordinary to you, that notwithstanding a whole wing of our cavalry was beat off, and another reduced to ten or twelve squadrons, our main body did not suffer by an accident so unfavourable. But when you consider, that the Austrian cavalry, though
they


they drove ours out of the field, were become the weakest of the two, by what they suffered in the first attack, your wonder will cease. The enemy had the prudence not to attempt too much; whilst our men deserved blame for losing their senses so far as not to see, that those who were pursuing them were in a worse condition than themselves, and that they might easily have drove them before them, in their turn, if they could but have put a better face upon the matter. So true it is, that when confusion once prevails among a body of horse, it is a very difficult matter to find a remedy.


From Berlin, Sept.

13, 1742.

I am, &c.

The END of the FIRST PART.






T H E
KING of PRUSSIA's
C A M P A I G N S.

W I T H
REMARKS on the CAUSES of the
several EVENTS.

Translated from the Original F R E N C H.

P A R T the S E C O N D.



*New Books printed for T. BECKET and
P. A. De HONDT.*

1. **M**MILITARY Instructions, written by the King of Prussia for the Generals of his Army; being his Majesty's own Commentaries on his former Campaigns.
2. Letters of the Right Hon. Lady Mary W—y M—e. Containing an Account of the Policy and Manners of the Turks. 3 vols. Price 6s. sewed.
3. Clark's Letters on the Spanish Nation. 4to. 12s.
4. Temora, an antient Epic Poem. 4to. 10s. 6d.
5. A Critical Dissertation on the Poems of Ossian. 4to. 2s. 6d.
6. History of Louisiana. 2 vols. 5s. sewed.
7. Emilius and Sophia. 4 vol. 10s. sewed.
8. Effusions of Friendship and Fancy. 2 vols. 4s. sewed.
9. Letters that passed between Theodosius and Constantia, after she had taken the Veil. 2s. sewed.
10. Genius and Valour, a Scots Pastoral. 1s. 6d.
11. Death of Adam, a Tragedy. 1s.
12. Considerations on the present dangerous Crisis. 3d. edit. 1s.
13. Appeal of Reason on the present State of Parties in the Nation. 1s.
14. An Expostulatory Letter to the Archbishop of Paris, by Mr. Rousseau. 2s.
15. Storck on the Medicinal Virtues of Henbane, &c. 1s.

ADVERTISEMENT

to PART II.

THE following Letters and Remarks were written by the same officer, who was the Author of the preceding Journal; but having been engaged, ever since the year 1743, in an employment, the business of which did not permit him to enter into the detail of daily transactions, he satisfied himself with sending his friend accounts of the most remarkable events, at which he assisted in person. As to the battle of Kesselsdorff, he was not in it; but his account of it is not, for that reason, the less exact, as he had by him, when he wrote it, all the authentic relations concerning
the

ADVERTISEMENT *to* PART II.

the exploits of the reigning Prince of Anhalt Dessau. And with regard to the expedition of the King's army, he was well able to give a particular account thereof, having served in it himself, from the beginning to the end.

Though the separate remarks are not of the same date with the Letters, but written some time after, it has been, however, thought proper to subjoin them to the historical relation.



T H E
KING of PRUSSIA's
CAMPAIGNS.

MDCC XLV.

P A R T II.

L E T T E R I.

TO make you perfectly master of the little action at Landshout, the particulars of which you desire me to send you, I must begin a little higher, and remind you, that Colonel Winterfield, having been recalled from Upper Silesia, was detached from the King's army, with fifteen hundred Hussars and four battalions of grenadiers, to the mountains of Schmiedeberg and Hirschberg, to make head against a body of Bosnians and Lycanians, who were ravaging that country. He soon came up with them, defeated, and intirely dispersed them; but the enemies were so vexed thereat, that they were determined to take their revenge, as soon as possible; and the rather, that their principal design was to force their way, with the whole army, through Landshout and the mountainous country which borders on Bohemia.

This

This expedition was committed to the care of Lieutenant General Count Nadaſty, who had under him Prince Eſterhaſy, and Colonel Pataſchutz, who had commanded the troop of Boſnians, that was ſo roughly handled by Colonel Winterfeld. The latter breathed nothing but vengeance, and had ſwore by all his ſaints, that he would catch the Pruſſians, or be caught by them; an obligation of which he punctually fulfilled one of the conditions, as you will preſently ſee.

While the enemy was making theſe diſpoſitions, and taking poſt at Friedland and Shœmberg, Winterfeld marched from Hirschberg towards Landſhout, and Lieutenant General du Moulin advanced, with two battalions of grenadiers, ten ſquadrons of Moëllendorff's dragoons, and three hundred Huſſars, from Schweidnitz towards the ſame place.

On the 20th of May Winterfeld took poſt at Landſhout. The ten ſquadrons of dragoons, under the command of Lieutenant-General Stille, were cantoned at Gieſmannsdorff, and Lieutenant-General du Moulin with the grenadiers and Huſſars at Reichenau; the former at the diſtance of one mile, and the latter two miles from Landſhout.

They continued there the 21ſt, becauſe the enemy did not move, and we had advice, that his deſign was to put a trick on us, by falling upon the magazine at Schweidnitz, where there were but two battalions. The Lieutenant-General had a conference, on the 22d, with Major-General de Stille and Colonel Winterfeld, about the
meaſures

measures proper to be taken, and it was agreed, that the Lieutenant-General, with the dragoons, grenadiers, and Hussars he had brought with him, should next day draw nearer to Schweidnitz, while Winterfeld, with four battalions and fourteen hundred Hussars, should continue to observe the motions of the enemy at Shoemberg and Friedland.

On the 23d at three in the morning, Winterfeld sent a Chasseur to General Stille, desiring him to suspend his march, because he had reason to believe the enemy intended to attack him; but he ordered him to be told, at the same time, not to quit his quarters till he should have fuller information, of which he would not fail to acquaint him, in case his presence became necessary. General Stille immediately dispatched the same messenger to Lieutenant-General du Moulin, ordered his dragoons to mount, marched out of his cantonments, formed his squadrons in the high way to Landshout, and waited for further advice. Between five and six o'clock we imagined we heard the reports of some cannon, but faintly and at great intervals, the wind, which was contrary, diminishing the sound. Meantime Winterfeld was attacked in form. He had quitted Landshout, at break of day, with three battalions, and taken post on the eminences, which are directly before the town, on the side next to Liebau and Grissau, by which the enemy must of necessity come. His Hussars encamped a little before him near Reichen Hennerdorf, and were on horseback in the front of their

G

camp.

camp, when they discovered a large body of Hussars, with some infantry, and a great number of Pandours, passing the defiles over against them. Our Hussars not being an equal match for such numbers, were obliged to fall back towards our grenadiers upon which the Pandours, slipping through the village, entered the deserted camp, and set fire to the straw huts, while the other troops of Hussars and infantry continued to pass along the side of the hill behind Reichen Hennerdorff. Winterfeld, to bring his Hussars into action, marched boldly down from the eminences, and skirmished for some time; but perceiving that Nadasty, who commanded this body of the enemy, was making a motion on his right, which might cut him off from the eminences of the town, he thought proper to return to his post, and place his Hussars behind the grenadiers; because those of the enemy were three times as strong, and supported by Hungarian infantry: and indeed the latter, persuaded that Winterfeld would still give way, thought proper to come down to the valley, and pretended to attack him upon his eminences. They had some cannon, and were advancing in pretty good order, when Winterfeld, in his turn, sent down his Hussars to meet them, with some cannon and a few companies of grenadiers, who, firing regularly by platoons, succeeded so far, that a battalion of Haller's Hungarians retired in confusion, and the other threw themselves behind a bank, for shelter from the shot. They did not, however,
quite

quite give up the cause, but formed in order of battle at the foot of the hill, along which they had come. The Pandours, on the other hand, got into a little wood, opposite to the eminences in the flank of our battalions, and killed and wounded some of our men. They had even the boldness to climb up these eminences, on their hands and feet, discharged their muskets in the very breasts of our men, and then dropt down again to the bottom, where they had nothing to fear. A party of the Tolpatsches and Hussars, at the same time, passed the suburbs of Landshout, and extended themselves upon the little eminences on the other side of the town; so that our affairs were but in a very indifferent way, as our grenadiers durst not quit their post, nor our Hussars return to the action. At this critical moment, General Stille arrived very opportunely with his dragoons. The first effect thereof was, that, as soon as their van appeared, all those of the enemy, that were already got beyond the town, fell back towards their main body, and the enemy's infantry quitted the valley in good earnest, and retired to the brow of the hill, covering themselves with three lines of Hussars, consisting of more than three hundred horse. As soon as our dragoons had got past the suburbs, and joined Winterfeld's battalions, they were drawn up in battle array on the right wing opposite to the enemy. Our Hussars, being ranged in a line before the dragoons, on the signal given first began to move forwards, and then darted full speed down the eminences on which we were formed, and

still at full gallop up those again on which the enemy was posted. The Austrian Hussars did not chuse to stand the violence of this shock, but retreated to the top of the hill, in hopes that their infantry and Pandours, posted in the woods, would stop us by their fire. But tho' they actually made a general discharge upon us, and tho' the hill we were ascending was very steep, we did not halt at all, but were at the top of it as soon as the fugitives; so that they were quite broken and overthrown. Five hundred of them were put to the sword; sixty two, of which number was Colonel Patafschutz, were made prisoners; and the rest entirely dispersed. We pursued them as far as the plain of Grissau, and should have taken the whole detachment, if the morasses, dykes, and other defiles, near the Abbey, had not prevented us from pushing our point. We found and gathered up above a thousand muskets, swords, and other implements of war, along the road by which they fled; and the peasants have told us since, that Nadasty sent into Bohemia three and twenty waggons loaded with wounded men.

After this blow we continued quiet at Landshout till the 26th; but hearing that the head of the enemy's whole army, both Austrians and Saxons, was but a large league distant from us, we retired in the night of the 27th to Schweidnitz, without being disturbed in our retreat.

*From the camp under Schweidnitz,
May 29, 1745.*

I am, &c.

L E T.

LETTER II.

On the Battle of Hohen-Friedberg.

THE little time I can spare from the business of my employment, has obliged me to form a resolution of writing no more journals nor relations, and it was pure friendship for you, that prevailed upon me to give you an account of the affair of Landshout. Yet the battle of Hohen-Friedberg is an event so great, and so glorious to the King our master and his army, that I cannot help communicating it to you, especially as I find myself actuated by a good deal of resentment against our neighbours, whose zeal, to let the world know on all occasions the mighty good opinion they have of themselves, will, I doubt not, be somewhat cooled by this damper.

After the King had been informed by his spies, by deserters from the combined army, and more particularly by our retreat from Landshout, that Prince Charles of Lorraine and the Duke of Weissenfels had actually entered Silesia, at the head of eighty thousand men, and thought of nothing less than making a compleat conquest of it, he moved his camp the 1st of June from the neighbourhood of Reichenbach, and pitched it between Striegau and Schweidnitz, having his left covered by that village, and his right by the village of Jauernick, where he established his head quar-

ters. The vanguard, consisting of seven battalions of grenadiers, ten squadrons of dragoons, and two thousand Hussars, under the command of Lieutenant General du Moulin, and the Major-Generals Stille and Winterfeld, encamped near Striegau in a line along the high way, with their left wing extended towards the village of Stanowitz. Lieutenant-General Nassau, with five battalions, ten squadrons of Bayreuth dragoons, and the regiment of Ziethen Hussars, took post between the army and the vanguard, at the village of Zedlitz, occupying at the same time the wood commonly called Nonnenbusch, to keep Nadasty's light troops from approaching the camps, either to interrupt their communication with one another, or to observe our motions. The front of the two camps, that is, of the vanguard and of the army, was for the most part covered by eminences, on which our advanced guards were posted, which procured us the double advantage, of not being overlooked by the enemy, and at the same time of seeing as far as the feet of the mountains, and even through their openings, the smallest motion he could make. As the eminence in the front of our vanguard was the highest, and most proper for making observations, his Majesty repaired to it, two or three times a day, to view, with his own eyes, what passed.

The 2d of June, we saw several separate bodies marching along the ridge of the mountains on the side next Hohen-Friedberg: and towards evening, a large body of between
fix

six and seven thousand men encamped near the castle of Furstenstein, the rest towards Quoolsdorf, and behind Hohen-Friedberg, but so concealed among the mountains, that we could only perceive a part of the tents through the openings.

On the third in the morning they were in the same position. The King coming, according to custom, to examine every thing with his own eyes, and observing that the soldiers were cooking so early, suspected they would come down that very day, and ordered us to be very much on our guard, and let him know of the smallest motion we should perceive them to make; his designs being to let them file through the passes of the mountains without disturbance, and then force them to a decisive action.

About one in the afternoon, they began to decamp. His Majesty having repaired to our observatory, we saw several columns filing off and marching slowly, with great precaution, on our right, towards the villages of Hausdorff, Kauder, Ronstoc, and Thomaswalde, situated in the plain on the high road from Landshout to Jauer. The body which encamped above the castle of Furstenstein, under the command of the Count de Nadasty, was drawn up in order of battle, but did not stir out of its place. His Majesty thereupon resolved to attack them next morning, and for that purpose ordered Lieutenant-General du Moulin to decamp that same evening at

eight o'clock, and to take possession of the eminences on the other side of Striegau, called the Spitzberges, where we had some little posts of Hussars. Lieutenant-General Nassau was, a little after, ordered to draw near to us; the army to be in motion the beginning of the night, and by two in the morning all the several corps were to be beyond Striegau, and re-united in two lines, that all of them might form, and take the posts designed for them in the order of battle. The seven battalions of grenadiers, and the Hussars of the van-guard, were reserved to be employed as circumstances might require.

We were preparing for these movements at seven o'clock at night, when a thousand Uhlands, supported by six battalions of Saxons, appeared upon the eminences which we were to have occupied. They had already beat off our little advanced posts, and were making their dispositions in such a manner, as gave us ground to believe they intended to stand their ground there. Whereupon the Lieutenant-General, knowing of what importance it was to prevent this, immediately drew out the van-guard, and gave orders to march against them. As we were obliged to make our dragoons file off by the village of Græven, which is one of the suburbs of Striegau, the day began to close, and the twilight was far advanced, before we could begin our attack. However, we drove the enemy from three of the eminences, but the fourth, which, on our side, was inaccessible, remained in their hands ;

ands; they therefore took post there, and raised a battery of four field pieces. Mean time, the body commanded by Lieutenant-General Nassau took post near us; the two lines of the army, which was marching in two columns, were at a little distance, and we were waiting with great silence for the dawn, when we were to enter upon action. It was pleasant to see the plain of Ronstoc, and all the country about it, illuminated with ten thousand fires, and by their light we could observe distinctly, that the enemy spent almost the whole night in making their troops file off.

Scarce had day begun to dawn, when the cannon from the abovementioned eminence saluted us with several shot, but without effect; and as we were on all sides beginning to march without minding this battery, the enemy, fearing to be cut off from the rest of their army, abandoned the battery in great haste, and retired through a fir wood, which concealed them from our sight.

This incident suggested to us, that the left wing of their army could not be far off; and accordingly we had not marched above three or four thousand paces before we found ourselves in the neighbourhood of the village of Pillgramshayn, directly opposite to that wing, consisting wholly of Saxons, except three regiments of Austrian cavalry, and some battalions of their infantry. We saw, moreover, that their whole army was drawing out of

their camp in a hurry, and with some confusion, to get into the order of battle ; so that they were extending their line both to the right and to the left. The manner in which they conducted the affair plainly shewed us, that they did not expect to meet us in their way. We were still marching in columns, drawing at the same time towards the right, that we might not expose our flank ; and at the head of our second line, which by the nature of the ground extended a little beyond the first, marched General du Moulin and Major-General Winterfeld, with the grenadiers and Hussars of the van-guard ; the ten squadrons of dragoons, under the command of Major General Stille, having resumed their post in the order of battle, which was at the extremity of the right wing of this second line. Du Moulin and Winterfeld having passed thro' a thin fir wood, and finding themselves directly opposite to the enemy's left wing, did not hesitate a moment. They immediately attacked it with a very brisk cannonade, and continued their fire without interruption, while the cavalry and infantry of the two columns of our right were running as fast as they could to form the lines. Had you been there, you would have admired, as we did, the readiness and bravery of our soldiers in this onset ; the eagerness with which they pressed on towards the enemy must naturally occasion some disorder, every one striving to get into his place, and the cavalry crossing the infantry more than once ; but the foot and the horse cleared themselves with such address, and

and made way for one another so readily, that, in a few minutes, we saw our wing of cavalry formed in two lines, and the infantry of the second line in action performing the duty of the first, on account of the latter's having been retarded in its march by the situation of the ground. Observe, that all this passed as we were marching up to the enemy, and charging, sometimes with fire-arms, and sometimes with swords and bayonets. This vigour and forwardness of our troops disconcerted the enemy, nor did we give them time to recover themselves; our two lines of cavalry fell upon them, and did their business so effectually, that their whole cavalry was overthrown, and driven from one place to another, and their infantry broken and routed.

The first shock between these two wings of cavalry happened at the village of Pillgramshayn, where that of the enemy, being once routed, was pursued, without stop, across the fields of Eisdorf, Hæfelicht, &c. and along the road to Bolckenhayn. Two Saxon battalions were involved in this first disgrace, and intirely destroyed. Our men, on this occasion, were too much exasperated against their neighbours; they seldom gave quarter, and the officers found it extremely difficult to save a few of those wretches. I have experienced this myself, to the hazard of my person.

From the very beginning of the attack, victory declared itself in favour of our wing. It is true, that two or three Saxon squadrons forced their way through our first line; but besides that the rest of the line were victorious, these squadrons scarce got to the second line, where Major General Stille's brigade were posted, before they were surrounded, and almost all put to the sword. After this event, fortune never forsook us a single moment. The enemy made only a running fight of it, and between six and eight thousand men were so effectually cut off from their main battle, that they were obliged to throw themselves into the great defiles of Bolckenhayn, and could not join the army before next morning. We pursued them as briskly as we possibly could; but the large woods and difficult passes on that side, secured them against all our efforts. However, I must on this occasion acknowledge two things: one is, that these troops made their retreat in a manner that shewed great skill in Tactics, and their movements were extremely well judged; the other, that the nature of the ground contributed greatly thereto; the chain of hills, which run from the field of battle to the defiles abovementioned, being more favourable to those who are retreating than to the pursuers.

When I say this, I would be understood to speak of the van-guard of our wing of cavalry, and a small part of the infantry of the right: for as soon as the first line of this infantry had
fur-

surmounted the difficulties of the ground, which I mentioned before, and resumed its natural position, the whole wing, and part of the center, entered into action, and were no less successful. Indeed we met with more resistance there, and the fire on both sides was better kept up, and more destructive, because the ground towards Guntherisdorf, where our attack was made, continued to be extremely unfavourable to the assailants. But, however, all these inconveniences could not abate the ardour of our soldiers, and though the enemy did their utmost, and made the best use of their advantages, yet our men advanced upon them every moment, over ditches, marshes, and bushes, till they had dislodged them, taken them in flank, and forced them to retire in confusion towards Ronstoc, Kauder, and further.

During the time that this wing and a part of the main-body were performing such glorious exploits, those on the left were not asleep. The latter, indeed, had further to march before they could come up, and were obliged to form in a hurry to enter into action, when those on the right were compleatly engaged. But they lost nothing thereby; unless that they met with enemies to fight that had had time to form themselves properly, and give them the warmer reception. The vigour with which this wing attacked the enemy was as remarkable as that of the right, and attended with the same happy consequences. It forced the enemy, after a very obstinate resistance, to retire
by

by Thomafwalde and Friedberg into the defiles of Quolfdorf. Our cavalry on this wing charged at leaft five or fix times, always with fuccefs, and the fire of the infantry never ceafed a moment, till nine o'clock in the morning, when the whole combined army was intirely defeated, put to flight, and purfued to the paffes of the mountains through which they had advanced upon us.

Some particular regiments performed prodigies of valour during the engagement. On feveral occafions, the infantry attacked with their bayonets fcrewed, and the cavalry often threw themfelves upon the adverfe battalions notwithstanding their prodigious fire. On the right, the King's body guards and the Carabineers cut a Saxon battalion to pieces. On the left wing, the ten fquadrons of Bayreuth dragoons broke through feven regiments of infantry belonging to Thungen's brigade, quite ruined them, and took more than two thoufand prifoners, with fixty fix pair of colours, and all their cannon. Monfieur de Thungen, Commandant of the brigade, had the misfortune to fall in that action. This laft atchievement deferves your particular notice.

Thungen's brigade, in which there were fome regiments of diftinction, had hitherto preferved itfelf entire, notwithstanding the regiments on its left were in diforder, and thofe on the right began to flagger. It even made fuch a brisk fire, and kept it up fo well, that
our

our battalions, which were opposite to it, no longer advanced with that impetuosity which is so common with them. It was therefore thought proper to place behind them the ten squadrons abovementioned, and our battalions being ordered to open to the right and left to let the dragoons pass through, they being, as usual, in the second line, Lieutenant General Gesler, who was at their head, together with Colonel Swerin, threw himself with such impetuosity upon the enemy, that he presently got the better of them, and gained to himself the honour of having crowned this glorious day by a most brilliant exploit.

At nine in the morning precisely, we were masters of the whole field of battle, and from that moment had nothing to do but pursue the fugitives, take prisoners, and collect trophies.

The King pitched his camp at the foot of the hills, over which the enemy had made his escape. The combined army left upon the field about five thousand dead. We are in possession of near seven thousand prisoners, among whom, besides one hundred and fifty officers, are the Generals Berlichingen, Francis St. Ignon, Forgatsch, and Schlichting, with forty field officers. The trophies are four pair of kettle drums, seven standards, sixty nine pair of colours, sixty three pieces of cannon, forty odd ammunition waggons, and all sorts of arms.

As

As the enemy's army was much dispersed, there must be a vast number of deserters from it; and therefore it may be supposed, considering the many deserters that came to us, that their loss, in general, may be very near twenty thousand men. We have only eight hundred killed and very near three thousand wounded, of whom, by the report of the surgeons, two thirds will be soon in condition to resume their functions. Lieutenant General Count de Troughses is among the dead, as are also a good many officers of infantry. The cavalry sustained but little loss, having met with the most rapid success every where. Observe, my dear friend, that during our whole march towards the enemy in the night, not so much as a single man left his colours, which, in the judgment of men of experience, is a very extraordinary case.

Our parties and patrols report, that the woods and mountains, from the field of battle all the way to the frontiers of Bohemia, swarm with dying and wounded men, as well as deserters; so that the loss of the combined army may be well supposed to exceed the number at which I have rated it above.

On the day after the battle, that is the 6th of June, the King marched forwards to Landshout, and while the enemy's army is retreating with great expedition towards Jaromirtz, we have again entered Bohemia.

From the camp under Friedland,
June 9, 1745.

I am, &c.

REMARKS

REMARKS *on the* BATTLE
of Hohen-Friedberg.

THE King of Prussia's conduct, both before and on the day of this memorable action, deserves the highest commendation. The situation of affairs, with regard to his own forces, as well as to the enemy's, required some decisive event. By keeping merely on the defensive, and only endeavouring to keep our adversaries from penetrating into Silesia, over the mountains, the King must have sacrificed a great many men, weakened his provinces and finances, by procuring subsistence for his army at his own expence, and all this at the hazard of not succeeding at last. For the enemy, on the other hand, was stronger than we, or believed to be so. He had behind him all the strength of Bohemia; and even supposing that a whole campaign could have been spent in skirmishing, his experience in this kind of warfare, and the superiority of his light troops, gave us no ground to hope for equal success every where. Moreover, we must add to these considerations, that the King, having occasion for all his troops to make head against Prince Charles of Lorraine and the Duke of Weissenfels, must have abandoned Upper Silesia, whence the body of insurgents might have spread itself over the country, and make it very difficult for us to find subsistence, especially as they had lately made themselves

themselves masters of the fortress of Cosel by surprize. It was therefore absolutely necessary to bring the enemy as soon as possible to a battle, to present him with opportunities for that purpose, and allure him to the point the King had in view; that is, to beat him, clear Silesia from his parties, and carry the theatre of the war into Bohemia. It was therefore a masterly stroke in the King, to pretend to be afraid of the superiority of the combined army, and spread the report that he would not wait for it in the neighbourhood of Schweidnitz; but take a sure post between Breslau and Glogau on the river Oder, for the convenience of his convoys. In consequence of these affected appearances, he caused the mountains of Upper Silesia and the country of Glatz to be evacuated, assembled all his different corps, and kept himself closely covered in his camp between Schweidnitz and Striegau, using all imaginable precautions to conceal from the enemy his real designs, and the number of his troops; being fully persuaded, that, if Prince Charles would but come down into the plain, it would be in his power to force him to a battle.

The event justified the wisdom of the King's measures; and if one must be a great General to contrive fine projects, and draw the plans of them, he must not be less so, to take advantage of the proper season for executing them with vigour and dexterity. And in this case also his Majesty discovered the reach of his understanding. When the King saw that his stratagem was successful, and that Prince Charles

Charles and the Duke of Weissenfels were falling into his snare, he laid hold of the favourable moment, with surprizing readiness; and justly supposing, that the combined army, having come down from the mountains about sun-set, would not have time to make the proper dispositions during the night, attacked and surprized it at the break of day, and gained over it a most compleat victory, of which I have already given you a particular account. It may be said, that this was doing business with a good-grace, and at the critical nick of time; and if we have seen Silesia saved, and our army subsisted at the expence of Bohemia, we owe this happy revolution wholly to the prudent foresight of our august Monarch.

The same cannot be said of the combined army and its conduct. The general plan of invading Silesia was proper, without doubt. The Court of Vienna proposed to terminate the war against our master by this single campaign, and to secure that end, something more was necessary than mere excursions; but in my opinion, their execution of this plan stood in need of some amendments.

I pretend not to determine, whether the place, by which Prince Charles entered Silesia, was the most proper for his purpose, or not? I leave the decision of this point to those who have more experience than myself in this important part of war. It seems to me, however, that Saxony being absolutely in the interest of the Court of Vienna, and al-
most

most on the point of declaring against us, he could not do better than to attack us on that side, and that he failed only in the manner of conducting his design. Would it not have been more judicious, not to be in such haste to come down from the mountains? Would he not have done better, to have established himself on them all along Luface, to perplex us with perpetual jealousies and suspicions, and in the mean time to set his light troops upon us every where, in order to harrafs us, and render our convoys very difficult and unsafe.

It may be objected, that a great army, like Prince Charles's, was not easily subsisted, and that by pursuing the measures here proposed, the Prince would have run the hazard of wanting necessaries, his magazines in Bohemia being but indifferently provided.

But all the world knows, that Saxony had enough to supply him; that that power waited only for a favourable opportunity to pull off the masque, and kept a train of artillery in readiness for the pretended siege of Glogau: what hazard then was there in playing a sure game, by keeping us for some time under check, and afterwards issuing out suddenly by some other pass, either higher or lower? For it would have been next to impossible for us to watch all those passes, without dividing and so weakening our forces, which indeed must otherwise have been but too much scattered by a vast number of escorts and detachments,
if

if the Hungarian troops had done their duty as they ought. But perhaps the Prince of Lorraine had positive orders from the Council of War at Vienna to push matters to a speedy issue, and to try the fortune of a battle? Even in this case, the blame still falls upon him. For, in all probability, the Council of War gave such orders only in consequence of the reports, which the General made to the Court, concerning the situation of the two armies; and he, for his part, was so blinded with the false but flattering advices he received of our earnest desire to avoid meeting him, that he did not take time even to doubt of them, but built upon imaginations, to which he and his Court became dupes.

Yet all this is nothing in comparison of what he did the day before the battle. He marched out of the passes in the mountains towards evening; and we know, from very good hands, that several regiments of his army did not get into the plain till the night was far advanced, and we were in full march to attack him. Why was not this done sooner in the day? He would have had time to put his army in the order of battle, and it would not have been amiss if he had kept them so the whole night: instead of this, he comes in dark night, which must hinder the necessary arrangements, ties up his horses, and sends his troops unseasonably to sleep, as if the enemy had been twenty leagues off. I say nothing of the long entertainment at dinner, which it is pretended the Prince that day gave

gave to the Duke of Weissenfels, and which, it is also said, suspended the activity of the two Generals for several hours. I chuse rather to attribute this anecdote to the malice of ill designing men, who are jealous of the favours bestowed on the House of Lorraine.

I am not ignorant, however, that the cause of the misfortune, which was the consequence of this ill-timed security, is imputed to the negligence of General Nadaſty; but it is certain, that the situation of our camp, and the precautions we took, prevented that General from observing us narrowly; a circumstance which, had there been nothing else, ought to have made the Prince of Lorraine suspect that matters were not as he imagined.

On the other hand, all, even down to the private soldiers, were infested with these groundless prejudices. It was constantly buzzed into the ears of the latter, that the Prussians were weak and disheartened by the last campaign, that every man of them would give way, and that the Austrians would have no trouble but that of plundering Silesia at their pleasure. What could these men, lulled to sleep with such flattering ideas, think, or say, when the first object that met their eyes on awaking was a formidable army of these same Prussians, who, far from waiting to be driven out of their hiding places, were advancing, with a resolute countenance and rapid pace, to make them sensible of the contrary? Such surprizes are never either agreeable or useful, and if it be sometimes proper

per to prepossess the soldier, in order to animate his courage by flattering his hopes, yet such hopes should never be founded, at least, on principles, of which the deceit may be immediately discovered. In this case also the Austrians had not experience on their side; we had already beat them on more occasions than one; and on this, they could see at once, with their own eyes, that the suppositions with which their Generals lulled them into security, were confuted by the real state of things. Thus the Generals themselves were taken napping, and the common soldiers surprized and astonished; what then could be the consequence, but confusion and a defeat?

We must, however, do those Generals the justice to say, that they exerted themselves as became men of courage and resolution, by endeavouring to avail themselves both of the advantage of the ground, and of their superior force; but our vivacity got the better of all their utmost endeavours, which indeed were employed a little too late, and their left wing being once disordered, their flank became exposed to our insults, and confusion spreading along the whole line, which had been formed in a great hurry, it may easily be conceived that the Generals could not have recovered their affairs, had their bravery and capacity been twice as great. A memorable example, in confirmation of the well known maxim, *That a fault committed in war never escapes with impunity.*

LETTER III.

On the BATTLE of SOOR.

WE are now covered with new laurels, which no body ever expected. Would you have thought of a battle between two armies, which, during all the fine season, were almost in presence of each other, without attempting one stroke of consequence, and afterwards parted without so much as a skirmish in the rear of either? And yet, this hath come to pass; and on the 30th of September we had a battle, which was fought with such obstinacy and vivacity, as, joined to other circumstances, render it in some sort superior to that of Hohen-Friedberg; and, leaving to the other the title of Grand, with regard to numbers and trophies, pretends to claim that of Glorious to itself.

Before I enter upon the particulars of this wonderful affair, I must give you an idea both of the camp in which we continued ever since the 19th of September, and also of the country about it; that you may be the better enabled to judge both of the enemy's art, and of the perplexing circumstances of our situation.

I suppose you may remember, that on the 18th his Majesty decamped from Jaromirtz, and entered next day into the camp at Staudentz.

dentz
of a
right
from
its fl
encar
The
acce
that
only
the
whi
The
Stau
Ob
cav
from
in
def
ma
gre
the
do
re
ev
w
th
fi
c
to
v
b
S
f
h

dentz. This camp was about three quarters of a league from the town of Trautenau. The right wing of the cavalry was at a small distance from the village of Bourckerfdorff, and had its flank covered with copse, in which was encamped a battalion of the Stangen grenadiers. The front of this wing was of very difficult access, on account of the pools and marshes that lay before it; but its rear was sheltered only by some small hills, on which were posted the centries of our little body of Hussars, which scarce amounted to four hundred horse. The infantry began opposite to the village of Staudentz, and extended along the villages of Ober and Unteratsch; the left wing of the cavalry ended at the defile, which proceeds from the little town of Eipel, and terminates in the said villages. On the other side of that defile were eminences, some of which commanded that wing; but the battalion of Kleist's grenadiers, which was posted and intrenched there, secured us from the insults of the Pandours, who swarmed in the wood of Koenigreich, which fronted us, and came regularly every night to beat up our quarters, tho' always to their own disgrace. On the rear of this wing were pits and hollows, which sufficiently defended us from a surprize. At Sicherhof, beyond the defile of Eipel and the town too, encamped Lieutenant General Lewald, with four battalions and five squadrons; but the King recalled him on the 27th of September, and sent him towards Trautenau, for the security of our convoys and our bake-houses, which were at that place. Lieutenant

H

General

General du Moulin, with his corps, was sent beyond Schatzlar and its defiles, for reasons of the same kind. General Winterfeld, with a small flying corps, scoured about the confines of Silesia, in order to observe Colonel Trenck, who was making inroads into that country. Here then the King resolved to stay some time, to consume the forage and provisions of the country round ; which was accordingly done, but not without blows ; for we fought, and had every now and then a little battle, for every truss of straw that was brought to our camp.

The enemy, who had suffered us to decamp quietly from Jaromirtz, and amused themselves on the 19th and 20th with noisy rejoicings for the election of the new Emperor, thought proper at last to approach us. They took post at first between Jaromirtz and Schourtz, on the other side of the Elbe, from whence they came and encamped at Kœnigshoff ; keeping still on the right bank of that river. General Nadasty kept upon our left, near the defile of Liebenthall, about two hours march from us. A corps, commanded by Desoffi, was on our right at Wildschutz ; Franquine at Marchendorff, towards Schatzlar ; and Trenck on our rear, near Schœmberg. Kœnigshoff was not a league and a half from our right, and the enemy, by crossing the river at that town, might pass, or, if thought proper, fetch a compass round the wood of Kœnigreich, come out by Gœren-Ground, between the villages of Deutsch-Prausnitz, Soor, and Altenboughl, and then take possession of the eminences which

which commanded our right flank, and the high-way to Trautenau.

Such was the position of the two armies; when, on the 29th, an Austrian deserter came in, and deposed, that the Prince of Lorraine's army, provided with bread for three days, was to march that very day, but to what place was not known. We immediately dispatched our scouts, and Major General Katzler was ordered out with a large patroll of five hundred horse, five hundred grenadiers, and the Hussars of Natzmer, to get intelligence; and, in the mean time, we intended to make a general forage next day. Monsieur Katzler, returning when the night was far advanced, reported, that he could make no discoveries, being prevented by the Pandours and Hussars, who were in possession of the defiles between our camp and Kœnighshoff; but that the prisoners he had taken assured him the army was marching towards Arnau.

On these advices the King, supposing that Prince Charles would actually march towards that town, cross the river there, and cut off our passage to Schatzlar, thought proper to move his camp, and march to take post between Trautenau and Freyheit, in order to traverse Prince Charles's designs.

Orders were given for this purpose, in the morning of the 30th of September, and the army was to decamp at ten o'clock. The Generals of the day, who attended to receive

these orders, were but just gone out of the King's tent to make the necessary dispositions, when the advanced guards of the right wing sent notice, that they perceived a large body of cavalry and some infantry, on the hills of Deutsch-Prausnitz, and soon after this news was not only confirmed, but it was added, that the whole Austrian army was advancing in several columns.

Here it is proper to interrupt a little the thread of my narration, to give you some idea of these eminences : They are large hills, which in our country might very well pass for mountains, intersected by hollow-ways, marshes, and thickets ; they rise gradually higher, so that those towards the Elbe, and beyond the village of Soor, which is contiguous to that of Prausnitz, are higher than the rest ; they are terminated on the right, to speak according to the position of the Austrian army, by the great wood of Kœnigreich, and on the left by the valley called Gœren-Ground, which runs in a semi-circle to the village of Hohenbruck, on the road to Trautenau.

The enemy, perfectly well acquainted with the advantages of this ground, had begun his march on the 29th at twelve o'clock at noon, leaving his baggage and his camp standing at Kœnigshoff. He had been filing off all night long, partly through the wood, and partly by the roads that lead to Soor and Altenbühl, and had taken possession of these eminences ; his left extended above the village of Bourckersdorff,

ersdorff, and his right covered by Deutsch-Prausnitz, having his wings secured by batteries of large cannon and haubitzers, and his whole front by a great many field pieces. Thus his left was precisely on our right flank, and reached even beyond it, so that our army, when attempting to form in order of battle, must naturally have drawn up under the enemy's cannon, and then been exposed to the fire not only of his left, but also of part of his centre. This position was therefore a critical one for us, and attended with many inconveniencies; but we surmounted all these difficulties, as you will presently see.

When the King could no longer doubt of this early and unexpected visit, he made the drums beat, and the trumpets found to arms. The right wing of the cavalry, and particularly our Gens d'Armes, were the first ready to march out of the camp, tho' the enemy endeavoured to hinder them by his artillery, the shot of which reached our camp; and it may be said, that our cavalry was forced to make haste, by the furious fire of great guns and haubitzers. As soon as they were on horseback, they marched to the right, and were followed by the infantry, describing, as it were, a kind of semicircle, the convex side of which was towards the enemy, that we might not expose our flank. Having then taken possession of the ground most proper for the attack, our cavalry formed; and tho' the ground was narrow and very uneven, as I have observed, and tho' the eminence, on which the Austrian army stood,

was very steep, yet fifteen squadrons, under the commands of the Major Generals Goltze and Katzlar, advanced, received the whole fire of the artillery, and rushed in full career upon the enemy's squadrons, whereof there were fifty five in this wing, drawn up in three lines. The match was very unequal; but what can numbers do against valour and fortune? This handful of cavalry fell so furiously upon the first line of the enemy's horse, that it overthrew them at the first onset, and pursued them so vigorously, as to put the second and third line into the same confusion, and routed them so entirely, that neither the one nor the other appeared any more; for I make no account of a few weak remains of cavalry, which reassembled, but made no resistance. Some squadrons of these fugitives were at the same time driven back upon their foot, and occasioned great disorders, which contributed not a little to the success of the day. Amidst these successful events, three battalions of our grenadiers had the noble assurance to assault the park of artillery, tho' guarded by fifteen companies of grenadiers, supported by all the Saxon foot. It was no wonder they lost a great many men, as they were twice repulsed: But being reinforced in time by the regiments of La Motte and Blanckensee infantry, they carried it at the third attack, and took the first line of the enemy in flank; after which their whole left wing was driven off the eminence, and the front of the two armies insensibly engaged. Our center and our left wing, which the King had hitherto made no use of, that he might be sure of a resource, in case his right wing

wing should be repulsed, advanced gradually through the neighbourhood of Bourckersdorff, but found every where an obstinate enemy resolved to dispute every inch of ground. As they had, in fact, the advantage of the ground and numbers of men, our people, at every eminence, and every little wood, found fresh troops to encounter, that had not been engaged before, and whose fire was always ready. Is there any thing more necessary, to wear out the most prudent patience? Many others would have given out on such an occasion; but our soldiers, accustomed to conquer under the eye of their King, instead of being discouraged, redoubled their efforts; they bravely climbed up the hills, through a tempest of musket and cannon balls, cleared one wood after another, and advanced with such rapidity, that they were soon ready to fall upon the enemy's battalions with their bayonets. But the game was become too serious; the enemy therefore resolved no longer to dispute the victory with men who deserved it so well; they soon began to give way, and then to run with all their might towards the wood of Kœnigsreich, which, being very near, concealed them from our pursuit. Meantime our cavalry on the left, which at the beginning of the battle consisted only of fifteen squadrons, and consequently durst not venture into the action, was reinforced by several squadrons from our right, who had nothing left to do; after which it fetched a small compass towards the village of Deutsch-Prausnitz, to fall upon the right wing of the Austrian cavalry. But the latter,

H 4 knowing,

knowing, perhaps, that there was nothing further to be hoped, and all its efforts would be in vain, fled quickly through the village towards the wood of Kœnigfreich, in order to save themselves. So that the regiments of Rochow and Bornstedt, being the first who got up the hills of Prausnitz, seeing that the cavalry was making its escape, and the regiments of Damitz and Collowrath infantry were endeavouring to retreat in good order, fell upon them, broke them, and took from them eight pair of colours, and eight hundred prisoners.

This exploit was the conclusion of the whole affair, and nothing was done afterwards, but cannonading on our side, because the wood of Kœnigfreich, and the terrible defiles about it, prevented our pursuing further. I must be understood to speak here of the right wing, and a part of the main body of the Austrians; for the remaining part of the center and the left wing were already at a great distance, having made their escape through the defiles beyond the village of Soor. The whole fled to Kœnigshoff, and staid no longer there, than to take down their tents, and collect their baggage, but set out, that same night, for their old camp on the other side of the Elbe at Jaromirtz.

General Nadaſty, at this battle, had orders to join Colonel Trenck and attack our rear; Deloffy was to fall upon our right flank; and Franquini's business was to fell trees across the road to Schatzlar, not only to keep Lieutenant-General

General du Moulin from coming to our assistance, but also to stop the flight of our run-aways, and render the scene more bloody. But of all these orders one only was executed. Trenck came too late; Nadaſty amused himself with pillaging the baggage; Defoffy was prevented by General Lewald, and the too sudden defeat of the left wing; Franquini alone, having nothing to fight with but firs and oaks, made a shift to execute the orders he had received.

You ſee, however, from theſe circumſtances, that the enemy had formed great deſigns: Not content with beating us, he pretended to extirpate us intirely: but this deſign the Lord of Hoſts thought proper to confound, to ſhew, that he alone directs the greateſt as well as the leaſt events, and that human wiſdom never fails to miſcarry, when it is not ſupported by his bleſſing. You will be, without doubt, of my opinion, when you weigh all the particulars I have laid before you, and ſee the two orders of battle, herewith ſent you, by which it appears evidently, that the enemy was twice as ſtrong as we. Their loſs is reckoned between ſeven and eight thouſand men. They left on the field of battle about two thouſand killed, and near two thouſand priſoners, beſides the wounded we found after the battle in the neighbouring villages; of theſe four thouſand and five hundred were carried off. The number of deſerters and ſtragglers cannot be yet aſcertained.

The Saxon cavalry did not suffer much, but their infantry was roughly handled, especially Prince Xavier's regiment, which greatly distinguished itself.

We have between five and six hundred killed, and near two thousand wounded. Among the former are Prince Albert of Brunswick, a Gentleman of great courage and vivacity; Major General Blanckenfee; and the Colonels Blanckenbourg, Bountsch, Count Dohna, Ledebour, Lieutenant Colonels Wedel of the Foot Guards, and Bredow of the Gens d'Armes. Among the wounded are Major General Count Schmettow, Colonel Forcade, Major Kahlden, and some other Field Officers. The King and all the Court have lost their baggage by the fault of the officers that conducted it. But his Majesty thinks he has made a good exchange of it, for a victory so complete and so glorious as this.

We are still in the neighbourhood of Soor; part of the infantry is cantoned in the villages, and the rest encamped on the hills, as is all the cavalry also. We expect to march soon towards Trautenau, and then to put an end to our campaign.

*From the camp at Soor,
October 5, 1745.*

I am, &c.

REFLEC-

REFLECTIONS

On the BATTLE of SOOR.

THE character of a man of veracity, on which I value myself, keeps me from representing things otherwise than they really are; therefore it cannot be taken amiss, that I act consistently with this character on the present occasion; that I admire in our enemies, what I think commendable in their conduct, and ingenuously own the small mistakes that may have been committed on our side.

The design that Prince Charles, or whatever other General you please, had formed to surprize us, and the measures taken for that purpose, must needs be approved. He knew that our forces were much scattered; he was informed of the quantity and quality of our detachments, of our embarrassed situation, and many other inconveniences, of which, that of being obliged to go out every other day for forage, and to get our supplies of that kind at the point of our swords, was not the least. His light troops, under the command of Nadaſty, Trenck, Defoffy, and Franquini, all partisans of great merit and reputation, besieged us all round; and he was sure we could not undertake the least motion, without giving him an opportunity to engage us, for which he had time enough to make preparation, and to take his measures before hand, while we were

confined to those which fortune might throw in our way. For this purpose it was necessary he should keep near us; and this the Austrian General accordingly did, by taking post at Kœnigshoff, from whence he might be with us in a single march. That was, in every respect, the most proper place for his designs. He was there in a secure and convenient camp. There he learned every thing that passed with us; whilst the King's army, being behind a large forest, and surrounded with hills, knew nothing of what the enemy was doing on each side of it. Our patrols could be of no great service to us; it was absolutely impossible for small ones to go abroad, and large ones were presently stopt and engaged in skirmishes, as happened to Major General Katzlar, who could never push out farther than one short hour's march from our camp.

The Austrian General, having so well disposed his preparatives, thought, with reason, that he needed not wait long, before he sprung his mine; and, in this respect also, he did every thing that could be expected from a great warrior. He drew near, in the night time, with great silence, to our right flank, formed his army in battle array, posted his cannon to the greatest advantage possible, and waited for day-light to beat up our quarters. Did not he deserve to succeed? Doubtless he did, with respect to his dispositions; and I believe would have succeeded, if three faults, which he committed in the execution, had
not

not robbed him of the prize, due to his abilities.

These, in my opinion, were :

First, His not attacking us immediately, without giving us time to come to ourselves ; his amusing himself with cannonading us at a distance ; his permitting us to march out of our camp to the right, when he might have prevented it ; and, finally, his remaining on the eminences, to receive the attack rather than to give it.

Secondly, He did very wrong, in not sufficiently opening the left wing of his cavalry ; for had it been extended as far as the great road to Trautenau, it would have absolutely prevented our getting out of our camp any other way but by exposing our whole flank ; whereas, being pent up as it was in three lines, it gave us the advantage of surrounding it in some measure, and attacking it in flank ; whence it came to pass, that the first line being broken and overthrown, the other two, not having room enough to perform their motions, could not avoid being involved in the same disgrace, put in confusion, and routed.

Thirdly, He was guilty of a gross error, in not pushing forward his right to meet us, between the villages of Prausnitz and Bourckersdorff : with ever so little attention, he might have seen that we formed but one line ; that we had urgent reasons for not bringing up our left wing, and placed our whole hope and safety in
the

the efforts of the right : he ought, therefore, to have made a push against our left wing, to force the few cavalry we had opposed to him there, at the beginning of the battle, then to have fallen upon the flank and rear of our only line of infantry ; by which means he could have made sure of a complete victory.

But he overlooked all these advantages, and depending, as his own accounts of the battle say, on the exploits of Nadaſty, who was to attack us in the rear, he let slip a certainty for an uncertainty, as the event sufficiently discovered. Let me not be told here, that the loss of the battle was owing to the miscarriage of this Count. For we can prove, leaving out of the question the rapaciousness of the Hungarian troops, which drew them towards the baggage, it was not in Nadaſty's power to perform exactly what his orders required. We all know, that Major General Schlichting, with five battalions of infantry and five squadrons of horse, was ordered to guard the rear during our march, but that circumstances having changed this march into an order of battle, he remained with his detachment on the eminence above our camp, and was in condition to prevent the Hungarian General from executing his designs. On the other hand, Lieutenant General Lehwald advanced by the high road of Trautenau, with four battalions of infantry, and five squadrons of cuirassiers, immediately after our right wing had dislodged the enemy's left ; so that Count Nadaſty, instead of falling upon
our

our rear, would have found difficulty enough in providing for his own safety, and the two Generals, Lehwald and Schlichting, joining, would without much trouble have attacked and dispersed his irregulars, who dreaded a regular fire, and were by no means fond of standing in close fight; moreover, we are satisfied by experience, that if Nadaſty hath gained some reputation, he did not get it by fighting against Prussians. I therefore conclude, that the Austrian General behaved wonderfully well, till the decisive moment came; but that in the execution he ruined and annihilated, so to speak, the work of his own hands.

The King of Prussia, if I may make the remark, acted in a quite different manner. When he saw that a battle was unavoidable, he did every thing that could be expected from a great Commander; but it cannot be denied, that this brilliant conduct was preceded by some steps which seem to have been a little rash, or rather let us own, that he furnished the enemy with the occasion of forming his pernicious projects.

In chusing the camp at Staudentz, he in a manner tied his own hands, and, by staying there too long, invited, so to speak, the Austrian General to come and insult him. I know very well, the King was detained by the design he had formed to consume the provisions and forage round the place, and to ruin the country. But was it not too much, to put this design upon a par with the dangers, that
might

might from thence result to the army, and, which is more, to his Majesty's own person ; ought he not, at least, to have looked out for some position more advantageous and more defensible ?

Moreover, it must be considered, whether he wanted to fight, or desired to avoid it ? In the first case, it was by no means proper for such a design ; and in the second, it was evident, that while we remained in that situation, it depended on the pleasure and caprice of our enemies to force us to a battle, whatever inclination we might have to decline it. It is therefore natural to think, that our obstinacy in continuing in the camp at Staudentz was somewhat hazardous, and that we should have done better to have chosen some other post, had it been done but twice four and twenty hours before the battle. But after all, may we not justly suppose, that the King did not see so much hazard in this conduct as we did ? A superior genius, like his, is never discouraged by any circumstance, however difficult and perplexing it may appear to others : he knows how to apply a remedy to every case, and finds so many resources in his own capacity, that he is never taken at a disadvantage.

The present age presents us with an example of this, in the conduct of Prince Eugene of Savoy, at the famous battle of Belgrade. That action has been criticized ; but it was such a glorious

glorious one, that it will ever be superior to all cavils.

The same may be said of the battle of Soor ; men may reason as they please about what preceded it ; the conclusion will always be, that the King that day equalled, and even surpassed, the greatest captains of his time. Surprized on his flank by an army of forty thousand men, surrounded on all sides by multitudes of light troops, and having only between eighteen and nineteen thousand men to oppose all these, was he disconcerted ? Not at all ; the greater the danger appeared, the more resources he derived from his own ability and courage. Let it not be imagined that this Prince was insensible of the danger, or blindly gave himself up to the caprice of his fortune. Very far from it ; for though he had scarce a moment to make his dispositions, amidst the noise usual on such occasions, he employed that moment to so good purpose, that his disposition may pass for a master-piece, and the very best that could have been made in such a case.

Observing that he had but little ground on the right, to oppose, with advantage, any front to the enemy, that was ready to fall upon us on that side, he immediately brought thither his cavalry, and some of his infantry, and resolved, without hesitation, to open the scene with his ordinary vigour, and the requisite precautions. For this purpose he kept his left disengaged, and took care not to make the battle general, till fortune had declared for his right.

right. He dextrously took advantage of the fault committed by the Austrian General, and flanked him, whereas the other ought naturally to have flanked us; this done, he makes at once a vigorous attack, breaks the enemy's cavalry, and, by this brisk and unexpected onset, opens his way to a complete victory. The enemy's cavalry, thus put to the rout, gave him the opportunity to attack, with more freedom, the park of artillery. He runs up to it, by extraordinary efforts takes it, and then, turning to the left, throws that whole wing into the utmost confusion. This done, with an admirable presence of mind he turns his attention to the other wing of his cavalry, dispatches to it as many squadrons as may be necessary to render it equal to the enemy's right, and marching out the rest of his infantry, at the same time, though in a single line, through the village of Bourckerisdorff and its environs, he attacks the whole front of the Austrian army, with astonishing rapidity. This movement was so well conceived, and so opportunely executed, that it could not miss to produce the effect expected from it. The enemy's infantry, notwithstanding its obstinacy and superiority was broken, and the cavalry of his right retreated without fighting. 'Tis true, this retreat, at first sight, seemed to be the effect of cowardice. But if it be considered, that this cavalry had given ours time to become equal, and even superior to them, by the reinforcements which came from our right; that they knew their left wing was beat, their main body routed, and they themselves
unable

unable to recover their affairs, I know not whether they can be blamed for providing for their own safety, which must have been very doubtful, if, after the retreat of their own infantry, ours, which was advancing at a great rate, had taken their flank, while our squadrons were engaged with their front. Thus his Majesty gained one of the most glorious and complete victories, and covered himself with laurels so much the more honourable, that he owed them entirely to his own courage and ability. 'Tis true, the valour of his troops contributed to it; but a good workman always takes care to have good tools, and a skilful General makes it his principal study to form good soldiers: So that we may fairly maintain, that he who leads on brave men with success is justly entitled to the principal glory, and that the officers and soldiers, who execute the schemes and plans of a judicious Captain, hold only the second place.

LETTER IV.

*On the EXPEDITION into SAXONY
in the year 1745.*

I Send you herewith an account of our short but glorious Expedition into Saxony. If you think I have not been particular enough in it, you must impute it to the short time you allowed me for drawing it up. You may, however, assure yourself, Sir, that nothing essential is omitted, and that it is above the reach of censure with regard to veracity. A friend communicated to me two manuscripts, which I quote now and then, and which may serve as vouchers to some parts of my narration. One of these is a collection of letters from the King of Prussia, his Minister the Count de Podewils, and Mr. Villiers, Envoy from the Court of London to that of Dresden; they are on the subject of the Negotiations of Peace, which England laboured earnestly to bring about. The other is an apologetic Manifesto, ascribed to the Count de Routowsky; and this piece clearly lays open the mysterious projects of the Courts of Vienna and Dresden against ours, together with their bloody scheme for a winter campaign.

An

*An account of the last CAMPAIGN
in SAXONY, in the year 1745, to
the PEACE of DRESDEN.*

THE King of Prussia had executed the plan he formed in the beginning of the campaign in 1745. After having beat, near Friedberg, the combined army under the command of the Princes of Lorraine and Weissenfels, he had carried the theatre of the war into Bohemia; he had subsisted his army there to the middle of October, and having, to crown his work, gained the famous victory of Soor, he had caused the provinces on the borders of Silesia to be ravaged and ruined, as far as was necessary, to prevent the Prince of Lorraine from taking post there, and disturbing our winter quarters. He therefore proposed to give his troops some rest, and imagined, with reason, that by blocking up the passages, through which the enemy's parties might enter that country, with felled trees, or large posts of infantry, he might quietly wait either for another campaign, or the peace which was then negotiating. His Majesty had the greater reason to expect the latter of these two events, that he knew the Maritime Powers were extremely pressing with the Courts of Vienna and Dresden, to accede to the Convention of Hanover, concluded on the footing of the treaty of Breslau, signed the 26th of August by the Ministers of Great Britain and Prussia; and

and that, on the other hand, the rapid progress of France and Spain, both in Flanders and Italy, scarcely left the Queen of Hungary and her allies room for any other measures.

We therefore decamped from Trautenau the 16th of October, and having, though with difficulty and some little loss, got through the terrible defiles of Schatzlar, we encamped the same day between that town and Liebau. We stayed there only till the 19th, when all the army, excepting a large detachment under the command of Lieutenant General du Moulin, struck their tents, and went into quarters of cantonment, the cavalry on the plains of Schweidnitz and Strigau, and the infantry further on, at the foot of the mountain, after having sent out other detachments towards the town of Hirschberg and Greiffenberg, contiguous to that narrow neck of land, which extends from Bohemia into Silesia and Luface. The King took up his quarters at Ronstoc, near to Friedberg, regulated the winter quarters of the army, and fixed the 10th of November for the day on which every regiment should be allowed to set out to take up their residence for the winter, and keep in readiness to appear again the next spring, in case peace should not be concluded. After this, his Majesty set out for the place of his own residence, leaving the command of the army to Field Marshal Prince Leopold. Lieutenant General Nassau and Major General Hautcharmoi were still with the flying corps in Moravia, and

and took care to keep the large parties of Hungarians from penetrating into and plundering the low country.

The army which had been in Magdebourg, under the command of the Reigning Prince of Anhalt, had separated on the 15th of October. That of the Saxons * near Leipzig had followed their example, but with this difference, however, that the latter could reassemble in eight and forty hours time; while our regiments were so far scattered, that they could not be drawn together in less than eight or ten days †. Prince Charles of Lorraine, after having suffered us to regain our own frontiers, without making any motion with his army, which was encamped in the neighbourhood of Jaromirtz, took care, in the mean time, to spread a report, that he was likewise going into winter quarters; that several regiments had already filed off towards Moravia, others towards the heart of Bohemia, and some to the circles of Bountzlau and Leitmeritz. But Prince Leopold, who did not chuse to be the dupe of this affected tranquillity, spared no pains to find out the real intentions of the Austrian General, and soon discovered, that a considerable body of light troops, supported by a large detachment of regular horse and foot, was advancing towards Bæhmisch-Friedland, and that the army was following, by short marches, in two

* See Routowsky's Memoirs.

† See the same.

columns,

columns, whereof one took nearly the same road, and the other that to Zittau. It was likewise found, that they were making magazines in the two Lufaces, and that a body of ten thousand Austrians, under the command of General Count de Grune, was coming from the army on the Rhine, through Voigtlande; which it was natural to suppose must be designed for some other purpose than that of taking winter-quarters. Therefore, instead of putting the King's army into such quarters, Prince Leopold drew it out of its cantonments, and posted it lower towards the Bober and Queiss, to prevent the enemy, in case he intended to make any attempts on the side of Luface, as it was natural to imagine that he did not make such great preparations without an object of great importance. The Prince sent the King notice of this, and his Majesty, on his side, causing strict enquiry to be made to the Count de Grune's march, learned, that it was directed towards Saxony, with a view to fall from thence directly on Berlin; while, on the other hand, the Prince of Lorraine was to penetrate through Luface towards Sagan and Crossen, to cut off our communication with Brandenburg, and give employment to the Prince of Anhalt, who could not easily oppose this invasion, because his army was too far scattered to be able to reassemble in time*.

Seing, therefore, clearly into the designs of his enemies, the King resolved, without scru-

* See Routowsky's Memoirs.

ple, to act offensively before they were ready. He therefore immediately ordered the Prince of Anhalt to re-assemble his army in the neighbourhood of Halle, and he himself set out from Berlin on the 16th of November, to put himself at the head of his troops in Silesia, which, at the time of his arrival in that country, were in quarters of cantonment along the Bober, between Bountzlau and Lœwenberg.

Immediately upon his arrival, he called in the detachment under Lieutenant General du Moulin, and that under Lieutenant General Bonin, both of which had been posted towards Landshout, Hirschberg, and Greiffenberg, and at the same time ordered the Generals Nassau and Hautcharmoi to fall down from Upper Silesia into the Lower, and cover the frontiers and mountains which the corps abovementioned had quitted. Having afterwards information, that all that he had supposed with regard to the intentions of the enemy, was exactly true, and that they had, moreover, opened several roads for marching an army, not only towards Bountzlau and Sagan, but also towards Crossen and Brandenburg; he set out on the 22d, and arrived about eleven in the morning of the 23d at his rendezvous near Naumbourg on the Queifs. The army was about thirty five thousand strong. We passed this little river the same day about one in the afternoon, the cavalry by the fords, the infantry on bridges, and so entered Saxony. While we were passing,
I the

the light troops of our right came to blows with a body of Uhlans, who quickly retired; but the Hussars of Ziethen and Ruesch, who had passed on the left, found in the village of Catholisch-Hennerdorff three regiments of Saxon horse and a regiment of infantry, who were cantoned there with very little precaution; so that our men, availing themselves of this favourable opportunity, easily put to flight their weak piquets, and entered at one of the ends of the village, in which they made at first some prisoners, and a great deal of booty. But the love of plunder amused the Hussars too long, and gave the Saxons time to form at the other end of the same village, which is a very long one; and accordingly they stood their ground there, and would, in all probability, have retired in good order, and without loss, if the King had not instantly detached ten squadrons of cuirassiers, and two battalions of grenadiers to support the Hussars. Lieutenant General Rochow and Major General Katzler, who commanded these ten squadrons, marched through a troublesome defile, across a wood, and found the enemy's troops in order of battle, with the cavalry on the left, and the infantry on the right, behind a hedge, which hindered our squadrons from advancing up to them, and depriving them of the advantage of having their flank, and the front of their cavalry covered by this hedge. The defile which our men had to pass did not allow them to enter immediately upon action. General Katzler having got through it, with
three

three weakly squadrons of Bornstedt, drew a little to the right, both to get on the left wing of the enemy, and to leave those who were following him room enough to form with advantage on coming out of the defile; but two repeated orders, from Lieutenant General Rochow, obliged him, with the small force he had, to begin the charge immediately and without delay, against six squadrons, each consisting of one hundred and fifty troopers, supported moreover by the fire of their infantry. He advanced against them with all imaginable ardour; but on the one hand the enemy's line extending beyond his on the right, and, on the other, being exposed to a smart fire of musquetry, he was repulsed, and obliged to fall back more than a thousand paces, where he halted, formed a-new his three squadrons, which had suffered very much; and being now reinforced by seven squadrons, which had by this time got out of the defile, he marched a second time against the enemy, whom he broke, and defeated entirely. Then our Hussars went in pursuit of the fugitives, killed a great number of them, and made many prisoners, while Lieutenant General de Rochow was making his dispositions to fall upon the foot, who had by this time drawn up in a hollow square. They at first gave themselves airs of intending to sell their lives dear, but Major General de Polentz arriving, at that instant, with two battalions of grenadiers, and discharging some cannon upon their square, it was put into disorder, and opened, so that our cavalry got into it.

All that were not massacred in the first onset, surrendered at discretion. Besides the advantage of such a good beginning, we took four cannon, three standards, two pair of kettle drums, three pair of colours, a great deal of ammunition, and nine hundred and fourteen prisoners, among whom were Major General Bouchner, Colonel Obyrn, besides twenty six officers. The Saxon regiments in this quarter were, the foot of Saxe-Gotha, and the cavalry of Vitzthoum, Obyrn, and Dallwitz.

The same evening of the 23d the whole army, having entirely passed the Queifs, encamped near Hennerisdorff; and next day, being the twenty-fourth, marched, during a terrible fog, to Troschendorf and Lichtenberg. We found upon the road a vast number of covered waggons belonging to the Austrians and Saxons, all broken to pieces, and the ammunition scattered on the ground. We were also informed by the country people, that the enemy's army was reassembled at Görlitz, with design to give us battle there.

Nevertheless our vanguard, consisting of all the Hussars and some battalions of grenadiers, advanced to that place in the night of the twenty-fourth, and was followed on the twenty-fifth by the cavalry of the right wing, and afterwards by the whole army. We summoned the town, and it surrendered with its garrison, which consisted of three hundred

dred Saxon foot, commanded by a Major and two Captains. We found there good store of forage and provisions, and encamped that day in its neighbourhood.

The enemy's army, instead of waiting for us, made haste to get to the little river of Neisse, with a view to shelter themselves behind it, and dispute the passage of it with us. The King, on his side, not thinking it proper to let them recover from their surprize, caused his troops to continue their march on the 26th, in his way took some small magazines, and upon his arrival on the banks of the Neisse, found that the Austrian General had decamped by stealth, and taken the road to Zittau. His Majesty immediately detached a strong vanguard, consisting of Dragoons, Grenadiers, and Hussars, under the command of Lieutenant General Bonin, and the Major Generals Winterfeld and Kleist, to bring the enemy to a battle, if possible, or else to harraß him in his retreat. The detachment had the good luck to come up with the combined army in the evening, after it had got beyond Zittau, and taken post on the eminence, on the other side, near the road to Gabel. As it was far superior in numbers, and posted to advantage, our people satisfied themselves with pushing their light troops near it, and taking possession, in its sight, of the town and its suburbs, that they might defend themselves therein next day, in case of an attack, and to give the King time to come up with his whole army. But the

I 3 enemy's

LETTER IV.

enemy's troops were too much disgusted for their Generals to make them advance against us. For which reason they thought proper to decamp at two in the morning, and retire to Bohemia, through the defiles of Gabel.

Our detachment, knowing nothing of this till day-break, issued out of the town to retard them in their march, but as they made great haste, and had taken all the precautions usual on such occasions, by putting the best men they had in their rear guard, they were obliged to content themselves with some prisoners, and fifteen hundred waggons, which were mostly plundered by the Saxon and Bohemian peasants of the neighbourhood. However, the loss sustained by the enemy on this occasion was not small. They lost a considerable number of men, by our arms and by desertion. They left there more than half their baggage, and, which was of still greater importance, the whole fruit of an expedition, the preparations for which must have been very expensive. After the taking of Zittau, and the evacuation of Lusatia by the combined army, the King established his head quarters at Görlitz, and without losing sight of the work of peace, with which he wished to crown his labours, he used his utmost endeavours to bring the Court of Dresden into it, either separately or in conjunction with that of Vienna. But these two Courts being less disposed towards peace, and having great expectations from the Count de Grune's

Grune's corps and the Saxon army commanded by the Count Routowsky, made such extravagant proposals, that the King found himself under a necessity of laying aside the Caduceus, and resuming his military operations *.

His Majesty, therefore, having sent orders to the reigning Prince of Anhalt, (who on the twenty third of November had assembled his army, consisting of twenty four thousand men, to begin to act offensively on the side of Leipzig, marched himself, with his troops, towards Boudissin, to be near the Elbe, and to pass it if it should be necessary, when the Prince of Anhalt should be at hand. A vanguard of thirty squadrons of horse and ten of Hussars, with ten battalions of foot, under the command of Lieutenant General Lehwald, marched before, and was to secure the bridge of Meissen, in order to join the Prince as occasion should require, and enable him to make a brisk push. This was the more necessary, as it was certain that the Count de Grune's corps, after having advanced towards the frontiers of Brandenburg, had turned back again after the affair of Hennersdorf, and joined Count Routowsky; and that, on the other hand, Prince Charles of Lorraine, with his main body, marching along the frontiers of Saxony, proposed to come down the Elbe by Peterwalde to reinforce the Saxons, and then fall upon the Prince of Anhalt, to whom all these troops united together would have been vastly superior. The King of Poland, his

* See Routowsky's Memoirs.

Ministers, and Court, seeing their first plan come to nothing, and the means of recovering their affairs very doubtful, had, in the mean time, retired to Prague, and our Monarch, continuing his rout by easy marches, arrived on the banks of the Elbe near Meissen, on the 4th of December.

It will be proper to leave him engaged in this march, and give a particular account of the Prince of Anhalt's operations, from the twenty ninth of November to the fourteenth and fifteenth of December, which gave the finishing stroke to this important affair. That Prince had, according to the King's orders, decamped from Halle in the night of the twenty ninth of November, and marched towards Skeuditz, where General Sybilsky was posted with a large detachment of Uhlans and light horse. Our vanguard dislodged him easily, and at three in the afternoon the whole army came in sight of the famous intrenchment under Leipzig. It was guarded by Lieutenant General Count de Renard, with a number of troops no way proportioned to its extent: for which reason he thought proper to abandon it, in order to save his people, and retreated by the village of Schœnfeld, to get the morass between him and our army. In the night time he intirely left the neighbourhood of Leipzig, and marched to join Count Routowsky, who kept under the cannon of Dresden. The Memoirs ascribed to this Count, which I often quote, find great fault with the resolution

lution taken by Count Renard on this occasion. But, as he has the reputation of a brave and sensible officer, we are morally obliged to think that his reasons were good and urgent, and that an ill-timed obstinacy might have exposed him to the danger of a total defeat.

After his departure there was nothing to hinder the Prince of Anhalt from making himself master of the town of Leipzig, and accordingly he did so. The Magistrates being summoned, did not hesitate a moment about surrendering the town by capitulation, and the Prince, having taken possession of it by four battalions of grenadiers, under the command of Major General Bose, detached, on the first of December, a vanguard, consisting of all his Hussars, and eight squadrons of cavalry, under the command of Major General Bredow, to secure the bridge of Eulenbourg.

On the 3d, the Prince followed with his army, which he put into quarters of cantonment in the neighbourhood of that city.

On the 4th, Lieutenant General Prince Maurice of Anhalt was sent, with four hundred Hussars, to make discoveries about Torgau; he returned towards evening, and reported, that there was a fine magazine at that place, but no troops, excepting three companies of Militia, commanded by a

Major, who guarded the end of the bridge on the other side of the Elbe.

On the 5th, the Prince detached Major General Kalnein, with four battalions of grenadiers, to seize the magazine, and the town of Torgau.

The army arrived on the 6th, and the Saxon Major having surrendered himself and his Militia, with a very good grace, the Prince had the advantage of securing, by this means, a communication with the King's army, as he found the bridge at Torgau in very good condition. He continued there till the tenth, because, being in want of ammunition bread, he was obliged to get a supply for some days baked there.

The King's orders, to move towards Meissen with all expedition, having been repeated, the Prince resumed his march on the eleventh, and that night arrived at Strehlen, from whence he detached, very early on the twelfth, in the morning, General Count de Geisler, with three hundred Hussars, seven squadrons of cavalry, and four battalions of grenadiers, to throw himself into Meissen. General Geisler found the place in the possession of Major General Alembek, with several companies of grenadiers; who having been summoned, returned for answer, that he would send to Dresden, to ask advice of the Council of war. The Prince arriving in the mean time, at the head of his army, refused to

to agree to any delay; and Monsieur Alembeck, perceiving that he was not strong enough, had the complaisance to evacuate the place, without noise, and retire with his men to Dresden; a step which is much blamed in the Memoirs already quoted; because, says that author, a detachment of troops of artillery was actually marching to his relief*. It is certain, that if the garrison had shewn more steadiness, and intirely broken down the bridge, the Prince's junction with the body commanded by General Lehwald must have been thereby obstructed for some days. The Prince of Lorraine, who was making forced marches for that purpose, would have had abundance of time to join Coun. Routowsky, and take measures in concert with him; and the Prince of Anhalt would have been, perhaps, obliged to march back to Torgau, to preserve that place, as the only means he had of communication with the King's army. It is also true, that General Lehwald, having presented himself with his detachment on the other side of the Elbe, some days before the arrival of the Prince, soon saw the impossibility of succeeding on that side; all that he could do was, to take post upon the nearest eminences, and batter the town with some cannon, which had as little success as the repeated summonses he had sent to the Commandant. A palpable proof, that, if the post at Meissen had been saved but for eight and forty hours longer,

* See Routowsky's Memoirs.

our armies must necessarily have contented themselves with the single pass of Torgau, for a communication between them; but the commanding officer having so precipitately abandoned this post, the Prince took possession of it, and having soon repaired the bridge, from which only a few planks had been torn away, immediately brought over the corps commanded by General Lehwald, which enabled him to march in quest of the enemy.

Meantime the cavalry and baggage belonging to his army had halted, on the 12th, in the little plain of Zehren, at the entry into the defile, which begins some hundred paces from the village of the same name. They passed through it on the 13th, and Lieutenant General Sybilsky, who with his light cavalry lay concealed in the mountains of Lommatzsch, observing that the rear-guard was neglected, and that the entry into the defile was not guarded by any infantry, fell upon them, and put them into very great disorder, which occasioned the loss of Lieutenant General Roel's life, and that of a considerable part of the baggage belonging to the officers of the army. The enemy, besides, took a couple of standards, two kettle drums, and made fifty odd dragoons prisoners. The passage of the cavalry at Meissen was not over till late in the night between the thirteenth and fourteenth, and all the infantry marched out of the town that same night, except one single battalion of grenadiers, which took post on the

the eminences of Sieben-Eichen, where all the army, including the body commanded by Lehwald, went to rest for some hours.

On the 14th the army resumed its march, in four columns, and took post near the little village of Röhrsdorf, in order of battle.

Next day, the 15th of December, they continued their march, in four columns, and left the little town of Wildrouff on their left. The vanguard, consisting intirely of Hussars, began to skirmish with Sybilsky's corps at this place, and after marching a full half hour, the enemy's army was observed in order of battle, on the eminences of Bennerick and Kesselsdorff; so that the right wing was before Bennerick, and the left behind Kesselsdorff, which Count Routowsky had lined with seven or eight battalions of Austrian and Saxon grenadiers, and a good many pieces of cannon. All the first line, and the greatest part of the second, that is, from the left wing to the center, consisted of infantry; the remainder of the second line, and the whole of the third was cavalry. The batteries of the front and flanks of Kesselsdorff were supported on the right by twelve squadrons of dragoons, and on the left by Sybilsky's corps and some companies of grenadiers, posted in the gullies and hollow ways. The left wing began behind that village, extending towards that of Zœlmen, it was also covered by another large battery; the center behind Zœlmen had before its front a morass
and

and two batteries. The right, before the village of Bennebeck, was fortified with a battery and the little valley of Ztschon, which rendered it almost impossible to come at it. A little higher on the right, between the villages of Ockerwitz and Brisewitz, was posted the body under the command of the Count de Grune, excepting two regiments of horse, viz. those of Bentheim and Hohenzollern, which made the right wing of the second line of the Saxons.

The Prince of Anhalt having examined the position of the enemy's army, determined to make his attack on the left, thinking himself very sure of victory, if he could make himself master of the post at Kesselsdorf, and by that means get at the enemy's flank. In consequence of this design, he drew his army up in such a manner, that the right of his cavalry reached beyond the front of the village, between Prince's Road and the wood called the Lerchenbusch. All his infantry made up two lines between this little wood and the great birch tree on the road to Wilsdrouff; and all the cavalry of his left filled the space between the road and the village of Roetsch, thereby fronting the whole length of the Saxon army, without regarding the Count de Grune's corps, which, by taking an inaccessible post, was so covered with hollow ways, morasses, and defiles, that it was impossible for him to get out of it, if he moved directly forward. It was then about two in the afternoon, and the shortness of the day

day not allowing time for unnecessary arrangements, the Prince made haste to attack the village with three battalions of grenadiers, under the command of Major General Hertzberg, followed by three battalions of the regiment of Anhalt, and supported by five squadrons of Bonin's regiment of dragoons, as the latter were, in their turn, by five squadrons of Stille's Cuirassiers. They marched up like brave fellows; but the fire of thirty pieces of cannon, well served, and that of seven battalions of grenadiers, with which the village was lined, made such havock, that they were forced to move a little to the right, that the whole body might not be sacrificed at one blow. They resumed, however, the same attack, but it was still unfortunate; which emboldened the enemy's grenadiers to sally out, that they might attack the assailants to better purpose, or perhaps to seize their field-pieces. Be this as it may, this sally proved their ruin and our preservation. For the Prince having ordered Bonin's dragoons to attack these grenadiers at full speed, they soon got the better of them, overthrew them, entered with them pell-mell into the village, and there made a most dreadful slaughter; while some battalions made themselves masters of the batteries, and of that whole post; and Stille's regiment of Cuirassiers, leaving Kesselsdorf on the right, drove out all the horse and foot that were in the defiles and on the eminences, and got to the flank of their army.

Mean-

Meantime our whole front advanced, and the battle became almost general. The right wing of our infantry got beyond the village and its neighbourhood, pushed those regiments of the enemy that were before it, and threw the whole of their two lines into confusion, especially as the cavalry of this same right wing had not only gained the enemy's flank, but also got upon their rear, having met with little resistance from most of their squadrons, which at the first charge gave way, and took to their heels. This motion was accompanied with that of the center and the left wing: from the latter some battalions were detached, which took post near Zœlmen, and maintained it, notwithstanding the disadvantage of the ground, and the terrible fire of the Saxon artillery upon their flanks. A little after, the whole line advanced across the morasses between Kesselsdorf, Zœlmen, and Bennerick, attacked the enemy's center and right wing, and put them to flight without much resistance; their left wing being already intirely routed. There still remained fifty squadrons on the eminences behind Zœlmen, which might have done some mischief, if they had fallen upon our battalions, who, having passed the hollow ways behind the village in a hurry, and without rallying, were advancing up these eminences in straggling parties. But the fire, though irregular, which they made during their rapid march toward this body of horse, disconcerted the latter so much, that they turned their backs, and
thought

thought of nothing but saving their lives: whilst the body commanded by the Count de Grune, who had hitherto been idle spectators, retired in the same manner, and encreased the number of runaways. Thus the defeat of the enemy was compleat. We had the honour of the day, the field of battle, a numerous artillery, and some thousands of prisoners, among whom were reckoned four Generals, and a great many officers of all ranks.

The cavalry of our left, during almost the whole affair, was quite inactive, on account of the valley of Zitschon, which lay before it, and was quite impracticable. They were obliged to wait till the infantry had cut out a passage towards Zœlmen; then they wheeled and filed off through that passage, so that when they got to the other side of the morass, the affair was nearly over, and, by pursuing the enemy beyond Bennerick, they got only a few prisoners who surrendered of their own accord.

It is very certain, and even acknowledged by our enemies, that if the day had not failed us, or if all our cavalry could have got up in time, the Saxon army would have run the hazard of being totally destroyed. But it is very probable, on the other hand, that if the grenadiers posted at Kesselsdorf had been satisfied with standing their ground there, and had not sallied out unseasonably, this battle would have cost us a vast number
of

of men, perhaps without success, nay, with very disagreeable consequences*.

Let me now say a word or two of the Prince of Lorraine and his army, which we have seen take refuge in Bohemia after the evacuation of Luface. This General had made forced marches through the circle of Leutmeritz, and was come down again into Saxony, by Auffig and Peterfwalde. His vanguard, under the command of Prince Lobkowitz, arrived on the thirteenth of December at Dresden, and Prince Charles himself on the fourteenth. Yet when the battle was fought, he was but a mere spectator, and satisfied himself with keeping his troops under arms till the conclusion of it, though the whole passed in a manner under his eye. This affair has been talked of differently: but of all the reasons that have been assigned for his conduct, that which I had from a Saxon officer, who was our prisoner, appears to me the most probable. He says, that the Prince of Lorraine, when pressed by the Duke of Weissenfels to join Count Routowsky, took him aside, and owned plainly, that all his army did not amount to eighteen thousand men, and even these very much discouraged by the distresses they had undergone, and that therefore, in case affairs should take a bad turn, which he had reason to apprehend, he should not have men enough to defend the defiles that lead to Prague.

* See Routowsky's Memoirs.

The thing in itself appears natural enough; but whether or no such an excuse could be satisfactory to an ally, who was thereby made a sacrifice, is what I cannot pretend to say.

Let us now return to the consequences of the victory. The King arrived with his infantry in the neighbourhood of Meissen, on the night of the fourteenth, entered that town on the fifteenth, and at the same time ordered his cavalry to draw near, in order to their passing the Elbe, early in the morning of the sixteenth. As there was but one bridge, and this circumstance, together with the defiles on the other side of the town, greatly retarded the passage, his Majesty set out before with his infantry the same day, and cantoned them at Wildrouff, and the places near it. Next night the cavalry had intirely passed the river, and the whole army had orders to assemble on the seventeenth, at break of day, on the eminences of Kesselsdorf and Bennerick, beyond the field of battle, to support the Prince of Anhalt, in case the armies under the Prince of Lorraine and Count Routowsky joined together, should think of taking their revenge, as it was said they intended. But hearing, a few hours after, that they had thought proper to retreat, as far as the mountains between Pirna and Dippoldswalde, the King turned off towards Dresden, ordered that capital to be summoned, and obtained it by capitulation, with the whole arsenal, the garrison, and a great number of officers, who had thrown themselves into it after the unfortunate

unfortunate battle of Kesselsdorf. It is certain, that the officers made prisoners there were then counted by hundreds.

On the 18th, 19th, and following days, the King sent out several detachments towards Freyberg, and other towns of the mountainous circle, called Ertzgebürgische-Creis, to prevent the enemy's establishing his quarters there, which, in fact, obliged him to quit Saxony intirely, and shut himself up in Bohemia. It was then very natural, that the two Court of Vienna and Dresden, seeing the hopes they had reposed in their armies quite ruined, should endeavour to extricate themselves out of their embarrassment by other means. Agreeably thereto, the English Minister at the Court of Dresden renewed the negociations, and finding in the King of Prussia's mind a generous disposition to extinguish all violent sentiments of revenge, the affair was soon put in a good way, and happily completed. On the twenty-sixth of December the Peace was concluded at Dresden, by the Plenipotentiaries of the three Courts, on the footing of the convention of Hanover and the Treaty of Breslau. The respective Ratifications having been exchanged by the several parties, our army evacuated Saxony, and the King, covered with glory, returned to Berlin.

This Monarch had, during the course of the war, more than once overcome his enemies in pitched battles, and had so skilfully accom-

accommodated each successive operation to the general plan he had proposed to himself, that by preventing, on all occasions, the designs of his enemies, he had forced them at last, to sue for a Peace, which they had often rejected with disdain.

I shall not give you a list of our killed and wounded during this expedition; it is well known we left behind us a great many brave men: but I cannot help adding, by the bye, a word or two by way of reflection on this memorable event.

The design of our enemies to carry the war into the heart of the King's dominions, was well planned, and could not have failed to disorder our affairs greatly, if it had succeeded. For this purpose it was necessary, on their part, to expedite the execution of their projects, and begin to act before the Prince of Anhalt's army could be reassembled. The Memorial ascribed to Count Routowsky, but disowned by the Court of Dresden, pretends that this was their plan, and that it was changed purely out of regard to the Court of Petersburg, which would not agree to an irruption into the hereditary provinces of the house of Brandenburg; but, by way of amends, gave up Silesia, as being the King's late conquest, to the secular arm, as the said Memorial expresses it. Let us suppose then that this Memorial speaks truth, as indeed there is a great probability that it does, and let us see whether the two courts
were

were in the right to alter their plans without at the same time dropping their enterprize. They had let slip the favourable and critical moment. As soon as it ceased to be in their power to attack us, either by Magdebourg, or at a time when we were not quite prepared for them, the face of affairs was quite changed. Austria had not forces sufficient to shut us up in Silesia, or entirely cut off our communication with Brandenburg; and Saxony was absolutely exposed to the danger of seeing the theatre of war fixed in her own dominions. To pretend, on their side, that the King of Prussia would use the same precautions with regard to Russia that they did, was to suppose him as void of understanding as good conduct. For besides the different procedure on both sides, their's being entirely offensive, it was never heard that a sovereign Prince, out of mere respect to a neutral Court, chose rather to let his enemies set their foot upon his neck, and sack his dominions, than endeavour speedily to prevent those evils, and make them fall upon those, who threatned him therewith.

This, in fact, was exactly the King's case; if he had kept upon the defensive in Silesia and in Magdebourg, however vigorous that defence might have been, the Austrians would have plied him on one side, and the Saxons on the other, while the Count de Grune, with his ten thousand men, would have fallen upon Brandenburg, at that time divested of troops, made himself master of the capital, and

and intirely ruined all the low country; whereas, if the King determined, as he actually did, and as it was, indeed, the only measure left him to take, to attack his enemies on both sides, and in their own country, he kept them out of his dominions, cut off the Count de Grune's communication, in case he continued to advance, and might with his victorious arms, oblige the powers at war with him to agree to an accommodation.


All this was so natural, that it might, and should have been foreseen; whence I infer, that the King of Prussia had no other resource but that of acting as he did; and, on the contrary, that the two allied Courts did not consult their true interest, when, after their first plan proved abortive, they continued to act with the same views, without having the same means in their power. The event has sufficiently proved this. It signifies nothing to say, that fortune favoured us in every thing. We do not deny it, in general; but I do not include in the number of fortunate hits, the getting possession of the enemy's quarters at Catholisch-Hennerdorff, nor the confusion into which we put Prince Charles's army, nor his evacuation of Lusace, nor his retreat into Bohemia, to which he was forced against his will, nor the irruption of the Prince of Anhalt on the side of Leipzig, nor his march, nor ours to the Elbe. All that could be ascribed to the caprice of fortune is the battle of Kesselsdorff, but that
con-

contributed little or nothing to the sum and substance of our affairs. For setting aside this victory, we had before established ourselves sufficiently in Saxony, not to be in pain about our own provinces, and that blow, though decisive, properly did no more than shorten the campaign and the war, the end of which, to speak according to the manner of men, and the connection of circumstances, could not but turn out to our advantage.

I wish the reading of this relation may give you as much pleasure, as this opportunity of obeying your commands hath given me.

From Berlin, March
20, 1746.

I am, &c.



F I N I S.

